

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD392344	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	UNCLASSIFIED
FROM:	SECRET
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 31 AUG 1968. Other requests shall be referred to United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, APO San Francisco, CA.	
AUTHORITY	
AGC D/A Ltr 6 Feb 1976 ; AGC D/A Ltr 6 Feb 1976	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AD 392344

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO: UNCLASSIFIED
FROM: SECRET
AUTHORITY: AGC, D/A Ltr,

6 Feb. 76

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

SECURITY

MARKING


The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT DOCUMENT
RELEASABLE TO RVN ONLY BY
AUTHORITY OF COMUSMACV,
21 AUGUST 68.

January-June 1968

AD392344

FOR GRAM REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM

**DDC
RECEIVED
SEP 12 1968
D**

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."



**FOR
RVNAF
PROGRESS**

**GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED**

**DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10**

**DDC CONTROL
NO. 80599**

**COPY [REDACTED] COPIES
AG CONTROL NUMBER 001136-68**

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



STATEMENT #2 CLASSIFIED

In addition to security requirements which must be met, this document is subject to special export controls and each transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may be made only with prior approval of -----

MACJ341

31 AUG 1968

SUBJECT: Program Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The Program Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress is designed to measure the effectiveness of MACV plans and procedures (programs) developed to assist JGS in improving the effectiveness of RVNAF.
2. A status of the results of the various programs contained within this system is published on a semi-annual basis. Highlights of exceptional performances and of significant shortfalls are extracted from the detailed section of the report and presented in Section I.
3. This is the third report and covers the period 1 January through 30 June 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Rpt, Prog Review and Anal
Sys, RVNAF Progress

R. F. Tuckey
R. F. TUCKEY
Major, USA
Asst AG

DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
INCLOSURE

DDC CONTROL
NO. 88509

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
EXCEPT DOCUMENT RELEASABLE TO RVN
ONLY BY AUTHORITY OF COMUSMACV,
21 Aug 68

AG CONTROL NUMBER 001136-68

SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>SECTION I - HIGHLIGHTS & SHORTFALLS</u>	
GENERAL	6
OVERALL EVALUATION	6
EXCEPTIONAL PROGRESS.....	6
MAJOR SHORTFALLS	8
MINOR SHORTFALLS	9
<u>SECTION II - ACTIVE PROGRAMS</u>	
<u>RVNAF</u> (excluding Air Force, Navy, Marines, Airborne)	<u>ACTIVITY</u> <u>DIRECTOR</u> <u>PAGE</u>
Aeromedical Evacuation.....	MACMD..... 12
ARVN Transportation Improvement.....	MACJ4..... 13
Conversion of CIDG Camp to RF.....	MACJ3..... 16
Conversion of Special Forces Camps to LLDB (VNSF)...5th SFG.....	17
Designation of Medical Facilities.....	MACMD..... 21
English Language Improvement Program.....	MACMA..... 23
Equipment Shortages (TOE).....	MACJ4..... 27
Financial and Procurement Self-Sufficiency of RVNAF Technical Services.....	MACJ4..... 29
Financial Management.....	MACCO..... 31
Hospital and Field Medical Supply.....	MACMD..... 35
Improvement of RVNAF PSYOPS.....	MACPD..... 36
Improvement of RVNAF QM National Inventory Control Center and Base Depots.....	MACJ4..... 38
Improvement of RVNAF Serviceman Subsistence.....	MACJ4..... 41

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>ACTIVITY DIRECTOR</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Inspection of RF/PF Activities.....	CORDS	43
Inspector General System.....	MACIG	49
Medical Depot Operation Improvement.....	MACJ4	54
Medical Service Force Structure.....	MACMD	56
Military Telecommunications Network, Vietnam.....	MACJ6	58
Off-Shore Schooling for VN Judge Advocate Officers..	MACJA	60
Maintenance Improvement.....	MACJ4	61
RDT&E Capability.....	ARPA	67
RVNAF Communication Security Unit.....	MACJ2	73
RVNAF Clothing Production.....	MACJ4	74
RVNAF Food Service Program.....	MACJ4	76
RVNAF Force Structure and Organization (Includes equipment modernization programming).....	MACMA	77
RVNAF Graves Registraton Service.....	MACJ4	85
RVNAF Military Police.....	MACJ1	86
RVNAF Personnel Programs.....	MACJ1	90
RVNAF Procurement.....	MACJ4	97
RVNAF Strength.....	MACJ1	98
RVNAF Supply Procedures.....	MACJ4	104
RVNAF Training.....	MACT	110
National Defense College.....		110
Vietnamese Military Academy.....		110
Command and Staff College		111
NCO Academy.....		112
Infantry School.....		112
Junior Military Academy.....		113

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>ACTIVITY DIRECTOR</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Armor School.....		113
Armed Forces Language School.....		114
Artillery School.....		114
Military Dog Training Center.....		115
Band School.....		115
Training Material Translation.....		116
Off-Shore Training.....		116
ARVN, RF and PF Training Base.....		118
Utilization of Division Training Center.....		120
Utilization of PF Training Centers.....		121
Inplace Training.....		123
Training of ARVN and RF in Support of RD.....		125
Battalion Retraining Program.....		127
ARVN Infantry Company Training.....		128
ARVN Regimental Recon Company Training.....		129
RF Company Training.....		131
Recruit Training.....		133
Individual Training - ARVN Reserve NCO Training Course.....		135
Officer Candidate Preparatory Training.....		136
RF NCO Refresher Training.....		137
ARVN Interpreter Preparatory Course.....		138
Individual Training.....		139
National Training Centers.....		143
Phu Cat Regional Force Training Center.....		150
Duc My Ranger Training Center.....		151
Trung Hoa Training Center.....		152
Cao Lanh Regional Force Training Center.....		154
POIs Used at CTC Controlled Training Centers.....		156
Ranger Training.....		157
Ranger Personnel.....		158
Technical Services Training (Ordnance).....	MACJ4	159
Training and Equipment Assistance to RVN, Military Security Service (MSS).....	MACJ2	161
Training of Medical Service Personnel.....	MACMD	163

AIRBORNE

SA,ABN

Accuracy of Strength Reports.....	167
Airborne Division Hospital.....	169
Airborne Division Training.....	171
Dependent Housing.....	179
Desertion Rate.....	182

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>ACTIVITY DIRECTOR</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Education for Dependent Children.....		184
Expansion of the Airborne Division		186
Maintenance and Use of Military Assistance Program Supported Equipment.....		191
Modernization of the Airborne Division.....		193
Troop Billets		196
Widows Aid.....		199
<u>NAVY</u>	CH, NAV ADV GP	
Counter Sea Infiltration and Counter-coastal Transshipment Operations.....		201
Creation of Salvage Capability.....		203
Increased VNN Participation in River Assault and River Patrol Operations.....		205
LDNN Utilization in UDT and SEAL Operations with RVNAF.....		207
Logistics Support in the VNN.....		209
Management Improvement in the VNN Shipyard.....		213
Training.....		217
Viable Leadership Program for the VNN.....		219
<u>MARINES</u>	SA, VNMC	
VNMC Construction.....		222
VNMC Medical Support.....		224
VNMC Training.....		226
<u>AIR FORCE</u>	CH, AF ADV GP	
Aircraft Maintenance Self-Sufficiency		230

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>ACTIVITY DIRECTOR</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Air Munitions Supply Improvement.....		236
Fuels Operation Improvement.....		239
Improvement of VNAF Aircraft.....		241
Supply Support Improvement.....		244
Vehicle Management and Maintenance Improvement.....		246
VNAF Air Liaison Officer Support of ARVN.....		249
VNAF Communications and Electronics Facilities.....		252
VNAF Modernization Program.....		259
VNAF Training.....		261

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECTION I - HIGHLIGHTS AND SHORTFALLS

1. (U) GENERAL: The Program Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress was established on 24 May 67. As originally published, there were 44 sub-programs submitted by 14 major activity directors. Presently there are 67 sub-programs. These programs provide the means to evaluate the status and conduct of MACV activities designed to improve or assist RVNAF. The results of the third semiannual Review and Analysis of RVNAF Progress are contained in Section II of this document and cover the period 1 Jan - 30 Jun 68.

2. (C) OVERALL EVALUATION: Many programs were disrupted or delayed as a result of the TET offensive. Emphasis and resources were diverted from long range programs to immediate operational problems. Most training programs were temporarily stopped. The reflex of the majority of the programs following the TET offensive showed renewed vigor which subsequently resulted in accelerated progress toward achievement of the predetermined goals. Recently approved RVNAF modernization, expansion and improvement plans are reflected in the current status and projection of the applicable programs. Manpower for expansion is ahead of schedule; major constraints now, and for the months ahead, will be the non-availability of hardware and a general shortage of qualified and skilled personnel. The projection of most programs indicates favorable progress at year-end.

3. (S) EXCEPTIONAL PROGRESS: The following extracts from the sub-programs in Section II represent significant achievements. Progress summaries of programs that are near or on schedule are contained in each of the sub-program statements in Section II.

a. Development of the RVNAF Force Structure and Organization: The accelerated expansion of RVNAF strength resulted in a significant increase of over 120,000 since 1 Jan 68. The implementation of the GVN mobilization plan indicates that the GVN is determined to improve and expand RVNAF, and thus assume a greater share of the burden of the war. (Page 77.)

b. Transportation Improvement: The goal of reducing the quantity of cargo awaiting sealift shipment by increasing the logistical sealift capability has been achieved. Since 1 Mar 68 there has been no backlog of cargo awaiting shipment. (Page 14.)

c. Airborne Division Training: Following the TET offensive there was a high influx of volunteers for the Airborne Division. Recruiting goals have been substantially exceeded. Airborne recruit basic trainees have increased from 1195 to 2621 since the last report. Influx of the large number of recruits has not degraded the combat effectiveness of the airborne battalions. (Page 177.)

d. Expansion of the Airborne Division: A ninth airborne battalion, designated the 11th Airborne Battalion, was organized, trained and equipped by 1 Feb 68, and committed to combat during the TET offensive. (Page 186.)

SECRET

SECRET

e. VN Naval Leadership: The effects of the emphasis on leadership are reflected in increased effectiveness of Vietnamese Navy units in both the demonstration of more dynamic performance and in the assumption of greater operational responsibility by Vietnamese Naval Commands. (Page 219.)

f. RVNAF Training:

(1) The National Defense College began its first class on 6 May 68 with 20 students (12 Army, two Air Force, one Navy and five career government civilians). The faculty and students are of high caliber and are establishing an excellent initial reputation for the college. The National Defense College has received high level support and interest from the Vietnamese government and military establishment. It will prove to be a valuable addition to the Vietnamese national military education system. (Page 110.)

(2) The new Officer Candidate preparatory training started during the 2d Qtr CY68. As a result of increased draft calls, sufficient manpower was available to fill both OCS and NCO course quotas with holders of Baccalaureate I and II degrees. A new nine-week basic training course for all officer and NCO candidates was begun at Quang Trung Training Center. During this training the top 1,000 graduates are picked by tests and sent upon graduation to the Thu Duc OCS course. The remainder are sent to the NCO Academy for the NCO course. This method of selection results in better student motivation and a higher quality of officer candidates. (Page 136.)

g. Improvement of RVNAF General Political Warfare Department: Improvement throughout the General Political Warfare Department is a direct result of command emphasis and the increasing awareness of the practical value of political warfare activities within the RVNAF. (Page 36.)

h. VNAF Modernization Program: One C-47 squadron was converted to C-119 aircraft which doubled the airlift capacity of that unit. (Page 259.)

i. RVNAF Inspector General System: Inspection techniques showed marked improvement as inspectors placed less emphasis on briefings and increased reliance on on-site inspections. (Page 49.)

j. RVNAF Financial Management: The effectiveness of the Ministry of National Defense Disbursing Center's emphasis on audit control programs and training has caused significant progress in detecting and preventing corruption, fraud and misuse of government funds. (Page 31.)

k. RVNAF Graves Registration Service: Significant progress in the capability of the RVNAF graves registration service was attained. Continued improvement can be expected as programmed equipment continues to arrive and the training and experience of personnel increases. (Page 85.)

SECRET

SECRET

3. (S) MAJOR SHORTFALLS: The following extracts from the sub-programs in Section II represent major short falls or problem areas that require command attention.

a. RVNAF Personnel Programs: The overall officer and NCO assigned strength compares favorably with the total authorized strength. However, there is an imbalance between the numbers of junior and senior officers and NCOs. The rapid expansion of the armed forces and the essentially peacetime promotion system, which requires a minimum of two years in grade before consideration for regular promotion, have been the major causes of this imbalance. To improve grade imbalances JGS must reduce time in grade requirements and liberalize and expand special promotions in order to reduce shortages in the higher NCO and officer grades. (Page 91.)

b. RVNAF Strength: Desertions remain the major drain on the manpower of RVNAF. The sharp increase in the desertion rate following the TET offensive has shown no significant downward trend. Accordingly, MACV/GVN have established desertion prevention and control as a priority effort. (Page 100.)

c. Vietnamese Navy Shipyard Manpower: The quality of shipyard work continues to improve but the depletion of skilled personnel has seriously curtailed the productive capabilities of the shipyard. Delays in overhaul and repair are keeping ships off the line. Imbalances in pay scales cause the skilled workers to seek more lucrative employment elsewhere. Action at JGS/GVN level is required to reverse the productivity trends of the shipyard and repair facilities as a result of skilled manpower shortages. (Page 213.)

d. RVNAF Training: In-place training ceased in all four Corps Tactical Zones because of the TET offensive. Resumption of training after the TET offensive was extremely slow. On 9 Apr CTC/JGS directed Corps/Divisions and Sectors to resume in-place training. On 26 Apr MACV sent a message to Corps Senior Advisors directing that they take immediate action with their counterparts to establish an effective in-place training program for RF/PF. Inspections during the period indicate emphasis is still lacking on in-place training. (Page 123.)

e. Modernization of RVNAF: Equipment and material requirements fall well below authorized levels. The modernization items required for the FY 68 force structure have been approved for programming and JCS is taking action to expedite delivery. The full conversion of a C-47 squadron to an AC-47 squadron is delayed due to the non-availability of modification kits. Expected delivery of kits is now Apr 69. (Page 259.)

f. Organizing and Equipping a Support/Supply Company in the Airborne Division: Organization has proceeded as programmed, however, initial shortages of equipment exist which constrain the readiness and effectiveness of the company. (Page 187.)

SECRET

(g) ARVN Dependent Housing: Dependent housing has previously been reported as unsatisfactory and is getting worse with increased mobilization. Requests for resources to improve this situation have been denied because of budgeting constraints by GVN. Limited priority resources for housing have been directed toward Hoi Chanhs, refugees and RF/PF families. (Page 179.)

4. (C) MINOR SHORTFALLS: The following extracts from the sub-programs in Section II represent minor shortfalls or problem areas of lesser significance but worthy of command attention.

a. Inspection of RF/PF Activities: Phase III for increasing the capacity of PF training centers is still in the planning stage. Command emphasis is required to insure that their capacity is increased by no later than the end of CY68. (Page 43.)

b. Conversion of Selected Special Forces Camps to LLBD (Vietnamese Special Forces): A lack of qualified Vietnamese Special Forces personnel continues to be the most critical obstacle of the transfer program. Consideration should be given to establishing an in-country equivalent to the JFK Special Warfare Center sending selected VNSF personnel to CONUS for special forces training in administration, logistics and communications. (Page 17.)

c. RVNAF Training:

(1) The construction of expanded facilities for the Vietnamese Military Academy fell behind schedule. The design of new buildings progressed satisfactorily but construction did not start on schedule. Construction bids on the new academic building could have been let on 15 May. However, the request for release of 550,000,000\$VN of the programmed 800,000,000\$VN has been at the Office of the Prime Minister, RVN, waiting for approval since late May. These funds are Joint Support Credits and cannot be used for other purposes. However, the National Assembly does not want any large sum of money spent until completion of a budget review. Estimated date for earliest completion of this review is Sep 68. (Page 110.)

(2) A total of 55 old RF companies were programmed for retraining, but only 21 were actually trained. This shortfall of 33 during the first six months was caused by retention of the companies by military sectors for operational missions. (Page 131.)

d. Conversion of CIDG Camps to RF: The conversion of CIDG companies to RF has not progressed in accordance with the CY68 plans due primarily to the enemy situation and the changing tactical situation. Field commanders have been urged to analyze continuously the existing camps with a view toward conversion to RF as soon as situations permit. (Page 16.)

e. Military Telecommunications Network, Vietnam (MTN-V): The TET offensive caused significant delays in the upgrading, expansion and training of personnel in the military telecommunications program. (Page 58.)

SECRET

SECRET

f. Improvement of RVNAF QM National Inventory Control Center (NICC) and Base Depots: The project for establishing a self-sufficient electrical accounting machine operation has been curtailed because of the lack of qualified personnel trained for this operation. (Page 38.)

g. Improvement of Status of the RVNAF Serviceman: The attainment of the goal of 220 commissary outlets has been delayed by the TET and May offensives. In addition the fluidity of the tactical situation prohibits establishment of an actual time frame for completion. With continued command emphasis the goal will be reached as soon as circumstances permit. (Page 41.)

h. Maintenance Improvement: There has been some improvement in the overall maintenance program of RVNAF; however, a significant limiting factor is the lack of qualified personnel available for training. Continued command emphasis will be required and a comprehensive OJT program must be developed throughout the RVNAF to attain desired proficiency. (Page 61.)

i. Training Requirement for VNAF Modernization and Expansion Program: In-country English Language Training of selected flying and maintenance personnel is programmed to precede CONUS training. In-country language training will be delayed due to non-availability of school facilities. (Page 265.)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION II - ACTIVE PROGRAMS

FORMAT

The format used in this Section is as follows:

Statement of Objective: Statement of quantity to be accomplished for the period covered, and/or the quality of performance programmed for the period.

a. Review of Progress: Statement of actual accomplishments achieved toward the objective in terms of quantity and/or quality.

b. Analysis of Progress: Statements of evaluation of performance in terms of efficiency or accomplishments in terms of quantity, timeliness and quality.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Comparison with previous data and indications for the remainder of the calendar year.

d. Corrective Actions: Analysis of corrective actions taken or to be taken and results obtained or to be obtained.

e. Projection: Analysis of projection or future trend.

NOTE: (Items not applicable are omitted).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Advisory Division

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Aeromedical Evacuation

(U) **Statement of Objectives:** To develop an inter-hospital aeromedical evacuation system for the RVNAF.

a. **Review of Progress:** Procedures for processing aeromedical evacuation requests have been established for each Corps Tactical Zone and for inter-corps evacuations.

b. **Analysis of Progress:**

(1) **Deficiencies in accomplishments:** Two problems inhibit implementation of an effective aeromedical evacuation system: lack of adequate communications and aircraft. Some improvement in communication has been realized through better teletype and telephone systems. The required radio capability is under study at this time. RAAF aircraft are being used to the extent possible but primary reliance is placed on US capability.

(2) **Critical Problems:** Sufficient aircraft are not available for aeromedical evacuation and this function is not assigned a high priority.

(3) **Lack of resources:** Same as b(1) and (2) above.

c. **Conclusions and/or trends:**

(1) **Trends:** During the report period, the trend has been toward greater use of US aircraft. Well over 50% of all missions were flown by the US.

(2) **Corrective Action:** The VNAF has been requested to furnish one section of helicopters (6) to each CTZ. However, no forecast can be made as to availability of these aircraft.

(3) **Projection:** Reliance on US aircraft may be expected to continue until the VNAF attains this capability.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Command Surgeon

PAGE 12 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Transportation Improvement

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: To improve the ARVN Transportation System

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Establishment of a single agency to manage logistical movements by all modes of transportation.

Goal: Continued advisory emphasis be directed to the RVNAF Joint General Staff to organize an integrated transportation system under a single central agency.

Analysis of Progress: Strong advisory effort is continuing to be placed on this element. As a result an RVNAF, JGS study group was formed in June of 1968 to explore the feasibility of establishing an agency resembling the Traffic Management Agency (TMA) of MACV. No formal recommendations have been submitted. However, transportation advisory personnel have been told informally that the TMA concept is not receiving favorable consideration due to the additional personnel that would be required and the necessity for a complete new communications network. The study group is presently considering transferring the control of logistics airlift from the Central Logistics Command (CLC) staff to the Directorate of Defense Transportation (DDT). DDT manages all surface movements with a field organization and communications system. This system can be readily expanded to include the airlift capability with negligible personnel increase. Such a move would provide the centralized control envisioned by this element.

2. (C) Element: Increase the capabilities of ARVN terminal service organizations.

Goal: Improve the capability of ARVN terminal service units through advisory assistance and increased utilization of existing lighterage, truck, and stevedore resources.

Analysis for Progress: Considerable progress has been made in the improvement of the utilization of existing resources in the Saigon area. During fiscal year 1968 no appreciable increase in ARVN terminal service personnel or equipment assets have been realized; however, the following statistics indicate the improvement in the management of this capability. In the Saigon Transportation Terminal Command (STTC) alone a significant favorable trend has developed in that tonnages discharged by ARVN have

CONFIDENTIAL

gradually increased from a rate of 9,000 metric tons in July of 1967 to 19,000 metric tons in November 1967 (the highest monthly tonnage discharged in 1967) to 46,000 metric tons in June of 1968. The average for all ports increased from 20,000 metric tons discharged in July of 1967 to 66,000 metric tons in June of 1968. Despite the improvement serious problems exist at the ports of Can Tho and An Thoi (Phu Quoc Island). The problems at Can Tho port during FY68 resulted from inadequate ARVN terminal service management, a low depot reception capability and marginal port facilities. Improvements are being effected at Can Tho port through a change in command at the ARVN Terminal Service Company, an increase in the material handling equipment at the field depots, and the construction of a US port facility (initially used in June 1968) which will relieve congestion at the ARVN discharge site. The problems at An Thoi are the absence of an assumption of responsibility and an inadequate port facility. Recent directives issued by CLC which were implemented by III Area Logistical Command (ALC) should eliminate the former problem. US engineer support is planned for the development of an acceptable port facility during FY69.

3. (C) Element: Proper distribution of transportation organizations.

Goal: Command emphasis on the proper distribution of transportation organizations.

Analysis of Progress: The transportation capability in the RVNAF Area Logistical Commands is still not adequate to meet the requirements of the logistical system. However, the distribution of the available transportation assets is such as to accomplish the maximum movement practiceable. The changing complexion of the war since the TET Offensive has radically changed transportation requirements. Command emphasis has responded to these changes as reflected in planning for transportation force structure increases. Providing the current recommendations for transportation force structure increases are approved, adequate assets should be available to meet anticipated movement requirements. The planned DODT distribution of these increases will provide for a transportation capability balanced against requirements and taking advantage of the inland waterway network.

4. (C) Element: Increase the development of sealift capability for logistical lift.

Goal:

a. Reduce the quantity of cargo awaiting sealift shipment by increasing the logistical lift capability.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Increase utilization of commercial transportation services.

c. Analysis of Progress:

(1) During the past year the RVNAF sealift capability has increased to the point that this element no longer requires consideration.

(2) The goal of reducing the quantity of cargo awaiting shipment by increasing the logistical sealift capability has been achieved. The progress in the reduction of cargo can best be measured within the port of Saigon. At the beginning of FY68 over 3,000 metric tons of cargo booked for more than 45 days were scheduled for shipment to ports north of Saigon. This tonnage has been reduced progressively. On 1 January 1968 there was a backlog of 707 metric tons of cargo; since 1 March 1968 there has been no backlog.

(3) The goal of increasing utilization of commercial transportation services has been achieved to the extent that the US sealift capability to ports north of Saigon is used only to lift vehicles, which will not fit efficiently aboard commercial coasters. Since 1 April 1968 2,800 metric tons of ammunition have been shipped north of Saigon by commercial coasters. In comparison, during 1967 no ammunition was transported aboard commercial vessels.

5. (C) Element: Increase secure lines of rail and highway communications.

Goal: Continued tactical operations to maintain secure lines of communications.

Analysis of Progress: Continuing efforts are being made by ARVN transportation personnel and their advisors to increase the use of highway lines of communication. Daily armed convoys are operated between Saigon and Can Tho, up from two per week prior to the TET Offensive. Convoy operations are also expanding in the Area Logistic Commands (ALCs) with daily operations, occurring in I, II and III ALCs. Significant in this area has been the initiation of joint US/ARVN convoys in the I, II and III ALCs. However, little progress has been made toward securing roads to remote units and roads within V ALC. Roads in these areas require major clearing operations so are used infrequently, if at all. No progress has been made in securing additional rail lines due to a lack of security troops and the ease of VC interdiction.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 15 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, OP&R Div, J32

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Conversion of CIDG Camps to RF

(C) Statement of Objective: To convert CIDG companies to RF companies in those camps located in areas that are pacified or where RF elements can adequately assume the mission of CIDG forces.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CIDG companies on Phu Quoc Island, IV CTZ were converted to RF on 15 Jun 68.

(2) CIDG companies at Phu Tuc and Luong Son in II CTZ will be converted to RF on 1 Aug 68.

(3) Plans for the conversion of CIDG companies at eight additional camps during CY68 have been deferred.

b. Analysis of Progress: The conversion of CIDG companies to RF has not progressed in accordance with the CY68 plan. This can be attributed primarily to the enemy situation which has existed throughout SVN since the enemy's TET offensive and the changing tactical situation.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: Although the plans for the conversion of CIDG companies have been deferred for the remainder of CY68, field commanders have been urged to analyze continuously existing camps with a view towards conversion to RF.

d. Projection: There are no plans to convert CIDG companies to RF during the 2d half CY68. This situation may change as field commanders continue to analyze existing camps.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Conversion of Selected Special Forces Camps to LLDB (VNSF)

(S) Statement of Objective: 5th Special Forces Group continues to conduct the transfer of selected Special Forces Camps to complete Vietnamese control.

a. Review of Progress: This report covers the period 1 Jan through 30 Jun 1968. The goals for CY 68 are the transfer of a minimum of one camp per CTZ to provide a training vehicle for the VNSF personnel and increased training in the areas of administration, logistics and communications. Current status of transfer camps is:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>CAMP</u>	<u>DATE TRANSFERRED</u>
II	Plei Mrong	1 May 1967
II	Vinh Thanh	15 Dec 1967
III	Ben Soi	1 June 1968
IV	Vinh Gia	1 Jul 1967

The Tet Offensive during the first quarter of CY 68 severely affected the Combined Campaign Plan AB-143 and subsequently the transfer of additional camps. However, in early June Camp Ben Soi was transferred to VNSF control and progress now continues toward additional camp transfers and increased training for the VNSF.

b. Analysis of Progress: Analysis of the areas of personnel, administration, logistics, operations and training follows:

(1) Personnel: Through increased experience, additional training and guidance from the C Detachment level, Camps Plei Mrong and Vinh Thanh in II CTZ and Camp Vinh Gia in IV CTZ are considered to be very successful; a fact attributable to the strong leadership exerted by the respective commanders of these camps, CPT Bao, CPT Hung and CPT Nam. Camp Ben Soi has recently completed transfer and appears eager to accept its new independence from the US advisors. An accurate evaluation of its personnel is not possible at this time. It should be realized that the personnel of these detachments are hand picked and represent the best trained and most capable VNSF leaders available. The success of future camps and the speed with which this program progresses will be dependent upon the capability of the VNSF to provide qualified leaders at the company grade officer and NCO levels.

(2) Administration and Logistics: In general these areas represent the most formidable problem in the effective operation of transferred camps. Neat, timely and accurate reporting procedures are slowly being realized, but will require additional emphasis.

(a) Camp Plei Mrong satisfactorily meets administrative requirements and is considered on an equal par with other detachments in its fund reporting. Logistical procedures are adequate but still requires assistance and close monitoring.

(b) Camp Vinh Thanh has continually had difficulties in submitting accurate

PAGE 17 OF 265 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

and timely reports. Funds management is their biggest administrative problem. Increases in requisitions for logistical support have been noted since Vietnamese take over, however the B Detachment S4 closely supervises this detachment to insure proper utilization of supplies received.

(c) Camp Vinh Gia has shown continued progress since transfer and administratively has maintained the standards expected of all camps in IV CTZ. Although not a requirement, the VNSF Commander, CPT Nam, continues to submit a US MOPSUM each month.

(d) Camp Ben Soi, the most recently transferred camp, has experienced little difficulty in the administrative and logistical areas thus far. This fact can be attributed to the lessons learned from previous camp transfers and the effective training given by the C Detachment prior to the actual transfer to VNSF control.

(3) Operational Performance: Tactically these camps have been marked generally by overall improvement and in several instances have performed successfully in joint operations with FWMAF.

(a) Camp Vinh Gia has continued to effectively control its TAOR and in the past 6 months was authorized an additional Camp Strike Force Company (CSF) which further enhanced its operational capabilities. Elements from Vinh Gia have also worked successfully with Delta Blackhawk where the overall commander was the US Cavalry Troop Commander.

(b) Camp Plei Mrong compares quite favorably with other US advised camps. The VC kill rate is somewhat better than the other camps in its area due primarily to a highly successful ambush operation in January which accounted for 47 VC KIA by body count. The camp has also operated in conjunction and/or jointly with FWMAF, and has received the praise of the 4th Division personnel with whom they worked.

(c) Camp Vinh Thanh has shown a decrease in the number of operations sent to the field since transfer to VNSF control and a general lack of aggressiveness has been noted. These areas are currently being bolstered by both the USASF and VNSF C Detachments.

(d) Camp Ben Soi initially reflected a decrease in the number of contacts and VC kills following transfer to VNSF control. This was possible due to a lack of confidence in their ability to call for and use available air and artillery support. On 19 June 1968, however, the VNSF carried out their first heliborne operation and scored 1 KIA and 1 weapon captured. A second heliborne operation conducted on 20 June in the same area resulted in 3 KIA by ground contact and airstrikes accounting for an additional 30 KIA. With these victories the VNSF seem more aggressive and willing to make contact.

(4) Training: The training of VNSF personnel to assume unilateral control of camps is a prerequisite to further camp transfers. As evidenced by the older camps, Vinh Thanh, Plei Mrong and Vinh Gia, a lack of adequate time in which to conduct logistical and technical training prior to transfer resulted in the

SECRET

SECRET

extensive use of an On-the-Job (OJT) training program after transfer to meet required standards. Due to priority commitments, this type program is somewhat slow in producing results. However, in the transfer of Camp Ben Soi the final training period prior to transfer was of 60 days duration and divided into two phases.

(a) Phase I was primarily devoted to training VNSF in camp administration and field support techniques. This included discussion and translation of administrative reports, fund reports, pay procedures and daily strength reporting. An SOP explaining all supply and administrative forms and procedures was written and translated to give additional guidance.

(b) Phase II the VNSF received increased responsibility for camp administration and operations. The USASF monitored and advised as required with emphasis on the testing of the Vietnamese personnel in all phases of camp operations. This also provided for a gradual phase out of the US advisor from the position of responsibility for the camp.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The transfer of selected camps to VNSF control is an extremely valuable program in improving the quality and training of the VNSF not only at the A Detachment level but also at the B and C Detachment levels through the experience gained in supporting the A Detachment.

(2) A lack of qualified VNSF personnel will continue to be the most critical area in the progress of the transfer program.

(3) Employment of a two to three month training period prior to transfer will substantially reduce problems in administration, logistics and communications. Continuous supervision by B and C detachments will insure proficient camp operation.

(4) Emphasis on increased training for VNSF personnel should be of primary importance in the development of this and other programs. Considerations should be given to establishing a training center in-country similar to the JFKSPWARCEN and sending selected VNSF personnel to CONUS training centers to be trained in administration, logistics, communications and other technical subjects.

(5) Long range goals, CY 70 plus, should include a pilot program where all A detachments under a selected B detachment are transferred, the culmination being the transfer of the B detachment to VNSF control. This would place an entire area under VNSF control; however, the area would continue to remain under USASF logistical support and funding.

d. Projections:

(1) Transfer of selected camps to VNSF control will continue during CY 68 and the rate of progress will be dependent upon the availability of qualified VNSF personnel.

(2) The pilot program for the transfer of a B detachment and subordinate A detachments should be initiated in CY 70.

SECRET

SECRET

(3) Training of VNSF continues and will be expanded during the second half of CY 68 to give increased emphasis and coordination with the VNSF on the use of Dong Ba Tin as the VNSF Training Center.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: 5th Special Forces Group

PAGE 20 OF 265 PAGES

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Advisory Division

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Designation of Facilities

1. (U) Statement of Objectives: To establish a 20-bed dispensary in each of 88 sub-sectors during FY 68 using medical personnel and equipment from each of 88 A&DSL companies to staff and operate these facilities.

a. Review of Progress: 49 sub-sector 20-bed dispensaries completed.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: None

(2) Critical Problems: Spaces to provide staffing for these dispensaries are currently programmed for the FY 69 and FY 70 Force Structure. Force Structure has not been approved.

(3) Lack of Resources: Same as 1b(2).

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) No experience indicators exist for comparison.

(2) Need for revision of program: None

d. Corrective action: None

e. Projection: Phase II of dispensary program for RVNAF Progressed as planned. Phase III for CY 69 should also follow the same progress, and both are dependent upon approval of the FY 69-70 Force Structure.

2. (U) Statement of Objectives: To establish a 100-bed hospital in 26 sectors and at the island of Phu Quoc, not now having military hospitals.

a. Review of Progress: The RVNAF Medical Services reorganization was approved 23 Mar 68. Beginning 30 June 68, all 27 sector hospitals were activated and personnel deployed to the 27 designated locations to establish nuclei around which the hospitals would be built.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: Seven of the 27 sector hospital sites do not presently have adequate space to establish and set up 25 beds as a minimum pending construction of new buildings.

PAGE 21 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) **Critical Problems:** The newly approved TOE has no provisions for emergency powered equipment. Original TOE had (2) 60KW generators, which were deleted by JGS.

(3) **Lack of Resources:** Funds for the construction of (27) 100 bed sector hospitals have been cut by DOD from \$6,957,000 to 1,739,000, limiting the number of hospitals to be constructed to seven (7).

c. Conclusions and or Trends:

(1) **Conclusion:** Although the sector hospital has been activated, construction, is at least one year away, with a limited objectives.

(2) **Need for Revision of Program:** Priorities should be established to provide construction in the areas where beds are most needed.

d. Corrective Actions: Revise TOE to reflect two 60KW generators, to give the hospital emergency power.

e. Projection: Funds will be approved for the construction of seven hospitals and construction will begin 1 April 1969.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Command Surgeon

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, MA (MACMA)

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: English Language Improvement Program

A. Element: Formal English Language Training

1. Statement of Objective: To obtain and install sufficient electrical power to operate equipment at the VNAF Air Training Center (ATC) by 1 June 1968.

a. Review of Progress: VNAF ATC officials have requested two 60 KW generators to provide power for the English language school and adjacent schools. Currently only the Communications-Electronics school has a generator. As a short range solution, the language school has obtained permission to connect their power line to an adjacent cadet facility power line. Relatively stable power to operate lab equipment now is in effect. The long term solution is to install the generators.

b. Analysis of Progress: Action to correct the power deficiency has been initiated by VNAF ATC officials. Final analysis will depend upon the receipt and installation of equipment at the ATC.

c. Conclusions and Trends: The power deficiency problem should be solved upon installation of the two 60 KW generators. The scheduled completion date of this objective will be revised when VNAF estimates become known.

d. Corrective Action: VNAF is the action agency and has initiated appropriate action for a short and long term solution.

e. Projection: No prediction has been made by the VNAF regarding the arrival date of the two generators. AF Advisory personnel will maintain progress checks on this project.

2. Statement of Objective: Install a new 40 position English lab at the VNN Training Center in Nha Trang by 1 May 68.

a. Review of Progress: Two 20 position language laboratories were programmed in FY 68 through MASF channels. The projected delivery date of 1 May 68 has not been met. Labs are currently being assembled at DLI-ELS, Lackland AFB, Texas, and will be shipped on/about 15 Jul 68. Estimated arrival time in country is 1 Sep 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: Programming action was appropriate and timely. Final analysis will depend upon receipt and installation of equipment.

c. Projection: The installation of the laboratory equipment

UNCLASSIFIED

will be completed by a programmed DLI MTT soon after its arrival. Expansion and improvement of the facility to house the new laboratories is now underway and should be completed by the arrival time of the equipment.

3. Statement of Objective: Assign an ELT DLI specialist to the VNAF Air Training Center by 1 Feb 68.

a. Review of Progress: Programming for an ELT specialist GS-9, was made in the FY 69 MASF Air Force Program. A program deviation was approved for May and June of FY 68 to permit the early arrival of the ELT specialist. Anticipated arrival date was May 68, however, the latest correspondence from DLI gives an estimated time of arrival in country as 15 Aug 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: Initial programming was appropriate. Delay was caused by the DLI re-classification of the language specialist to a GS-11 from a GS-9. This involved requesting approval for new cost factors from CSAF. Although the objective was not reached in the time frame established DLI has responded to inquiries with a specific individual's name and an estimated time of arrival in country of 15 Aug 68.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The VNAF English language school has the potential to produce an excellent product but has long operated without a DLI language specialist. Both quality and quantity of the school's output will improve with the assignment of a DLI Senior language advisor. The re-classification of the GS-9 position resulted in a delay for funding approval. In order to expedite the filling of this position, DLI has advised AF GP that a GS-9 will fill the position. Upon arrival of the ELT specialist, action will be taken to have this objective deleted.

4. Statement of Objective: Obtain an instructor reference library and upgrade Vietnamese instructors at the VNAF Air Training Center English language school by 1 June 1968.

a. Review of Progress: A DLI English language reference library package was received and put in use in January 1968. The language school staff has implemented a continuous in-service instructor training program.

b. Analysis of Progress: The instructor reference library was established within the time frame established. A firm basis has been established for instructor upgrading by use of in-service training. Instructor upgrading is in the formative stage and will require continuous coordination with VNAF officials and staff supervision.

c. Projection: Controlled use of the reference library and continuous staff supervision of in-service training will result in upgrading of assigned Vietnamese instructors.

UNCLASSIFIED

5. Statement of Objective: Eliminate or reduce the CONUS English training required for ARVN students by use of Armed Forces Language School (RVNAFLS) facilities by 31 Dec 68.

a. Review of Progress: As of July 1968, ARVN students are completing their English language prerequisites in country at the RVNAFLS, Saigon. ARVN students are able to report directly to CONUS technical and orientation training.

b. Analysis of Progress: The objective was reached in the time frame established. The RVNAFLS is currently operating on a double shift basis in a facility that was severely damaged during the TET offensive. The student load is projected to increase in Aug 68; therefore additional classroom space and instructors will be required to train students to the required ECL in country. Action has been taken to obtain a new facility by 1 Aug from the ARVN Central Logistics Command. Additional US instructor personnel will be furnished on a TDY basis until JTD approval can be obtained.

c. Projection: With the acquisition of a suitable facility and the required instructors, RVNAFLS will continue to eliminate the need to send ARVN students to the CONUS for prerequisite English language training. Recommend this objective be deleted as a sub-program goal.

6. Statement of Objective: Modernize present RVNAFLS facilities or relocate to new facilities by 31 Dec 68.

a. Review of Progress: A rehabilitation project to include soundproofing, lighting and air conditioning of language labs was started on the RVNAFLS in January 1968. During the TET offensive, 31 Jan - 1 Feb 68, the language school was severely damaged by enemy action. Rehabilitation was cancelled on 5 Feb due to the destruction of classrooms and steps were taken to relocate RVNAFLS. Attempts were made to rent existing facilities but neither Vietnamese or MASF funds were available for this purpose. Ten expedient metal huts were constructed on the grounds of the RVNAFLS. These buildings are considered inadequate for classrooms due to noise and lack of electrical outlets. In May 68, plans for a new language school were submitted to be included in the FY 70 MILCON plan. In order to provide support for projected increased student inputs, the RVNAF Central Logistics Command (CLC) is now investigating the availability of buildings which can be confiscated for this purpose. The Chief CLC has directed that a facility be provided by 1 Aug 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: Modernization was discontinued due to the destruction of facilities. Increased language requirements due to projected force structure changes have revised the goal for a suitable facility from 31 Dec 68 to Aug 68. Representatives from the CLC, CTC and ARVNAFLS have recently investigated two buildings but have found both unsatisfactory.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Acquisition of a 100 classroom facility will allow the school to relocate to a suitable building and handle the projected increased input. Any delay past the 1 Aug acquisition date of the building will result in delayed language training for RVNAFLS students projected as a result of force structure changes. MACV Training Directorate is maintaining progress checks on this project.

B. Element: Informal English Language Training.

Statement of Objective: Distribute 500 English language training kits to US advisors in the field. Kits consist of a teacher's guide, lesson plans and text books. Target date 1 Nov 68.

a. Review of Progress: During FY 68 1000 instructor kits were distributed to Corps Tactical Zones and field advisors for use in informal English language training of RVNAF personnel.

b. Analysis of Progress: Language training kits, consisting of a teacher's guide, lesson plans and textbooks were delivered by the end of August 1967. No language training kits or texts books have been funded or ordered following the final distribution. A study will be conducted to determine if additional language texts can be utilized by advisory personnel.

C. Summary: Established goals of this sub-program are progressing in a satisfactory manner although all have not met their target date. The goal to reduce or eliminate CONUS English training for ARVN students (objective number 5) has been achieved in the FY 69 training program in advance of the time frame imposed.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Equipment Shortages (TOE)

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: Develop an Equipment Status Reporting System that will immediately identify shortages and overages of authorized equipment by unit with RVNAF.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. Element: Improve Equipment Status Reporting.

Goal: Continued RVNAF command emphasis on the necessity for accurate and timely equipment status reports.

a. Analysis of Progress: (C) Monthly equipment status reports continue to be completed and forwarded from units to Area Logistics Commands (ALC). They are consolidated by technical service and forwarded to the Office Chief of Technical Service. Technical Service Chiefs further consolidate the reports and forward them to the Central Logistics Command (CLC). CLC is developing formats and procedures for a new improved Equipment Status Reporting System that will utilize data processing equipment.

(1) The accuracy of ARVN equipment status reports has continued to improve during the first half of CY68. Plans to establish an automatic data processing system to insure that reports are provided on a timely basis have been delayed due to budget problems. Reports submitted under current system continue to be received from 60 to 90 days after the as of date.

(2) Of special interest is the RVNAF BC-003 Equipment Status Report which lists equipment on-hand in units, equipment deadlined, equipment in transit within country, and equipment due-in through MASF channels. Monthly attrition and salvage reports have improved in accuracy. A continuing program for determining unit TOE shortages and possible solutions thereto, is a daily RVNAF/US function.

2. Element: Redistribution of existing assets based on authorizations.

- (1. Some units have overages of equipment while shortages exist in others.
2. Unauthorized units are in existence with equipment on hand that should be in authorized units).

Goal: Command emphasis on the proper distribution of equipment in accordance with MACV approved TOE authorizations. Identification of and withdrawal of equipment assets from unauthorized units.

Analysis of Progress: (C) Continued progress is evident in the area

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

of redistribution of assets during the first half of CY68. Particularly noteworthy is the redistribution of ARVN equipment, replaced by modernization, to RF/IF. Assets are distributed to units deemed to have the greatest requirement. This is applicable not only to types of equipment, but also to quantities. Equipment brought into country for one unit is arbitrarily transferred to another. Advisors constantly place emphasis in this area, but results are marginal.

3. Element: Timely allocation of available assets particularly equipment on hand in depots.

Goals:

a. Timely allocation of available assets in accordance with TOE. Continued efforts to open and secure LCC. Improve coordination between tactical and logistical unit commanders to resolve equipment shortages problems.

b. Continue efforts to advise JGS to delegate more distribution authority to technical service chiefs to preclude long delays occurring between receipt, allocation and distribution of major items.

Analysis of Progress: Timely allocation of available assets is being accomplished on a continuing basis. An efficient Logistics Operations Center was established at the CLC during February 1968, to expedite logistics support. A radio communications net has been established to provide an alternate means of communications between the ALC and the CLC. Coordination between tactical and logistic units is enhanced through CLC inspections, staff visits and through the use of Technical Inspection Teams.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACoFS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Financial and Procurement Self-Sufficiency of RVNAF Medical, Ordnance, QM, and Signal Technical Services

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES: Develop the maximum amount of self-sufficiency within the RVNAF technical services (Reference to technical services in this Sub-Program pertains to the Medical, Ordnance, QM, and Signal Technical Services).

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Develop the capabilities of the RVNAF Technical Services budgeting procedures to provide maximum effective programming in support of the respective technical service mission.

Goals:

- a. Develop closer coordination between budgeting personnel and requirements determination personnel to assure that program objectives are coordinated.
- b. Convince RVNAF technical services that realistic inflationary factors must be considered in future years' budgeting, and that budgets must reflect the impact of inflation upon the prices of goods and services.

Analysis of Progress:

- a. Technical Service Advisor follow up has assured that the CY68 RVN Defense Budget was effectively coordinated with RVNAF personnel engaged in requirements computation. HQ CLC is instituting procedures to monitor the development of future RVN Defense Budgets.
- b. US technical service advisors are placing maximum emphasis to assure that RVNAF technical services consider inflationary factors in the formulation of the RVN Defense Budget. Cost computations are monitored to assure that the budget reflects the impact of inflation. Advisory effort is being directed toward having future budgets executed in accordance with past inflationary trends and economic indications for the future. It must be noted, however, that if this is overemphasized, the higher budgets executed by RVNAF to compensate for inflation may accelerate the inflationary process. The USAID Economics Department provides extensive guidance and direction in assisting the Joint MACV-US Mission review of the GVN Defense Budget with particular emphasis on prevention of further inflation of the local economy.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) Element: Transfer to the maximum extent possible, the support of technical service supplies from US MASF support to the GVN Defense Budget.

Goals:

- a. Identify commodities available on the local economy currently being MASF supported.
- b. Establish that local industry can meet both qualitative and quantitative requirements.
- c. Determine that the transferral will not be detrimental to the RVN economy.
- d. Program the necessary funds in the GVN Defense Budget.

Analysis of Progress:

- a. The MACV Commercial Consumables Transfer Program Committee and technical service advisors are continuously reviewing items supported by MASF to insure that they are kept to a minimum. Maximum effort is being made by the MACV Budget Screening Board to assure that funds are programmed in the RVN Defense Budget for items available in-country.
- b. Close coordination is exercised between and among the MACV Commercial Consumables Transfer Program Committee, Technical Service Advisors and USAID (Industry) to insure that local industry can provide both qualitative and quantitative requirements of RVNAF before items are transferred from MASF support.
- c. The US Mission Council approved the CY68 RVN Defense Budget for 62.6 billion \$VN. Action taken by the Vietnamese Congress reduced the budget to 53 billion \$VN. The MACV Budget Screening Board met on 1 July and 10 July 1968 to review a revised CY68 RVN Defense Budget. The results of the board approved an increase of 10.1 billion \$VN above the Mission Council approved amount of 62.6 billion \$VN, for a total of 72.7 billion \$VN.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, VN Advisory Division, Office of the Comptroller

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Financial Management

1. (U) Statement of Objective: To insure effective and efficient fund utilization in all chapters of the RVN Defense Budget by monitoring obligation and expenditure reports and recommending appropriate action to VN counterparts.

a. Review of Progress: CY 1968 expenditures were originally projected at 59.7 billion piasters. During the first five months of the year, expenditures totaled 23.3 billion piasters. Performance in the logistics area was poor during the first five months, but are expected to improve in the last half of the year. In July 1968, the expenditure projection was increased to 69.2 billion piasters. Force increases and several pay raises for the RVNAF have caused pay and allowance expenditures to exceed the original projections. Expenditures for pay and allowances were 20.2 billion piasters as of 31 May 1968, therefore they will exceed the semi-annual projection of 22.4 billion piasters.

b. Analysis of Progress: Total expenditures fell short of the projection for the first five months of CY 1968 due to poor performance in logistics areas and the austerity program implemented by the Directorate General for Finance and Audit. During the month of June, performance in the logistics area improved. With the improvement demonstrated in this area, the program will be on target by year end. Projected pay and allowance expenditures are based upon programmed average monthly strength and the projection for the first six months of CY 1968 will be exceeded due to the recent pay increases and the increase in force levels.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The expenditure rate for the first five months of 1968 paralleled that for the same period of 1967. The expenditure rate will improve during the last half of 1968. Performance in the logistics area is usually slow at the first of the year because of the time required to negotiate contracts. As the procurement system is refined the initial lag should be reduced. Pay and allowance expenditures are influenced by establishing new entitlements for which funds have not been budgeted.

d. Corrective Action: The procurement cycle was aided by the establishment of a Ministry of National Defense Disbursing Center on

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 31 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

1 April 1967 which resulted in contractors being paid promptly after completion of a contract. The procurement cycle has continued to improve as a result of this Disbursing Center. The supplemental budget will cover the shortfall in pay and allowances. If there is an over expenditure in this area, the balance will be financed from the RVN National Budget.

e. Projection: Expenditure rates will continue to improve as the RVNAF refines program and budget procedures. Logistic fund utilization will improve with a refinement of procurement programs and contract procedures.

2. (U) Statement of Objective: To mechanize 53,000 RVNAF military and civilian pay accounts by 31 December 1968.

a. Review of Progress: As of 30 June 1968, 29,683 pay accounts (21,840 military and 7,843 civilian) were mechanized.

b. Analysis of Progress: In March 1968 seven keypunch and six verifier machines were installed in the area used by the Director for Budget and Foreign Aid for use of personnel assigned to the Director General for Finance and Audit. Twelve keypunch operators were trained by IBM in country. This allowed for a more efficient flow of mechanized records.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The number of mechanized pay records has increased by approximately 13,000 since the end of 1967. This indicates that DGFA is aware of the importance of a mechanized pay system and the necessity of utilizing the available time on the IBM 1401 computer.

d. Corrective Action: VN Advisory Division is monitoring the training of operators and provides an ADP advisor to work with the Director General for Finance and Audit.

e. Projection:

(1) Conversion of additional pay accounts will continue until approximately 53,000 accounts are mechanized. This will be the maximum number that can be accommodated with the computer time available.

(2) Four additional key punch operators are to be trained as soon as training space becomes available at IBM facilities in country.

(3) A proposal was received from IBM in April 1968 for a Director General for Finance and Audit owned computer center. This center would have the capacity to process all of the RVNAF pay accounts in the Saigon area.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

However, to date no decision has been made as to when or if to proceed with the proposal.

3. (U) Statement of Objective: To better qualify RVNAF personnel in finance positions by improving the curriculum of the RVNAF Administration and Finance School, developing standard student texts for training courses, publishing a monthly Finance Newsletter, and expanding off-shore technical training.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) RVNAF Admin. and Finance School: As of 30 June 1968 three new textbooks were completed by the school. A POI for the Officer Advanced Course was approved but the course scheduled for August 1968 was cancelled due to pressing requirements within the Finance network which took priority. Consideration for rescheduling the Advanced Course during 1969 is in process.

(2) Finance Newsletter: Issues are now being published monthly. Distribution is being made to all finance activities and other command elements on a need to know basis.

(3) Offshore Training Program: Maximum utilization is being made of spaces allocated by the Central Training Command. Training is at the U. S. Army Finance School, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. They include: Finance Officer Advanced Course, Military Comptrollership Course, Programming and Budgeting Course, and the Techniques of Review and Analysis Course.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) RVNAF Admin. and Finance School: New courses provide a broader and more comprehensive training base for officers and enlisted men within the lower grades.

(2) Finance Newsletter: Distribution and utilization of the monthly letter was significantly higher than expected. This communication medium is extremely valuable to finance personnel in the field.

(3) Offshore Training Program: This program is small, but effective, in training the more advanced finance officers for key positions within the RVNAF financial network.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Accomplishments in this area reflect the importance placed on training of finance personnel by the RVNAF. The corruption and inefficient operations are being reduced significantly.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

d. Corrective Action: None required.

e. Projection: Program will continue to receive emphasis by the RVNAF and U. S. Advisors.

4. (U) Statement of Objective: To improve the quality, scope and depth of audits conducted by the office of the Director General for Finance and Audit, Ministry of National Defense, by more joint US/VN field audits, increasing the number of trained auditors, insuring compliance with regulations and decrees, and reducing corruption and misuse of public funds.

a. Review of Progress: Progress of the Audit Division was curtailed by the TET offensive due to restriction of travel. Consequently audits were conducted in secure areas close to the home base of the auditors. A full time audit schedule was resumed in June 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: Even though the audit program was curtailed as mentioned in 4.a. above, progress was made. For the period ending 30 June 1968, 44 cases of theft, fraud, of misuse of funds were disclosed: with a value of 12,833,860 piasters. Disciplinary action was taken against 48 personnel who were implicated by the findings.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Audits have proven effective in detecting and preventing corruption, fraud and misuse of government funds.

d. Corrective Action: An aggressive audit program is continuing.

e. Projection: The audit program within RVNAF will be accelerated during the remainder of 1968 to compensate for the curtailment during February - May 1968 as a result of the TET offensive.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Comptroller

PAGE 34 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief Plans, Supply and Operations Division

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Hospital and Field Medical Supply

(C) Statement of Objective: Establish area supply support missions for hospitals and other large medical units in order to reduce number of depot requisitions.

a. Review of Progress: Action on this project is being held in abeyance until phase III of the reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service: establishment of medical groups in each of the corps tactical zones and coincident control of fixed medical assets by the Surgeon General, RVNAF. This will take place during the period, 1 July 1969 through 31 December 1969.

b. Analysis of Progress: See 2a above

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: see 2a above.

d. Correction action: An effort is being made to accelerate the phasing of the reorganization. However, no definite progress can be reported at this time.

e. Projection: Once phase III of the reorganization is completed this objective can be accomplished.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Command Surgeon

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Psychological Operations Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Improvement of RVNAF General Political Warfare Department (GPWD).

Statement of Objective: To meet the increasing demands for support to RVNAF political warfare programs through improved planning, organization and expansion of facilities and equipment.

a. Review of Progress: Under the direction of the Chief, General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), considerable progress has been made in the past six months in the overall improvement of resource management required for the efficient operation of the department. Chief, GPWD, has directed a comprehensive study on reorganization of GPWD be conducted. While a target date has not been establish for reorganization, that event will provide the opportune time to assign officers from all RVNAF to GPWD staff. Chapter 14 of the National Defense Budget, which covers Psywar activities, was combined with Chapter 29, Polwar activities, effective 1 July 1968. The plan for the expansion of Channel B, RVNAF Radio Broadcasting channel, was approved by the Mission Council on 27 May 1968. On 30 June 1968 representatives from JUSPAO, MACV, USAID, GVN and RVNAF signed an agreement authorizing the construction of the network. USAID Contract Services will act as the agent for MACV and JUSPAO to negotiate and let the contract for the expansion of the network. The construction of a new printing plant has been included in the FY70 MASF Military Construction program with the possibility of reprogramming for FY69. The building plans for the Political Warfare College were submitted to JGS by 1 June 1968. However, the programming for construction is to be delayed until FY72.

b. Analysis of Progress: Improvement throughout the General Political Warfare Departments at all levels is a direct result of increased command emphasis and the increasing awareness of the role and the practical value of political warfare activities within the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. This awareness was greatly enhanced during the TET Offensive as evidenced by the morale, esprit de corps, and fighting ability of the Armed Forces. The consolidation of two chapters of the National Defense Budget streamlined the accounting procedures which in-turn contributed to improved financial management. The plans for the construction of the new printing plant have been delayed until FY70 however, the printing capability has improved both qualitatively and quantitatively due to increased "on the job" training and the partial renovation of the existing plant. Two new presses and one large paper

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

cutter have been received and installed. This does not completely satisfy the demand for printed material as two publications are still being printed on a "contract basis" in Saigon, and special requirements are being printed by US resources in-country and off-shore. The RVNAF radio has increased the number of hours broadcast, but the coverage remains inadequate. The programmed expansion of the Vietnamese radio network will provide complete radio coverage in the Republic of Vietnam.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Indications for the remainder of this calendar year are that continuing improvement can be expected.

d. Corrective Action: The study being devoted to the reorganization of GPWD is indicative of the emphasis being applied to every aspect of political warfare in RVNAF. It is hoped, and strongly urged, by all advisory personnel that a marked integration of officers from all services will occur concurrent with reorganization.

e. Projection: The capability on the RVNAF General Political Warfare Department should continue to improve. The expansion of facilities, the increase of equipment, the pending reorganization and as the training and experience of the personnel increase improvement will continue in the quantity and quality of the political warfare effort throughout RVNAF.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.

PAGE 37 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Improvement of RVNAF QM National Inventory Control center (NICC) and Base Depots

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: To develop RVNAF QM NICC and base depot operations and facilities to improve supply responsiveness and make the activities self-sufficient.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Provide an efficient inventory control system for the RVNAF QM NICC.

Goals:

- a. Establish a self-sufficient electrical accounting machine (EAM) operation.
- b. Establish an NICC/Depot liaison team to conduct periodic reconciliation of stocks to identify excesses.

Analysis of Progress:

a. The project of establishing a self-sufficient electrical accounting machine operation has been curtailed because of the lack of qualified RVNAF personnel to be trained for this operation. In addition, RVNAF did not provide air-conditioning and electrical power for the machine room and it was impractical to install the machines without these necessities.

b. The present NICC manual system of maintaining inventory is efficient and practical. It serves the needs of the RVNAF QM supply system and is not complicated by the sophistication of electrical accounting machines. It is considered that IAM should not be adopted for inventory control in the near future because of the lack of personnel available for training and employment in the EAM field.

c. The proposed RVNAF NICC TOE has spaces for two captains and three senior NCC's to form a liaison team. This TOE has not yet been approved; however, advisory effort is being directed toward making advisor-counterpart visits from CCQM to the QM Field Depots. Quarterly reconciliations of the Field Depot records with the NICC by depot representatives are enabling the NICC to identify excesses; however, there is still some reluctance on the part of RVNAF to report excess MASF stocks to the US for disposition.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) Element: To improve Class I, Class II and IV depot operations.

Goals:

- a. Teach proper warehousing techniques and storage methods.
- b. Revise and update receiving and shipping operations and accounting procedures.

Analysis of Progress:

a. Pertinent sections of the US storage manual have been translated into Vietnamese and training is being conducted for warehouse supervisors in proper warehousing techniques and storage methods. It has been noted that there is a need for leadership training particularly for the first-line supervisors in depot storage operations.

b. Advisor effort has been directed toward speeding up receiving and shipping operations within the established framework of the RVNAF supply system.

c. Greater efficiency has been obtained by having MASF supported supplies delivered directly from CONUS and Japan sources to QM field depots in I, II, and V Area Logistical Commands. It is planned that direct shipment procedures will be implemented for all QM Field Depots within seven months.

3. (C) Element: To develop more efficient POL supply and distribution throughout RVNAF.

Goals:

- a. Determine optimum system to effectively service RVNAF ground forces.
- b. Increase bulk storage capabilities for POL products throughout the system.

Analysis of Progress:

a. The optimum system to effectively service RVNAF ground forces is one which will provide a bulk fuel handling capability within each ALC.

b. The present RVNAF POL distribution system has little modern bulk fuel handling equipment on hand. Support is presently accomplished through the use of 2½ ton trucks and 55 gallon drums. Effective utilization

CONFIDENTIAL

of modern bulk fuel handling equipment will provide the capability to haul larger quantities of fuel to POL supply points where adequate bulk storage will be available. In addition, modern filtering equipment will provide RVNAF the benefits of improved quality surveillance of all fuels. After the issue of essential items of equipment, such as, tank trucks, pumps, filter separators, collapsible containers and steel storage tanks, RVNAF will be capable of enjoying the benefits of a bulk fuel distribution system.

c. Realizing that a bulk petroleum system will reduce cost and manpower, action has been initiated to increase bulk storage capabilities throughout the RVNAF POL system. Present permanent bulk storage capacity for fuels in RVNAF POL depots is 171,500 barrels with an additional 7100 barrels stored in collapsible containers. Currently approved construction projects and requests for additional equipment designed to facilitate the handling of bulk fuel will provide 108,000 barrels of increased capacity in permanent steel tanks and 13,095 barrels of increased capacity in collapsible, fabric tanks. The projects include construction at the POL Base Depot, all five POL Field Depots and four POL Supply Points. Upon receipt of modern equipment and tankage required to fully develop a bulk POL system, increased economy and efficiency of operation will be realized as well as improved service and combat support to the ultimate consumer.

d. Projection: The RVNAF QM NICC and Base Depots continue to improve; however, the curtailment of electrical accounting machine operation was necessary due to lack of available trainees, required air conditioning and electrical power. Reconciliation of depot excesses and the reporting of MASF excesses to US for disposition is a problem; however, the proposed RVNAF NICC TOE to form a depot liaison team should reconcile the problem. POL supply, distribution and bulk storage will improve upon receipt of essential items of equipment.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACoS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Improvement of Status of the RVNAF Serviceman.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: To improve the subsistence of the RVNAF serviceman.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Garrison Rations.

a. Establish additional unit messes.

b. Provide food supplement for RVNAF forces directly engaged in Revolutionary Development.

Goals:

a. Establish an additional 1,000 unit messes.

b. Implementation of the Revolutionary Development Food Supplement Distribution Program.

Analysis of Progress:

a. As of 1 January 1968, 1547 unit messes were established. 96 additional unit messes have been established for a total of 1643 unit messes in RVNAF as of 30 June 1968. The program is lagging because of insufficient RVNAF command interest. Only one full time food service staff officer is authorized in RVNAF to provide guidance and direction, and adequate numbers of mess personnel are not authorized or trained.

b. The Revolutionary Development Food Supplement Distribution System was implemented in January 1968 and as now planned, the program will terminate in December 1968 or January 1969 based on present assets.

2. (C) Element: Commissary increased capability to provide an adequate number of food items for sale to dependents.

Goal: Establishment of an operational self-supporting Commissary System.

Analysis of Progress: Sales of US donated food items have reached \$8,850,052 as of 31 May 1968. Six new items have been introduced into the system and a total of 201 retail outlets have been established. Construction of depots at Saigon and Can Tho has begun. Distribution and service have improved and the RVNAF serviceman and his family are benefiting from the improved system.

Projection: The attainment of the goal of 220 Commissary outlets has been delayed by the TET and MINI-TET Offensives; in addition, the

PAGE 41 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

fluidity of the tactical situation prohibits establishment of an actual time frame for completion. Command emphasis, however, indicates that the goal will be reached as soon as circumstances permit.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

PAGE 42 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, RF/PF Division, MACCORDS

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Inspection of RF/PF Activities

(C) Statement of Objective: To inspect, in conjunction with the RVNAF JGS RF/PF inspection teams, the RF/PF units to determine the appropriateness of their employment and utilization in support of the GVN pacification program. Also, to monitor the overall effectiveness of RF/PF units in their missions, and to maintain the status of RF/PF upgrading programs.

Sub-Program Elements and Goals:

Element 1 - Inspection of RF/PF Activities.

Goal - Inspect units of the RF/PF on a regular basis; visiting units in each province and special sector every other month, with special attention to units in the pacification priority provinces.

a. Review of Progress: Total area and units to be inspected included 44 provinces, 44 A&DSL companies, 246 districts, 12 RF battalions, 64 RF company group headquarters, 1050 RF rifle companies and 4530 PF platoons. RF/PF Division representatives accompanied JGS inspection teams on 82 inspection trips to the provinces, visiting each of the provinces and A&DSL companies at least once. Included in these trips were inspections of 7 RF battalions, 223 RF companies and 231 PF platoons. Each of the 26 priority provinces was visited at least twice during the period of review.

b. Analysis of Progress: The inspection objectives were met satisfactorily except during the month of February following the Tet Offensive. In April the number of JGS inspection teams was increased from eight (8) to twelve (12). In the month of January a policy was adopted to improve the US inspection teams by filling the inspection department with personnel who had served approximately six months as Province or District Advisors.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Inspections conducted during the period 1 Jan 68 to 30 Jun 68 were more comprehensive and meaningful due to increased acceptance of MACV members on the inspection teams and with the inclusion of MACV personnel with field experience.

d. Corrective Action: Correction of deficiencies noted as a result of the inspection of RF/PF units through the RVNAF and US advisory channels is still in progress.

e. Projection: To insure that each JGS inspection team is accompanied by a MACV representative, action is being taken to bring additional personnel with field experience into the inspection department.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Element 2 - Status of RF/PF Upgrading Programs.

Goal - In coordination with the RVNAF JGS, obtain effective implementation of at least 30 of the MACV suggested RF/PF upgrading proposals in CY68.

a. Review of Progress: An omnibus action program has been prepared and approved to pull together all actions in the RF/PF improvement field. The purpose is two-fold: to provide management with a system of periodic reviews and evaluations for expediting much needed improvements of RF and PF and to encourage and assist the JGS to focus attention on upgrading RF/PF in weaponry, resupply, training, and all facets of strength, force levels, disposition and assignment. MACV staff agencies are responsible for implementing their respective portions of the program.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) October 1967 Conference Goals. Of the 30 programmed goals arising from the 26 Oct 67 RF/PF Conference, 17 goals were achieved and four deferred or deleted as of 30 June 68. The remaining 9 goals are scheduled for completion by December 1968 and include: appointment of acting sector IG's; combined MACV/JGS inspections of RF/PF units; establishment of AN/PRC-10 radio maintenance floats in A&DSL companies; simplification of forms/regulations; further deployment of Mobile Advisory Teams; improvement of transportation for A&DSL companies; deployment of province Engineer Construction and S-1 Advisors; and increased strength for A&DSL Advisory Teams.

(2) Allocation and Activation of RF/PF Unit Authorizations. JGS was allocated a total of 1053 RF companies for FY68 by MACV. As of 30 June, 1050 companies had been activated. Total allocations for PF platoons was 4561. As of 30 June, 4560 platoons had been activated.

(3) Weapons Upgrading.

(a) The immediate action plan to issue additional M2 carbines and BAR's to RF/PF has progressed rapidly during the past two months due to the turn in of weapons from ARVN units receiving the M16 rifle and the conversion of 30,000 M1 carbines to M2's. As of 25 June 68, 90.5% of the total M2 carbine requirement for RF/PF units had been achieved and 100% fill is expected by August 1968. As of 25 June 68, 72% of the BAR requirement was on hand and 100% fill is expected by late December 1968.

(b) M79 grenade launchers are currently in short supply, with only 20% of the total requirement of 15,788 on hand. The additional requirements have been programmed, and it is estimated that 92% of the total RVNAF requirement will be in country by April 1969. MACV planning figures indicate that 6337 are programmed to arrive in country December 1968 and 5116 in April 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Current plans are to issue the M16 rifle to RF/PF, primarily on a unit issue basis, with priority by geographical area. Initial issues to RF/PF began 30 June 68 in the Capital Military District. Initial issues will be limited to combat and combat support units, and the final phase will complete the issue to support elements. The tentative plan is as follows:

<u>Priority *</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Est Issue Period</u>
1	Capital Military District	Jul - Aug 68
2	IV Corps 70%	Aug - Dec 68
3	I Corps 100%	Dec 68 - Apr 69
4	IV Corps 30% bal	Apr - Jul 69
5	III Corps 100%	Jul - Dec 69
6	II Corps 100%	Dec 69 - Jun 70
7	Fillout to training and support elements	Jun 70 - Dec 71

* - Priorities 1-6 apply to RF/PF combat units.

(4) Organization and Activation of RF Company Group Headquarters.

These headquarters act as span of control headquarters for up to five RF companies or an equivalent number of RF companies and PF platoons during operations. Sixty-four (64) were allocated by MACV, and 64 were activated countrywide by JGS as of the end of June.

(5) New TO&E's for Sector, Subsector Headquarters and A&DSL Companies.

The new TO&E's enable sector and subsector headquarters and the Administrative and Direct Support Logistical Companies to cope with increased troop densities in their respective areas. A total of 17 new sector and 16 A&DSL company TO&E's were authorized for FY68 and were activated by the end of June. Remaining sector headquarters and A&DSL companies will be authorized and activated in FY69. One hundred two (102) subsector headquarters were authorized new TO&E's during FY68. All 102 subsector headquarters were activated by the end of June. In FY69 the remaining 144 subsectors will have headquarters upgraded in accordance with new TO&E's.

(6) Deployment of Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT's), Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams (MALT's) and Engineer and S-1 Advisors. MAT's are the only direct application of US advisors to RF and PF units. There were 192 MAT units in the field as of the end of June. Two hundred fifty-three (253) are programmed by the end of September. Another 100 MAT's are being considered for implementation by December 1968. To aid the logistic system, all seven of the programmed MALT's were deployed to Area Logistical Commands (ALC's) by May 1968. The MALT's are currently involved in assisting logistics flow from the ALC's through A&DSL companies to RF/PF units. Assignment to provinces of 30 Engineer and 33 S-1 Advisors of a programmed 44 for each was accomplished by the end of June. This action should be completed by the end of September.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 45 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

(7) Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES). TFES is responsive to the varying needs of MACV, JGS and other management levels in the application of continuing effort to improve the force structure, deployment and mission performance of RF/PF units. Constant refinements are being made in the system, and it is an effective management tool for both MACV and JGS headquarters.

(8) Revolutionary Development (RD) Training for PF Platoons. One thousand forty-seven (1047) PF platoons are to be trained in revolutionary development in CY68. Three hundred forty-seven (347) newly activated platoons will receive RD training in PF training centers. Three hundred twenty (320) PF platoons will receive RD training from Mobile Training Teams. The remaining 380 platoons will receive RD refresher training either at the PFTC's or from the MTT's.

(9) Increased Capacity for PF Training Centers. The JGS construction plan provides for consolidation and expansion of the PF training centers in three phases.

(a) Phase I. Twelve training centers expanded to a 500-man capacity by April 1968. Action is completed.

(b) Phase II. Twelve training centers mentioned above are planned to be expanded to a 1000-man capacity. Phase II construction is 25% complete and may be completed by September 1968. It is likely that a lack of adequate Engineer Construction support will cause the program to slip.

(c) Phase III. Nine of the training centers mentioned above are planned to be expanded to a 1500-man capacity and three expanded to a 2000-man capacity. Phase III is still in the planning stage. Funds and transportation problems have yet to be addressed.

(10) RF/PF Advisor Structure Study. This is a review of the RF/PF advisory structure at MACV, Corps, province and district levels with special attention focusing on adequate staffing at the higher levels to support the ever-increasing advisory strength at district level.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Of particular significance is the series of recent visits by the Vice Chief of the Joint General Staff, LTG Nguyen Van La, to each of the four Corps Tactical Zones and several subordinate Division Tactical Areas. He conducted six hour seminars on upgrading the effectiveness of RF/PF units at these headquarters. This is the first time an ARVN officer of LTG La's stature has taken such an unprecedented stand on behalf of the RF and PF. He specifically emphasized the need for ARVN division commanders and province chiefs to look to the needs of RF and PF. LTG La plans to make personal follow-up inspection visits to all provinces to ensure that his instructions are carried out at province and district level.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) The JGS directive on reorganization was published on 2 January 1968. This directive outlined the program for reorganization of RVNAF and set forth responsibilities for the JGS and for CTZ, DTA and Sector Commanders. Action to implement reorganization measures has been relatively limited. On 22 May MACV forwarded a letter to Corps Senior Advisors outlining the purpose and extent of the reorganization plan. The letter requested Corps Senior Advisors use their influence to gain early attainment of the objectives of the reorganization plan. In addition, Corps Senior Advisors were recently requested to submit comments on the status of implementation and recommendations on additional reorganization measures. In a related action, the TO&E for the Office of Corps Deputy Commander for Territory, concurrently RF/PF Commander, is currently being developed by the RVNAF Joint General Staff. The draft TO&E, upon completion and approval by the JGS, will be forwarded to the ACofS, MACMA, for review and approval of MACV.

(3) The October 1967 Conference goals to appoint an acting IG at each sector and to initiate combined JGS/MACV IG inspections of RF/PF units have not been achieved for the following reasons:

(a) Both the MACV IG and JGS IG consider that, at this stage in the development of the RVNAF IG system, appointing acting inspectors general is not feasible. Forty-four (44) spaces for sector IG's were included in the FY69 RVNAF Force Structure Review which was approved by COMUSMACV on 3 May 1968. Approval and fill of these spaces would accomplish this goal.

(b) Limited staffing of both the JGS and MACV IG offices precludes a concentrated effort since the JGS IG has only three teams of four men each to provide inspector general coverage of all RVNAF. The primary effort of these three teams is inspecting ARVN less RF/PF. The MACV IG office has only one six-man inspection team. This team is being used to inspect all divisional and nondivisional advisory elements of the provinces and districts. Combined teams have been formed, as required, to inspect designated substandard RF/PF units. However, this does not satisfy the intent of the goal to concentrate on RF/PF units and their advisory elements on a continuing basis. The capability of the MACV IG office to participate in these inspections would be facilitated by the fill of 11 RF/PF inspector spaces proposed by the RF/PF Conference. These spaces were approved by MACV in April 1968 and forwarded to JCS. If approved, they would be filled in November 1968.

(4) Phase III of the JGS construction plan for increased capacity for Popular Force Training Centers has not proven feasible due to limitation on funds and the security situation since 1 Feb 68. Phase III is still in the planning stage. No funds are available at this time for construction.

d. Corrective Action:

(1) Command emphasis is required to ensure JGS action to implement RVNAF reorganization measures.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 47 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Approval and fill of MACV and JGS Inspectors General spaces is considered a necessary adjunct to RF/PF improvement.

(3) Command emphasis is required to encourage the JGS to complete plans for the construction and funding for Phase III of Popular Force Training Centers, ensuring that their capacity is increased by no later than the end of CY68.

e. Projection: There will be a steady improvement in the combat effectiveness of the Regional Forces and Popular Forces throughout the remainder of CY68.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: IG Deputy Senior Advisor

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Inspector General System

1. Statement of Objective: To provide the RVNAF Inspector General system with effective and responsive procedures for conducting inspections and investigations and handling complaints.

a. Review of Progress: This element is progressing satisfactorily.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Continuity of the inspectional effort improved through the preparation of quarterly inspection schedules. These schedules were reviewed regularly to account for changes in unit status and inspectional priorities. Techniques for combined inspections were developed and continued to be refined. Reports of previous inspections were analyzed as a basis for special subjects for inspection. Inspectional techniques showed marked improvement as inspectors placed less emphasis on briefings and increased reliance on on-site inspection.

(2) Procedures for expediting the processing of investigations improved and report writing techniques became more standardized. Procedures for combined investigations were developed in May 1968. Those procedures were the basis for the first bilingual combined investigation conducted by the two offices.

(3) The IG complaint system received increased publicity. Total complaints and investigations received from January through June were 456 compared with 506 for 1967. Complaint processing was expedited; however, delays were encountered because of the large number referred to subordinate units for resolution or information with which to complete the cases.

c. Conclusions: Progress in this element was promising. The JGS IG inspectional and investigative techniques showed marked improvement. Publicity for the complaint system increased as evidenced by the increased number of complaints received in the six-month period.

d. Corrective Action: Emphasis is required to continue the development of formal procedural guides for JGS unilateral and combined JGS/MACV inspections. Emphasis is also required to further the standardization of the complaints processing system at all levels.

e. Projection: Final promulgation of the decree which formalizes

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the IG system should result in greater improvements in this element in the next six months.

2. Statement of Objective: To insure effective inspector general coverage of all Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

a. Review of Progress: Short-falls in personnel assignments offset previous accomplishments in this element. Air Force and Navy components were not included in the RVNAF IG Directorate.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Personnel selected and trained for assignment as inspectors general were qualified and motivated

(a) Shortfalls in filling authorized spaces were experienced at all levels. Shortages were caused primarily by the lack of qualified personnel to fill vacancies created through reassignments. This situation should be alleviated when the IG decree is finally promulgated. The decree will preclude the reassignment of inspectors general by subordinate commanders.

(b) Training of inspectors general was enhanced through orientation and refresher courses conducted, in-country, by an instruction team from the Office of the DA IG. Fifty-five inspectors general attended an orientation course conducted from 1 to 5 April 1968. Included in the attendees were three Air Force Inspectors. A refresher seminar, 22-24 April, was attended by 47 previously trained inspectors general.

(2) Plans to integrate the fragmented JGS inspectional activities into the IG Directorate were not formalized. These activities are the technical, logistics and RF/PF inspectors.

(3) Plans to improve the IG organization and staffing at the JGS, corps and division levels were finalized. As a result of these plans, JGS/J3 submitted to MACJ311, on 15 May 1968, a request for approval of space increases at each of the above levels. Also included in this request were spaces for 33 regimental and 44 provincial inspectors general. The improved organization and staffing resulting from these spaces, if approved, would:

(a) Improve the IG/troop ratio making it possible to provide increased IG coverage of all RVNAF personnel including RF/PF. (Present ratio: 1 to 3,040; proposed ratio: 1:2,630.)

(b) Provide assets with which the RVNAF IG Directorate could increase the priority of IG coverage of RF/PF.

(c) Provide assets at all levels to expedite the processing of complaints.
(Proposed increases are shown at page 53.)

Conclusions: The goals under this element were not fully attained. Assignments to fill IG spaces were offset by reassignments. Air Force and Navy inspectors general were not assigned to the IG Directorate. Training was effective; however, the number of personnel trained did not satisfy the requirements. The fragmented JGS inspectional activities were not integrated into the IG Directorate.

d. Corrective Action: Continued emphasis will be needed to improve the selection, assignment and training system to insure adequate fill of authorized IG spaces. Final approval of the recommended space increases is needed to provide a more compatible IG/troop ratio. Continued emphasis will also be required to develop formal plans to integrate the fragmented JGS inspectional activities in the IG Directorate.

e. Projection: None.

3. Statement of Objective: To fill authorized IG advisor spaces with qualified personnel.

a. Review of Progress: Progress was made in attaining the goals under this element. However, expansion of the MACV IG mission and reorientation of the advisory effort impacted directly on the original schedules. These actions resulted in shortfalls in filling IG advisor spaces in the divisions.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Assignment of advisors at JGS and the four corps was 100% as of 30 June, and one of the eleven authorized division IG advisors had been assigned.

(2) By January 1968, the mission of the MACV IG had been expanded to provide greater coverage of MACV advisory elements to assess the total mission performance and advisor effectiveness. The mission had also been expanded to provide increased participation in combined MACV/JGS inspections of ARVN and RF/PF units and their advisors.

(3) Increased US troop density and the increased tempo of operations resulted in conditions and situations which required an expansion of the MACV IG investigative capability. Increased troop awareness of the existence of the IG system resulted in higher monthly averages of complaints and requests for assistance.

(4) The need to satisfy each of the above requirements and conditions necessitated increased staffing of the MACV IG office. The requirement to increase the number of combined inspections caused a reprogramming of personnel assets to provide necessary staffing at MACV/JGS level.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(5) Pending approval of JTD changes, submitted in February and March 1968, the reprogrammed personnel assets have been taken from the division IG advisor spaces. This action was necessary to provide a more responsive inspector general capability at the MACV level.

c. Conclusions: Advisory spaces at JGS and the corps were filled as scheduled. As of 30 June there was a shortfall of 10 in the division IG Advisor spaces. Expanded MACV IG missions and functions resulted in the reprogramming of division IG advisor spaces. The resultant MACV IG effort was more responsive to COMUSMACV and provided more uniform and comprehensive coverage of MACV advisory elements.

d. Corrective Action: Approval and fill of the proposed space increases are needed to provide adequate staffing of the MACV IG office. These actions will free personnel assets for assignment to fill division IG spaces.

e. Projection: Projection of goal accomplishment under this element cannot be made without more definite information as to approval and projected fill of recommended space increases.

Major Activity Director: IG Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL

RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

(Inspector General Requirements)
(Less Navy and Air Force)

<u>LINE NO</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TO&E</u>	<u>MAP ELEMENT</u>	<u>UNIT(S)</u>	<u>CURRENT AUTH</u>	<u>SPACE INCREASES</u>	<u>TOTAL SPACES</u>
1	Inspector General Directorate, RVNAF	62-218	7FAA	1	41	107*	148**
2	Headquarters, Corps	4-351	3BBE	4	24	12	36
3	Infantry Division	4-361	3AAO	10	40	20	60
4	Abn Div HHC	54-301A	3AEA	1	4	2	6
5	Infantry Regiment Hq & Svc Co	4-564	3AAO	30	0	30	30
6	Infantry Regt (Sep)	4-563	3AAN	3	0	3	3
7	SF Comd	11-301	3BBX	1	6	0	6
8	Ranger Command	5-201	3BAW	1	5	0	5
9	Armor Command	8-211	3AQA	1	3	2	5
10	Artillery Command	6-211	3AQF	1	4	1	5
11	CMD	4-301A	3BBC	1	3	2	5
12	Naval Hq	3-310	7FAE	1 (Spaces for IG's within VNN and IG Directorate will be submitted by NAG)			
13	Hq VNAF	0010	7FAJ	1 (Spaces for IG's within VNAF and IG Directorate will be submitted by AFGP.)			
TOTAL					130	179	309

* Includes 44 spaces for 1 IG per province (44 provinces)

** These spaces do not include 5 VNAF IG's authorized by TO&E 0010, and 5 VNN IG's authorized by TO&E 3-310 detached for duty with JGS IG.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 53 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Medical Depot Operations Improvement

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: To improve the quality of Medical Depot Operations.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Establishment of improved depot warehousing and storage techniques.

Goals:

a. Instruct the ARVN Medical Depot personnel in correct warehousing and storage procedures, making maximum utilization of available covered storage space.

b. Evaluate covered storage requirements and encourage self-help building programs in the ARVN Field Medical Depot and Depot Annexes.

Analysis of Progress:

a. Establishment of improved depot warehousing and storage techniques is being rapidly attained in the RVNAF Medical Depot system. Programs have been established to provide instruction to personnel, improve storage facilities by assuring proper stock levels, and making maximum use of available covered warehouse space.

b. An active program of providing instruction and advice to ARVN Medical Depot personnel has been established. Continuous emphasis is being placed on formal training in storage techniques, space utilization, receiving and shipping procedures. To this end, depot advisors have been writing lesson plans and personally instructing ARVN depot personnel. Each program of instruction presented at the depot is carefully monitored to insure that the instruction will help to raise the proficiency of the student in warehousing and storage procedures. At the present time, a plan is being developed in coordination with US depots in Vietnam and Okinawa to provide an CJT program for ARVN depot officers.

c. Progress has been made towards improving storage at the 70th Medical Base Depot. 85% of the stocks that were previously in open storage are now under cover. Currently, a rewarehousing project is underway which will maximize the use of available space and improve the efficiency of the storage operation.

d. The evaluation of covered storage requirements is a continuing area of concentrated advisory effort. Stock surveys have been made and based on their results, a draw down of excess stocks has occurred. The draw down procedures coupled with increased emphasis on proper requisitioning has resulted in a stabilization and reduction of the overall storage requirements.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

e. To this point, only a limited amount of progress has been achieved in the self-help program. This program has had difficulty in getting off the ground because of a lack of funds, materials, time, and personnel. Another factor has been the depot commitments to security requirements. Self-help projects are being encouraged and receiving command emphasis in the ARVN Medical Depot system.

2. (C) Element: Purification of stocks and disposal of unserviceable supplies and equipment.

Goal: Instruct the ARVN Medical Supply personnel in proper quality control procedures and expedite the processing of destruction, suspension and extension information.

Analysis of Progress: Purification of stocks and disposal of unserviceable supplies and equipment is being accomplished by assuring that ARVN personnel establish and carry out good quality control procedures and dispose of unserviceable supplies and equipment on a timely basis. Little progress has been made in the disposal area because of the accounting system imposed by JGS/CLC. Because the RVNAF Medical Service is reorganizing and the depots will no longer be under CLC, it is anticipated that new regulations will allow for easier disposal procedures. Proper procedures of quality control and disposition are being followed for items requiring suspension, extension or destruction. ARVN depot personnel are now providing more timely dissemination of suspension, extension to the field resulting in a better utilization of medical supply resources.

Projection: The RVNAF Medical Depot operations continue to improve, and it is felt that the goals outlined will be achieved within this FY.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 55 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief Advisory Division

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Medical Service Force Structure

1. (C) Statement of Objectives: Review all tables of organization and equipment.

a. Review of Progress: During report period, all TO&E's were reviewed in order to align them with revisions to the Medical Service Force Structure. New TO&E's were submitted for sector hospitals and the Airborne Medical Battalion. Also, four (4) clearing companies and four (4) medical companies (separate) were inactivated on 1 June 1968. These actions were pursuant to decrees issued by the Minister of Defense on 23 March 1968 directing reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service.

b. Analysis of Progress: Actions on TO&E's were dictated largely by requirements of reorganization. Submission of new TO&E's was delayed somewhat by late approval of the reorganization. However, activation of new elements and deactivations of units no longer required under the new structure are proceeding on schedule.

c. Conclusion: Action required by the reorganization is proceeding well considering the later date of approval. TO&E's for new units are being prepared and should be submitted so as to permit approval prior to the scheduled dates of activation.

2. (C) Statement of Objectives: To establish RVNAF Medical Service Force Structure Authorization for CY 1968.

a. Review of Progress: Programmed actions for assignment of personnel against 1967 spaces have been accomplished by reallocating personnel to Duy Tan General Hospital, the four (4) convalescent centers and the Airborne Battalion. Of the 2486 medical spaces requested for FY 1969, 1778 are being incorporated in the MACV UAL. 682 will be used for activation of sector hospitals in CY 68. The balance will be used in CY 69 to activate phase II elements of the reorganization.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies in Accomplishment: Lack of construction continues to inhibit assignment and utilization of personnel. While sector hospitals are authorized, the facilities are not in being. Positive action in this regard is being withheld pending consideration of a joint construction plan which would incorporate both RVNAF and Ministry of Health fixed medical facilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Critical Problems: To obtain approval of the GVN for Joint construction of medical treatment facilities so that medical personnel can be assigned and utilized to their maximum potential.

c. Conclusions and/or trends:

(1) Trends: Programmed actions to upgrade the level of medical care through increase of personnel staffing ration in medical facilities will be adversely affected by the reduction of 708 spaces of those requested. Further delay can be anticipated in proper assignment of personnel due to delays in construction.

(2) Need for revision of program: None.

(3) Correction Action: The approval of by GVN for joint construction is being actively sought. Once obtained it will resolve the problem of optimum utilization of personnel.

(4) Projection: The approved reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service is to be phased in over 18 months. When accomplished, this plus the construction of adequate facilities will assure the optimum utilization of personnel with a consequent improvement in the total RVNAF medical capability.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Command Surgeon

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Command Surgeon

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J6

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Military Telecommunications Network, Vietnam (MTN-V)

Statement of Objectives: The Military Telecommunications Network, Vietnam (MTN-V) was established to upgrade and expand existing RVNAF fixed plant communications facilities and, in later phases, to provide an inter-connected area communications system. The resources necessary to implement this plan are obtained through 200 MAP funded Class IV Signal Development Projects which will provide equipment for telephone exchanges, outside cable plant, radio relay systems, and communications centers.

a Review of Progress: The actual accomplishments achieved during the period 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1968 are shown below:

(1) Goal: Preparation and submission of ten Class IV Signal Projects during CY 68.

Accomplished: Five (5) Class IV Signal Projects were submitted during the reporting period.

(2) Goal: A total of forty-one (41) buildings were programmed for completion by end of CY 68.

Accomplishment: Engineering work, preliminary to award of construction contracts, was completed on three buildings during this period. Site surveys and site adaptation plans were approved for 29 buildings.

(3) Goal: Completion of 143 Class IV Signal projects by end of CY 68.

Accomplishment:

<u>Type Project</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Completed</u>
Inside Plant	26	9
Outside Plant	58	2
Radio Rehabilitation	5	0
Microwave Radio Relay	9	0
Communications Center	45	2

(4) Goal: Off-shore training for 25 officers and 16 NCO's. In-Country training for 149 officers and 3,890 enlisted personnel.

Accomplishment:

Off-shore training: 18 officers and 5 NCO's

In-Country training: 26 officers and 213 enlisted personnel were graduated from the RVNAF Signal School.

b Analysis of progress:

(1) The Tet offensive caused significant delays in MTN-V progress during this period. Emergency diversion of materials, particularly cable and outside plant hardware, disrupted normal installation schedule. Post-Tet

PAGE 58 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

restoration and short range emergency demands on RVNAF installation personnel has delayed installation of other projects. Restoration demands were satisfied to a large extent in late April and installation work was returning to normal towards the end of the reporting period.

(2) Processing of building construction projects was satisfactory during this period. Final engineering work was completed on three building and construction contracts are expected to be awarded early in the 3rd quarter of CY 68.

(3) Delivery of Class IV project materials improved during the latter part of the reporting period. Approved projects were reviewed to determine status of supply action with the objective of identifying over-due items. Follow up action was initiated and is being closely monitored for delivery of critical items.

c. Conclusions: Diversion of personnel and materials for post-Tet restoration caused delay of MTN-V project installation. Major damage was suffered by aerial cable while damage to fixed installations was negligible.

d. Trends: Resumption of normal installation schedule and increased delivery of Class IV project materials are expected to accelerate completion of projects now under construction. Start rate on new projects is expected to show improvement during 3rd and 4th quarters of CY 68. Completion of three building projects is expected late in the 4th quarter of CY 68. Equipment to expand Saigon dial central office capacity from 4600 to 7200 lines is scheduled to arrive in 4th quarter of CY 68. Minor building modifications to accommodate expansion are expected to start early in the 3rd quarter, CY 68 and installation of new equipment is expected to be under way in the 1st quarter of CY 69.

e. Corrective Actions: Continued action will be taken to monitor and coordinate equipment delivery schedules, building construction schedules, and programmed power projects. RVNAF project submissions will be closely reviewed to insure compatibility with existing and programmed projects, sound engineering and economy of resources.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACOFS, J6

PAGE 59 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Staff Judge Advocate, MACV

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Off-Shore Schooling for Vietnamese
Judge Advocate Officers

Statement of Objective: To increase the total number of school-trained military lawyers in the Directorate of Military Justice, MOD, RVNAF, and to ultimately establish a cadre for conducting such training in-country.

a. Review of Progress: Two judge advocate officers are programmed for off-shore training for FY 69. One such officer has already returned to Vietnam, having successfully completed his course of study. The other officer is presently enrolled in Language School, in preparation for his schooling and on-the-job training in the United States.

b. Analysis of Progress: The most recent graduate of the Off-Shore Training Program is being utilized extremely well. On 15 July 1968, he was assigned the very challenging and important position of Assistant Prosecutor at the IV CTZ Military Field Court in Can Tho, presently one of the busiest courts in Vietnam. In fact, the Director of Military Justice always assigns each off-shore graduate to a position where he can optimize, to the fullest extent possible, the training received in the program.

c. Conclusions: Currently, only a small number of personnel, 12 in number, have received such training in the United States. The program has proven to be exceedingly effective and worthwhile, and every attempt should be made not only to continue it, but also to broaden its scope, where possible.

d. Corrective Action: No corrective action is necessary at the present time.

e. Projection: An increase from two to four space allocations at the Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia will be requested for FY 70. A request will also be made to send one or more judge advocate officers to civilian law schools, for study at the post-graduate level.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Staff Judge Advocate

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Maintenance Improvement

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: Increase overall serviceability of RVNAF materiel and increase responsiveness of the maintenance system in the regeneration of unserviceable equipment to operational status.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: RVNAF command emphasis on preventive maintenance.

Goal: Continued advisor emphasis at all levels regarding the necessity for RVNAF command interest and follow-up actions concerning preventive maintenance at unit level.

Analysis of Progress:

a. The Central Logistics Command (CLC) has placed emphasis on preventive maintenance through the use of inspections and publication of preventive maintenance information.

b. One hour class, emphasizing the need to stress preventive maintenance at the unit levels is given to each MACV advisor at his initial orientation. Each advisor is given a listing of preventive maintenance indicators that is printed in both English and Vietnamese. This is used to encourage ARVN commanders to perform spot check inspections and follow-up on preventive maintenance.

c. In the engineer equipment area, an Advisors' Guide Pamphlet has been published on tires, tracks, cable, and batteries which seem to be the primary problem areas. An initial publication of 300 of these pamphlets has been made and these have been distributed to the field. In addition, one thousand pocket size dictionary pamphlets in Vietnamese and English, "Glossary of Maintenance Terms" have been published and distributed to the field. The efforts toward helping the advisor emphasize to his counterpart the importance of preventive maintenance have somewhat improved the preventive maintenance problem. However, judging from the condition of engineer equipment that is turned in to support maintenance, this area requires further effort.

d. Advisors and their counterparts have published and distributed preventive maintenance indicators to officers, NCOs, and operators. Follow-up inspections are being performed by 3rd echelon personnel of 2nd echelon units, which causes unit commanders to take more interest in the maintenance of their equipment. Also DSU commanders are encouraged

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 61 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

to inform both the ALC Commander and the appropriate technical service where improper preventive maintenance has resulted in equipment failure.

e. All levels of ALC logistical support are stressing the need for preventive maintenance. Technical assistance visits by DSUs to supported units are accompanied by advisors. These visits frequently result in the dispatch of maintenance contact teams to perform on-site repairs and to train unit personnel in preventive maintenance practices. The DSUs have established training courses in preventive maintenance, especially on new equipment being introduced into the ARVN inventory.

f. In summary, steps toward improved preventive maintenance practices have been taken principally through more inspection visits by supporting units to the supported units. Additional advisor assistance has been made available through MALT visits and by placing specialists with units who request special assistance. The latter program has been effective and will be continued.

2. (C) Element: Availability of repair parts.

Goals:

a. Increase shipments of repair parts from off-shore sources direct to up-country ports.

b. Increased effort on translation, publication and distribution of equipment maintenance manuals.

c. Improve supply reporting system to assure that requisition objectives are properly maintained and anticipate critical repair parts shortages.

d. A wall to wall inventory of existing repair parts stocks at DSU's and depots.

e. Insure timely return of recoverable repair parts to DSU's and depots.

f. Update the density listing of technical services equipment to insure proper repair parts requisitioning.

Analysis of Progress: Repair parts, which are supplied by either Depot Command Japan or COMUS, are direct shipped to the 1st, 2nd, and 5th ALCs. With the exception of Signal items, parts for the 3rd and 4th ALC's come to the base depots and are redistributed. Signal repair parts are transshipped from the base depot to afford better control of these important items.

3. (C) Element: Complete utilization of RVNAF depot overhaul and rebuild capabilities.

Goals:

- a. Provision for additional school-trained and on-the-job trained personnel.
- b. Reduction of the out-of-country rebuild program.

Analysis of Progress: Action is taken by Central Logistics Command to review Technical Services rebuild programs to assure maximum utilization of RVNAF capability prior to requesting out-of-country rebuild. At this time ARVN has the in-country capability to rebuild all M600 series vehicles and CSPJ vehicles currently in their inventory. Off-shore rebuild supports ARVN M113 Armored Personnel Carriers and the major assemblies for the M41A3 tank. Due to the density increase of M113 vehicles, the off-shore rebuild program will be continued for some time. All Signal equipment rebuild is performed in-country with the exception of modules for the AN/PRC-25 and AN/GRC-106 which can only be rebuilt in CONUS depots. The AN/VRC-12 series modules will also be sent back to CONUS for rebuild when this is required. No other ARVN equipment is involved in out-of-country rebuild.

4. (C) Element: Analyze the current technical service maintenance system and identify problem areas.

Goals:

- a. Visit technical service maintenance activities throughout RVN to gain a comprehensive knowledge of the existing system and to identify problem areas.
- b. Develop and publish a comprehensive RVNAF technical service maintenance directive.

Analysis of Progress: The Central Logistics Command Inspection Team and Inspector General Team inspect technical service maintenance activities to determine problem areas. All technical service advisory personnel on this team perform continual visits to their respective ARVN maintenance facilities throughout the Corps areas to obtain first-hand knowledge of potential problem areas and to advise their counterpart of solutions. In addition, ALC advisors have periodically visited technical service units in other ALC's to observe operations and exchange information on techniques and problem areas. Technical service conferences held by the chiefs of each technical service advisory division have also been helpful in this area.

5. (C) Element: Provision of adequate direct support facilities as close to the operating elements as is feasible with available resources.

Goals:

a. Encourage activation of more direct support shops on the province level, especially in pacification and special priority areas.

b. Improve mobility of direct support shop on-site capability for technical service support of field operations.

Analysis of Progress:

a. The present capability to provide mobile on-site repair is being utilized adequately. Increases in this capability, while considered to be desirable, are dependent upon TOE changes to increase personnel and equipment authorizations.

b. In addition to the Signal direct support vans in each province, the traveling maintenance teams from direct support units, and the contact teams from the A&DSL Companies, a new concept that provides for a sector direct support platoon has been developed by RVNAF. This platoon will provide direct supply and maintenance support to all RF/PF units in that district. This will be tested in IV Corps for a three month period.

c. A plan to organize Signal mobile contact teams was developed and implementation begun. Three man teams with a 3/4 ton or 1 ton vehicle mounting a maintenance bench, test equipment, power supply, and spare parts cabinet will be available to perform on-site maintenance.

d. Each Engineer DSU has contact teams which have the capability to support field operations. The proposed force structure will expand the contact team concept which is vital to Engineer field operations.

e. Mobile contact teams from Ordnance DSUs have proven most effective. Small arms repair and artillery repair has been greatly enhanced by the employment of these teams. Mobile track repair teams from the Ordnance DSUs are attached to each Armored Cavalry Regiment. Signal repair teams are completely mobile. Engineer DSUs also provide contact teams to perform on-site repairs. Quartermaster and Medical depots have not experienced a requirement to provide this capability on a repetitive basis.

6. (C) Element: Take steps to aid RVNAF maintenance system to become more self-sufficient.

Goal: Advise and assist ARVN field depots to establish maintenance calibration capability so as to reduce reliance on US sources for calibration support.

Analysis of Progress: A Calibration Support agreement has been consummated between ARVN and 1st Logistical Command. 1st Log Command will provide maintenance calibration, (Type C calibration) until ARVN is capable of performing this type of calibration. To establish this maintenance calibration capability in ARVN, Vietnamese soldiers are performing OJT at 1st Log Command maintenance shops. As the ARVN personnel are trained and their capability increases, maintenance calibration will be shifted from 1st Log Command to ARVN. This will take approximately 24 months. Progress has been made in both signal and medical services to reach greater independence from the US in calibrating ARVN equipment. The 641st Signal Depot has the equipment and technical competence to calibrate the equipment of supported units. A "standard" is needed by the field depot in order to calibrate its equipment, and this must be provided by higher echelons. It is anticipated that continued training and improvement of facilities will lessen, but not eliminate, the requirement for calibration support from US sources in the future.

7. (C) Element: Increase equipment availability.

Goal: Establish functioning maintenance floats.

Analysis of Progress:

a. At present, maintenance float items are available for certain radios, small arms, and artillery pieces. Although maintenance float vehicles are authorized, none have been issued to II ALC. As the equipment availability situation improves, priority of issue for maintenance float items should be considered.

b. A maintenance float has been established within the ARVN system for all technical services except Medical and Quartermaster. The Ordnance float, consisting of approximately 3% of the supported density of major items, is operational at the DSU level. Maintenance float is not established at the divisional DSU. Divisions obtain their float support from the 230th Ordnance Service Center. Advisory effort has resulted in the establishment of a functioning maintenance float system for most high density Signal major items. Maintenance float has been established in all Engineer DSU's within the availability limits of resources. This float is further limited because of the diversity of Engineer equipment.

c. Functioning maintenance floats of Signal equipment have been established. Maintenance float is authorized and on hand for equipment which is required for continuous use and which requires 10 days or more for repair. Quantities of maintenance float are based on the number of items supported at each support unit. In addition to the maintenance float available to regular force ARVN units, a maintenance float has been established in A&DSL companies for RF/PF. As an example, 337 AN/PFC-10s are authorized for maintenance float in 44 A&DSL Companies. However, only 88% of the authorized float is on hand (77% of A&DSL companies have 100% of their maintenance float on hand).

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACoFS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: OSD ARPA RDFU-V

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Development of RVNAF RDT&E Capability

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: Creation of an RDT&E capability within RVNAF in both the technical and social sciences. Expand the RDT&E capability throughout the scientific community within the Republic of South Vietnam.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) In connection with a study dealing with the defense of hamlets and villages, Major Loi visited 14 provinces, spending more than a month in the field. The ARVN Joint General Staff became so interested in this study, they assigned three senior officers to participate in the field work, and one of these officers is presently in the U.S. assisting the American field team to complete the final report. Major Truong designed and implemented a major CDTC-V study, Living Standards of the ARVN, which required him to travel to all four Corps areas. In addition, the study has required the participation of six junior officers, all of whom have traveled throughout the country. Total time spent in the field thus far would exceed two months. Also, Major Truong has traveled to Hue, and to several provinces adjacent to Saigon, in the process of assisting investigators working on the ARPA/CDTC-V study, Project Echo. Major Loi accompanied several very distinguished visitors on numerous field research trips to the Delta, the Plain of Reeds, and the Highlands. Major Trong conducted a field test and evaluation of the starlight scope for the M-16 rifle in three different locations in RVN. Major Phong prepared a test plan, staffed it through JGS, and implemented an operational test and evaluation of the PSID (Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector) in several field locations. This new equipment is being introduced simultaneously to American and Vietnamese forces. Major Phong and his assistant made three field trips to collect data for a study on communications propagation effects. Lt. Hai made a field trip in connection with the Plain of Reeds Development project, and another for the study dealing with the Plain of Camau. Major Trong and Lt. Vuong actively participated in the test of the GEODAR tunnel detector equipment in the areas of Saigon and Gia Dinh, and assisted in training Vietnamese army crews in the use of GEODAR. These newly trained crews have conducted several operational sweeps in the field with this experimental equipment. Lt. Hai collected putrid water samples from various places in the Plain of Reeds, and analyzed the samples for impurities before and after chemical treatment. This study is designed to produce potable water for the canteens of individual soldiers. Finally, LTC Toan, the Director of CDTC-V, and Major Loi, toured numerous R&D and training centers throughout the United States. This tour, which lasted approximately one month, enabled LTC Toan and Maj Loi to observe a variety of RDT&E operations at locations such as the RAND Corp., Fort Sill, Fort Bragg, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Fort Belvoir, and the Pentagon.

(2) Close cooperation between CDTC-V and the University of Saigon was initiated with a project to determine the edibility of various oils extracted from vegetation in South Vietnam. This study is being conducted by the Chemistry Department of the Faculty of Sciences. Another civilian effort which is receiving encouragement and assistance from CDTC-V deals with a study of the effects of altitude on forests and other vegetation in Vietnam. This study is being conducted by the Botany Department of Saigon University's Faculty of Sciences. In an effort involving both training and cooperation with civilian scientists, RDFU-V contracted with an economist, Dr. Tuyet (of Saigon University), to provide advanced courses in economics and statistics for staff members of the CDTC-V project, Living Standards of the ARVN. Finally, in cooperation with the Research Directorate of the Vietnamese Department of Agriculture, a book is being prepared which will describe the various flora of South Vietnam, their toxic and/or beneficial properties, and their relationships to military survival in Vietnam. This book will contain illustrations of the plants, and the descriptive text will be printed in both English and Vietnamese, on opposite pages, to facilitate reading by most of the allied forces in Vietnam.

(3) Relations with the Thai military establishment were continued by a visit of several JGS officers to Thailand for the purpose of observing the production of the Thai combat ration, and studying the possibility of using it in Vietnam. In addition, CDTC-V involvement with third country researchers is further exemplified by the joint Korean-U.S.-Vietnamese Social Science Study. This project attempts to investigate the inter-relationships among the U.S., Korean, and Vietnamese armed forces in Vietnam, as well as their relationships with the Vietnamese civilian population.

(4) During the current reporting period, the practice of assigning CDTC-V officers to each of the RDFU-V projects was continued. This practice has continued to enhance the ability of CDTC-V officers to make significant contributions to the studies, and to upgrade their RDT&E management expertise. In addition, RDFU-V officers have been assigned to each CDTC-V project to offer advice and instruction wherever it might be needed. These reciprocal assignments have sometimes resulted in the production of highly creative products, particularly in the area of psyops. The ability of RDFU-V and CDTC-V to work together closely and successfully was shown in a joint briefing and demonstration given for ten visiting U.S. congressmen. Further, the two organizations work together each month to produce a joint progress report for all current projects, and this report is widely distributed, both to U.S. and GVN agencies. Also, in order to increase the scope and number of CDTC-V projects, and to provide additional testing and evaluation experience to the CDTC-V project officers, a wide variety of equipment has been provided to CDTC-V for field testing, such as hamlet alarm systems, patrol seismic intrusion detectors, starlight scopes for the M-16 rifle, and various chemical supplies.

UNCLASSIFIED

The CDTC-V project, Living Standards of the ARVN, is a prime example of the close cooperation between ARPA and CDTC. With CDTC-V providing the manpower and principle direction of this major study, ARPA has supported the effort with (1) the provision of expert consultants, (2) supplies and air transportation, (3) monetary support of a civilian interview team, and (4) professional course work to upgrade the staff of the principal investigator. Further support will be provided at the conclusion of the study with the provision of expert program analysts to aid in computer operations.

Another CDTC project, Project ECHO, is a good example of close cooperation. This is the first joint study conducted by ARPA and CDTC in as much as the study is being performed in English and Vietnamese simultaneously. Assistance from ARPA in this project takes the form of the provision of an American research contractor and logistics support.

Other examples of cooperation include a tri-lingual library placed in the CDTC compound and operated by and for the Vietnamese, a translator pool to enable both CDTC and ARPA to overcome the language barrier, and a pool of Vietnamese interviewers to provide interviewing support for both ARPA and CDTC projects.

(5) The current reporting period has another significant milestone to exhibit: the Vietnamese Vocabulary Study was successfully completed, and the final reports are currently being staffed with the appropriate U.S. and GVN agencies. This study is significant because it was the first major project ever to be conducted entirely by the Vietnamese social science community.

(6) In line with CDTC-V's increased acceptance of responsibility, ARPA helped CDTC to reorganize its TO&E to include a new mission, new capabilities, and a new title for the organization. The new TO&E has been submitted to MACJ311 and is presently under consideration. CDTC has already had this TO&E approved by JGS, RVNAF, and the Ministry of Defense, GVN, the proposed title of the new organization is Defense Research and Development Center.

b. Analysis of Progress: Satisfactory progress in the achievement of most program goals has been made. However, conditions of war provide some qualification to this statement.

(1) The number of field trips, and the quality of field work in which CDTC-V has participated, has continued at a high level throughout the reporting period. However, if it had not been for the insecure conditions following the Tet and May offensives, the extent of field work participation would have been even greater.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 69 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Positive and successful working relationships between CDTC-V and the civilian scientific community have increased, but only with the faculties of the University of Saigon. Involvement with the universities at Hue and Can Tho was not increased because of the major damage incurred by those institutions during the Tet offensive. For a long period, all Vietnamese universities ceased to function, and only at this time are the institutions at Hue and Can Tho beginning to recover their normal operations.

(3) Progress in forming mutual research associations with other national groups has been extremely slow because of the complicated coordinations that must occur among numerous high level agencies in the various government involved. However, during the reporting period, the necessary coordinations have been accomplished, and a joint multi-national study is ready to begin. Another project in 1968 is contemplated, if the necessary coordinations can be accomplished within that time period.

(4) Several measures have been taken to increase the cooperation and interaction between CDTC-V and RDFU-V. For example, the practice of physically locating U.S. project officers in the same offices with their Vietnamese counterparts has been continued as new personnel report for duty. Every attempt is made to overlap new project officers with their predecessors so that smooth counterpart relations can be passed on to the new generation. Greater management capabilities within the CDTC-V staff have been achieved by the joint work in formulating monthly progress reports, and by the provision of new hardware equipment which becomes CDTC-V's responsibility to test. Every effort has been made to increase JGS awareness of the increased scope and responsibility of the CDTC-V programs, and all factors indicate that this effort has been a success. In addition, CDTC-V has been encouraged to make contacts with other governmental agencies within the GVN, and to indicate a desire to conduct RDT&E functions which may be of assistance to these other agencies. Finally, periodic social functions are held so that project officers have an opportunity to discuss mutual problems in an informal setting, and so that both groups can become more aware of the traditions and customs of their counterparts' nations.

(5) The R&D management capability of the CDTC-V staff has been enhanced by letting them assume the technical management responsibility for the projects which are being conducted through local universities. Three such projects have been established during the current reporting period. It is expected that at least two more projects will begin during the next six months.

(6) In the past, CDTC-V had had little working relationship with other agencies of the GVN. If their new TO&E is approved by MACJ311, they will be in a position to provide positive contributions in the RDT&E field to numerous other GVN agencies. The fallout from such a reorganization of CDTC-V's mission could easily be a heightened interest in research in several GVN agencies.

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) During the past six months, four new hardware evaluations were initiated by CDTC-V. This hardware includes the very latest in military research and development equipment (e.g., seismic detectors, starlight scopes, tunnel detectors, etc). The trend of supplying CDTC-V with an increasing variety of new equipment for test and evaluation to determine its compatibility for use by Vietnamese forces will continue. Their capability to conduct credible test programs will show continual improvement as experience is gained in the management of such testing programs.

(2) The broadened scope and increased depth in CDTC's research and development capabilities is an obvious sign of RVNAF progress. In addition to the testing and evaluation of hardware equipment, research in many of the social and behavioral sciences has been added to their functions in the past six months. Their new mission calls for cooperation with many more GVN agencies, and research in support of these organizations will occur for the first time. This trend will continue in the future, even though most of CDTC-V's efforts will be directed toward the support of JGS and MOD.

(3) With the introduction of more advanced and sophisticated military equipment to the RVNAF, the existing facilities of CDTC-V are rapidly becoming outdated, and incapable of providing the laboratory support needed for test and evaluation efforts. This is particularly true the areas of electronics, chemistry, and optics. Expansion of such facilities will be needed in the relatively near future.

(4) During this reporting period, the JGS has shown a heightened interest in the development of CDTC-V. That this interest will continue was strongly indicated in the contents of a speech given by the chairman of the JGS when he officiated at a ceremony to dedicate a new reference library donated by ARPA for the use of CDTC-V and other personnel. This interest in CDTC-V has been pragmatically demonstrated by the assignment of additional qualified personnel to CDTC-V, and by a promise to meet further needs as they arise.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) Efforts will be made to further encourage JGS/MOD to identify and assign qualified personnel resources for RDT&E work in CDTC-V.

(2) An initial study will be conducted to determine the feasibility of improving the physical plant, primarily the technical laboratory facilities, of CDTC-V.

(3) In line with the new mission and TO&E of CDTC-V, proper liaisons with various agencies of the government will have to be established in order to insure the proper utilization of the research produced by the new Defense Research and Development Center.

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Projection:

(1) An increase in the number of officers and enlisted men assigned to CDTC is expected to continue. The educational level of these individuals will also continue to increase.

(2) Training programs such as those offered to the staff of the Living Standards Project will continue as needed. In addition, a more formal set of courses will be offered to individuals who have limited opportunity to increase their educational level at a formal educational institution.

(3) Just as Colonel Toan and Major Loi were sent to the United States, so will other officers be offered the opportunity to view U.S. research operations as well as to receive technical training. It is projected that some of this educational training in the U.S. will encompass the areas of social science.

(4) CDTC-V's interaction with the civilian scientific community will probably diminish in the next few months because the National Mobilization Program is resulting in the military induction of a large number of the scientists in the civilian community. However, it is hoped that some of these scientists can be incorporated into the personnel structure of CDTC-V.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: OSD ARPA RDFU-V

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF COMSEC Unit (C)

(C) Statement of Objectives: Issue to Unit 16 100% of the RVNAF TO&E 22-872 signal equipment by 30 June 1968.

a. Review of Progress: The signal equipment on hand increased from 89% (December 1967 to 92% June 1968).

b. Analysis of Progress: Some of the items included above were issued in excess of operational requirements and have been excluded from acquisition goals. A new TO&E for Unit 16 has been prepared and has been submitted for approval by respective technical services prior to final approval. Satisfactory progress has been made in acquiring needed signal equipment for Unit 16.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: The remaining 8% of those authorized signal items for Unit 16 are programmed throughout normal supply channels and will be issued when available. Until such time as composite equipment is received, i.e., trucks, shelters, and racks, the additional equipment authorized could not be used in an operational environment.

d. Corrective Actions: Those items of signal equipment peculiar to ASA and authorized by Unit 16 have now been authorized for issue by CG, USASA. Requisitions for composite equipment have been submitted in anticipation of receipt of the remaining signal equipment.

e. Projection: The new proposed TO&E for Unit 16 is still being staffed through RVNAF technical services and should reach MACV for staffing and final approval during the first quarter of FY 69. It is not anticipated that the realignment of equipment and personnel will pose any problems concerning the requisitioning and programming of additional signal equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals:
Not automatically declassified

PAGE 73 OF 265 PAGES

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Clothing Production

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: Increase RVNAF Clothing Production

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Increase clothing production.

Goals:

- a. Utilize GVN Prison production facilities when established.
- b. Institute technical improvements in production facilities and methods.
- c. Increase the utilization of equipment presently on the production line.

Analysis of Progress: Tan Hiep Rehabilitation Center has been approved for contracting and has started production. A cutting machine is being converted to dual-speed for the purpose of cutting synthetic material. A machine, pattern, perforating for punching multiple thickness of pattern paper has been requisitioned. Two hydraulic press balers were installed to speed up baling procedures and shipping. Progress is being made in hiring new sewing machine operators to use all idle machines. Workflow patterns have been revised and implemented. Very close coordination with NICP and 10th Base Depot has been effected to insure adequate quantities of material for each days production. The most significant bottleneck this past reporting period was the baling procedures. This was overcome by using more military labor and packing the finished product in boxes obtained from incoming material shipments. Further, two hydraulic press balers were installed.

2. (C) Element: Improve clothing production planning and scheduling.

Goals:

- a. Reorganize the workflow patterns currently being utilized in production.
- b. Utilize accurate planning data for production scheduling, reflecting coordinated programs between the Clothing Production Center, the RVNAF QM, and the National Inventory Control Point (NICP).

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Emphasize the virtues of flexibility in day to day operations which will enable temporary bottlenecks to be bypassed or overcome without materially affecting total programs.

Projection: The program is proceeding satisfactorily and will continue to show improvement primarily due to the improvement in planning, production scheduling, the introduction of new equipment, and the hiring of additional personnel to increase production.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 75 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Food Service Program

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: To develop a self-sustaining RVNAF Food Service Program.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Develop a self-sustaining RVNAF Food Service Program.

Goals:

- a. Develop a food service career program in RVNAF.
- b. To develop a mess supervisor training program in RVNAF.
- c. Study and improve RVNAF kitchen equipment and consumable supply allowances.

Analysis of Progress: Very little progress has been accomplished in the food service career program due to a lack of RVNAF command interest, lack of personnel authorizations, and lack of personnel who have the desire and would be qualified to enter such a career program. A Mess Control and Administrative Course, three weeks in duration, was instituted in March 1968 to train officers and NCO's, at the RVNAF QM School. To date three classes have been held. Two types of diesel fueled stoves have been adopted for RVNAF use and a press pressurized kerosene burner unit is under study for possible field and garrison use. A garrison mess tray has been developed and is being field tested. No progress has been made concerning consumable supply allowances, as RVNAF considers these items to be local purchase. QMCAD proposed and the RVNAF QM School adopted a shortened, improved cooks training program of instruction. The revised POI has been submitted to the RVNAF Central Training Command for approval, after which it will be used in all cooks training conducted in RVNAF.

Projection: This subject program will receive increased emphasis and the RVNAF food service program will improve with proper training, equipment and the availability of personnel.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

SECRET

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief RVNAF Force Structure and Organization Division, MA.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Development of the RVNAF Force Structure and Organization.

1. (S) Element: Activations and inactivations of RVNAF units in accord with the jointly approved Unit Authorization List for a balanced force structure.

Statement of Objective: To review the success that the RVNAF has made in attaining the year end force levels. Further, to provide a projection of the FY69 program and its objectives.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The momentum of the RVNAF expansion which began in January 1968 continues. ARVN unit activations were generally on schedule and by 30 June RVNAF had exceeded earlier expectations.

(2) RF and PF had also exceeded initial projections. As of 30 June 1968, 1,053 companies and 4,561 PF platoons were authorized for activation. Of that number, 1,050 companies and 4,560 platoons were activated for a shortfall of three companies and one platoon.

(3) Of the 1,050 companies activated, on 30 June, 944 were operational, 79 were in training and 27 were awaiting training.

(4) Of the 4,560 platoons activated, on 30 June, 4,327 were operational, 129 were in training and 104 were awaiting training.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The RVNAF strength increase of over 120,000 between January 1 and June 30 is noteworthy. The increase is attributable to the sharp increase in volunteers and the GVN mobilization effort.

(2) ARVN unit activations progressed generally as scheduled.

(3) Following the TET offensive, both RF and PF strengths showed moderate gains through the end of March. Since 1 April, RF strength has experienced a significant upsurge. On the other hand, PF strength continued to show only moderate gains. For example, between

SECRET

PAGE 77 OF 265 PAGES

SECRET

31 March and 15 June RF strength increased by 33,115 from 157,591 to 190,706. During this same period PF strength increased by 8,520 from 153,094 to 161,614. The large increase in RF is attributed to the increased emphasis that has been placed on recruiting and the provision of conscripts for the RF.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: The accelerated expansion since TET and the implementation of general mobilization indicates that the GVN is determined to improve RVNAF effectiveness and assume a greater share of the burden of the war. The GVN has generally fulfilled manpower requirements for unit activations in FY68.

d. Corrective Actions: A concerted effort is being made to obtain an approved force structure plan for FY69-70 for presentation to CINCPAC/JCS by August. Early OSD approval of the revised FY69 plan will greatly assist in the orderly preparation and implementation of an activation schedule for FY69.

e. Projection:

(1) At the current rate of expansion, the maximum sustainable strength of 801,215 should be attained by 31 December 1968. Presently, the program for unit activations, equipping and training has been delayed due to the requirement to resubmit a revised force structure plan to OSD. This plan will provide maximum GVN ground combat capability.

(2) In FY69, the increase for the RF provides spaces to improve command and control capabilities and logistical support forces. These space increases will permit remaining sector and subsector headquarters and administrative and direct support logistical companies to reorganize under new TOEs. In addition, there is a moderate increase of 143 RF rifle companies from 1,053 to 1,196 and 300 PF platoons from 4,561 to 4,861.

(3) Activation schedules will insure an orderly implementation of the plan. Future manpower requirements for unit activations should not present a problem.

(4) A noticeable increase in combat effectiveness may be expected when about 50% of the modernization equipment arrives, currently forecast for about December 1968.

2. (S) Element: Inactivation of unauthorized units.

Statement of Objective: To eliminate unauthorized RVNAF units by reprogramming action or inactivation.

a. Review of Progress:

SECRET

(1) The MACV staff identified 57 unauthorized units* as of 31 December 1967. The total spaces involved amounted to approximately 4,180.

(2) During the first half of calendar year 1968 six of the units were inactivated and three were incorporated in the proposed revision of the force structure forwarded to higher authority for approval. One unit was activated during the period.

b. Analysis of Progress: The legalization or elimination of these units represents an effort by MACV and the JCS to adjust available manpower.

c. Conclusion or trend: Continued effort will be required during the last half of CY68 to identify and eliminate unauthorized units. It is possible that the accelerated expansion of the RVNAF currently in progress may result in the creation of additional unauthorized units.

d. Corrective Action: To eliminate unauthorized units by inactivation or reprogramming into the force structure.

* References made to unauthorized units does not necessarily indicate company or battalion sized elements. In many cases the term refers to sections, caretaker headquarters, offices or agencies.

3. (U) Element: Development of jointly approved authorization documents (TOE/TA).

Statement of Objective: The goal is to have 85 percent of all jointly approved authorization documents current and published by the end of CY68.

a. Review of Progress: Seventy two percent of all authorization documents were current as of 30 June 1968. This can be compared with sixty nine percent current as of 31 December 1967. Review of progress is as follows:

<u>TOE/TA</u>	<u>31 Dec 67</u>	<u>30 Jun 68</u>
Current	69%	72%
Approved by MACV/JCS, awaiting publication	14%	7%
MACV for review	4%	1%
Pending action, JCS	13%	20%

SECRET

PAGE 79 OF 265 PAGES

SECRET

b. Analysis of Progress: The difference between the percentage of authorization documents now current and the stated objective, is attributed to the large number changes in unit strengths and equipment as a result of the RVNAF expansion and modernization.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: MAP equipment is based primarily on jointly approved RVNAF authorization documents which include tables of organization and equipment and tables of allowances for ARVN, RF/PF, VNN, VNMIC, and the unit manning documents/unit authorization lists of the VNAF. The current review of all authorization documents as a result of the RVNAF expansion and modernization indicate a trend to improve the number of documents current by the end of CY68.

d. Corrective Actions: Equipment lists for all RVNAF units have recently been reviewed and updated to incorporate the modernization equipment. These revised unit equipment lists will be used as a basis for authorization document revision. A concerted effort is being made to accelerate the revision of all outdated authorization documents and reduce the time required to print these documents.

c. Projection: The goal for CY68 is to have 85% of all authorization documents in a current status.

4. (S) Element: Modernization of RVNAF.

Statement of Objective: To determine the status of progress on equipment and material approved for inclusion in the appropriate RVNAF equipment authorization tables.

a. Review of Progress: An ongoing program is underway to replace the World War II weapons in the hands of RVNAF units. The following review of progress encompasses individual weapons, crew served weapons, vehicles, and radios that are being replaced in RVNAF inventory.

(1) M16 rifles have been approved for issue to replace both types of carbines, M1 rifles, BARs and SMGs. During FY68, M16 rifles were issued to all Marine, airborne, infantry, and ranger battalions. In addition, M16 rifles were issued to Recon companies, mechanized rifle troops, highland scout units, CIDG mobile strike forces, special forces teams, and a token issue was made to the training base. Sufficient weapons are expected to be received during FY69 and FY70 to complete the issue to all RVNAF and US sponsored paramilitary combat and combat support units. The table below includes requirements and expected deliveries through FY70.

SECRET

SECRET

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Required	714,457	792,696	818,995
Expected Deliveries		287,345	246,828
Cumulative On Hand	123,561	410,906	657,734
Shortfall	590,896	381,790	161,261

(2) M60 machineguns are more suitable for RVNAF than M1919 series 30 cal machineguns. The advantages include the lesser weight of the weapon and ammunition, reduced maintenance requirements at all echelons, and mechanical advantages such as preset head space. The following table includes the total requirement through FY70 and the expected delivery dates for the 10,663 M60 machineguns that have been approved for programming.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Required	12,104	15,099	15,502
Expected Deliveries			
Cumulative On Hand	1,236	9,427	9,427
Shortfall	10,868	5,672*	6,075*

* Not approved for programming.

(3) M79 grenade launchers are exceptionally effective anti-personnel weapons. These weapons are authorized for RVNAF combat and combat support units. The allowances for RF and PF have been amended to increase RF from three to nine per company and one per PF platoon. Shown below are requirements through FY70 and expected delivery dates for the 15,939 currently programmed.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Required	31,864	34,891	35,234
Expected Deliveries		15,939	
Cumulative On Hand	14,921	30,860	30,860
Shortfall	16,943	4,031*	4,374*

* Not approved for programming.

(4) M29 mortars are lighter than M1 81mm mortars and may be traversed through 360° without baseplate changes. Shown below are the FY68-69 requirements and expected deliveries for currently approved programs.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Required	1,324	1,434	

SECRET

SECRET

Expected Deliveries		971
Cumulative On Hand	265	1,236
Shortfall	1,059	198*

* Not approved for programming.

(5) Protective Mask M17 is included as a modernization item to provide a means for combat in urban areas which will reduce structural damage and serious injury to non-combatants. Requirements shown below include combat units and those units normally in close support during combat in urban areas.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Requirements	300,249	331,200	
Expected Deliveries		229,249	
Cumulative On Hand	71,000	300,249	
Shortfall	229,249	30,951*	

* Not approved for programming.

(6) AN/PRC-25 radio sets will replace AN/PRC-9 and 10 radio sets which are old and have unacceptable deadline rates. Figures shown below include requirements through FY70 and currently approved programs.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Requirements	32,705	36,610	36,839
Expected Deliveries		25,384	
Cumulative On Hand	5,882	31,266	31,266
Shortfall	26,823	5,344*	5,573*

* Not approved for programming.

(7) M101A1 105mm howitzers are required to reduce the long standing deficiency in artillery in the RVNAF structure. Requirements shown below include howitzers required to provide one battalion in support of each infantry regiment, CMD, and the 44th SZ, plus two additional batteries for VMC. Expected deliveries include only those howitzers programmed for FY68 attrition.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Requirements	502	625	739
Expected Deliveries		28	3
Cumulative On Hand	502	530	533
Shortfall		125*	206*

* Not approved for programming.

SECRET

SECRET

(8) M102 105mm howitzers: These weapons are required to replace M101A1 howitzers in the airborne division and one battery per IV CTZ battalion. The advantages of the M102 include increased ground mobility, 360° traverse, and ease of air transportability. When coupled with the aluminum firing platform, this weapon will be particularly suitable for deployment in the Delta area. Receipt of these weapons will generate M101A1 assets for additional artillery units. JCS approved programming action for 59 M102 howitzers. The expected delivery date for these weapons is June 1969.

(9) M114A1 155mm howitzers: ARVN is seriously deficient in medium artillery. Six battalions are currently authorized. Additional weapons are required to expand the medium artillery support to a ten battalion force with one 155mm howitzer battalion in support of each division. Approval to initiate programming action for 73 additional weapons has not been granted.

(10) Truck 2 1/2 Ton M35A2: The M600 series and OSPJ 2 1/2 ton trucks are old and create severe maintenance problems for RVNAF logistical and support units. The replacement of the obsolete vehicles with the M35 series will enhance the RVNAF transportation capability. The following figures include requirements through FY70 and expected deliveries of currently approved programs.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Requirements	10,837	12,943	13,293
Expected Deliveries		10,187	
Cumulative On Hand	388	10,575	10,575
Shortfall	10,499	2,368*	2,718*

* Not approved for programming.

(11) M113 Armored Personnel Carriers: These vehicles are used in the armored cavalry squadrons. Although quantities on hand are adequate for the FY68 force structure, additional vehicles will be required for two squadrons planned for force structure increase.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Requirement	700	789	843
Expected Deliveries		35	
Cumulative On Hand	665	700	700
Shortfall	35	89*	143*

* Not approved for programming.

SECRET

SECRET

(12) M125 Mortar Carrier: This vehicle has been approved for the 81mm mortar platoons of the armored cavalry units. Requirements and expected deliveries are as shown.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Requirements	107	116	122
Expected Deliveries		107	
Cumulative On Hand	107	9*	15*

* Not approved for programming.

(13) V100 Armored Car (Commando): The V100 is required for RF mechanized platoons and as a convoy escort vehicle. Until armored cars are available, APCs must be diverted for escort duty.

	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>
Requirements	429	436	442
Expected Delivery		155	
Cumulative On Hand	224	379	379
Shortfall	205	57*	63*

* Not approved for programming.

b. Projection: The modernization items required for the FY68 force structure have been approved for programming and JCS is taking necessary action to expedite delivery. Those measures include increased production, accelerated procurement action, and reallocation of available assets. Although certain RVNAF units have been authorized for activation in accordance with the FY69 force structure plan, equipment for these units must be supplied from assets currently available. This can be accomplished for some units through drawdown on maintenance floats, diversion of incoming assets, and substitution of obsolete on hand inventory. However, JCS should be cognizant of the critical requirement for artillery weapons and fire control equipment. Early approval to initiate programming action and reallocation of existing assets from US resources must be accomplished to alleviate this critical requirement.

Summary: The attainment of goals established for the for the Development of the RVNAF Force Structure and Organization Sub-Program is progressing in a satisfactory manner.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, MA.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Graves Registration Service

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES: To develop a self-sustaining RVNAF Graves Registration Service.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Improve RVNAF Graves Registration Service.

Goals:

- a. Activate the Bien Hoa National Cemetery.
- b. Evaluate and update RVNAF Graves Registration procedures.
- c. Improve and expand Graves Registration training in RVNAF.
- d. Evaluate and improve facilities, personnel authorizations and equipment in the RVNAF Graves Registration activities.

Analysis of Progress: The first interment took place at the Bien Hoa National Cemetery on 16 June 1968. Headquarters and two operating platoons of the 1st Grave Registration Group are now located at the Bien Hoa National Cemetery. Construction of all facilities is not complete, however they do meet operational requirements. The graves registration procedures have been evaluated and the graves registration advisor is teaching modern mortuary techniques to graves registration personnel. Key Graves Registration personnel from the National Cemetery have been taught modern embalming techniques so that this procedure can be expanded to all RVNAF graves registration units. Supplies and equipment required for embalming remains have been requisitioned. Sufficient refrigeration units have arrived in-country to provide each graves registration platoon with a minimum storage for 5 remains. Personnel authorizations have been evaluated and adjudged adequate.

Projection: Significant progress in the capability of the RVNAF graves registration service has been attained. As programmed equipment continues to arrive and the training and experience of the personnel increase continued improvement can be expected.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

Sub-Program Manager: Chief, Provost Marshal Division, J-1

Sub-Program Title: RVNAF Military Police

1. (C) Statement of Objectives. To effect 100% assignment of personnel in the RVNAF Military Police Corps in accordance with the strength authorization.

a. Review of Progress. The actual strength of the MP Corps at the end of 2nd Qtr FY 68 was 5,349 with an authorized strength of 5,419. The current authorized strength is 6,337 with an actual strength of 6,891.

b. Analysis of Progress. This overage of 554 personnel is due primarily to the enthusiastic and effective recruiting campaign conducted by OPMG. Included in the total strength are 1,683 personnel currently undergoing training at the MP School.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends. Activation of the recently requested MPC units will quickly absorb the noted overage. Training coupled with effective mission performance are still areas requiring constant adjusting. The RVNAF MP personnel posture is in accord with programmed objectives.

2. (C) Statement of Objective. To achieve at battalion level and lower units, 100% of the mandatory training requirements.

a. Review of Progress. The "Tet Offensive" necessitated the cessation of all unit training. Since Tet, individual units have resumed training based on earlier guidelines.

b. Analysis of Progress. OPMG experimented with battalion training of recruits to alleviate the crowded condition at the MP School. This did not meet the level of proficiency expected and a new training program had to be written. This program has been submitted to all units. However, the fragmentation of battalion elements will continue to be a problem insofar as meeting training requirements.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. Reaching a satisfactory level of unit training will continue to be a problem until the current readiness posture is reduced. At that time, without an increase in mission, unit training should reach a satisfactory level.

d. Corrective Action. New lesson plans are 50% prepared. In August OPMG will host a conference of battalion commanders and unit training will be on the agenda. The outcome of this conference will establish a basis for all future unit training.

3. (C) Statement of Objective. To develop a TO&E and SOP intended to establish uniformity of organization and standardization of operations of the MP stations.

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress. The recommended TO&E for the MP station has not been approved. An MP station SOP is under consideration.

b. Analysis of Progress. J3, JGS will not recognize the MP desk as a separate entity but rather a function of the MP battalion. An official MP station SOP, revised by OPMG and concurred with by J1, AG, J3 and CLC/JGS, has been submitted to Chief of Staff, JGS for his approval.

c. Corrective Action. Continued efforts will be exerted in order to persuade J3, JGS to reconsider current policy on MP station TO&E.

4.(C)Statement of Objective. To achieve at the Military Police School 100% of the training requirements.

a. Statement of Progress. Prior to Tet, the MP School had exceeded the training requirement by 108%.

b. Analysis of Progress. Approximately 45 training days were lost because of the 'Tet Offensive'. However, through Sunday and night classes, the total days lost to the student were reduced to 15. Recent expansions in cadre and facilities have permitted the school to grow with the needs of the Military Police Corps.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends. The Advisor Branch personnel at the MP School were transferred to the MACV Training Directorate on 15 March 1968. No problems are anticipated in the orderly growth of the school.

5.(C)Statement of Objectives. To effect the transfer of all ex-gendamerie (CI personnel) to the National Police as well as to train the replacements necessary to fill the vacancies created by this transfer.

a. Review of Progress. Seven officers were transferred to the National Police prior to the 'Tet Offensive'. 242 ex-gendarmarie NCO's remain to be transferred.

b. Analysis of Progress. A new OPMG policy permitting MPCl personnel the opportunity to attend officer candidate school caused many ex-gendamerie to re-consider leaving the MPCl program. Nevertheless, all personnel will be phased to the National Police in groups of 30 over a two year period commencing July 1969.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends. 242 RVNAF Military Police NCO's have been recruited for the MPCl program and are being trained.

6.(C)Statement of Objective. To improve the effectiveness of the operations and security of the Prisoner of War Camps.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress. The Military Police School has incorporated PW training into its officer, NCO and enlisted subject schedules in order that a broader base of PW oriented Military Police may be available.

b. Analysis of Progress. PW training conducted at Phu Quoc, Pleiku and Bien Hoa PW Camps coupled with previous training at the MP School will adequately prepare Military Police personnel for an expanding PW population.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends. Programmed activation of Military Police units for duty with the PW camps will provide the necessary manpower needed for increased security and operation.

7.(C)Statement of Objective. To prepare and submit for approval a TO&E for the Central PW Camp at Phu Quoc.

a. Review of Progress. The TO&E for the Central PW command has been submitted.

b. Analysis of Progress. The Central PW Camp has over 11,500 PW's and has more than doubled its original capacity.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends. Current programs call for the expansion of Phu Quoc PW Camp to 7 enclosures. A PW Command TO&E is necessary to provide control, security, logistical support and administration for the Military Police forces.

8.(C)Statement of Objective. To expand the Central PW Camp on Phu Quoc Island to provide sufficient PW facilities.

a. Review of Progress. Four of the ten programmed enclosures at Phu Quoc have been completed. The fifth and sixth enclosures are under construction.

b. Analysis of Progress. The present PW capacity under normal conditions at Phu Quoc is 8,000 PW and under emergency conditions 13,000 PW.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends. The RVNAF Central PW Camp construction is following program objectives. Enclosure #6 is scheduled to be completed 31 July 1968, and enclosure #5 is scheduled for completion on 31 August 1968. No dates have been set for completion of enclosures 7, 8, 9 and 10.

d. Corrective Action. Construction emphasis should be paced to the PW capture rate.

9.(C)Statement of Objective. To develop and maintain a vigorous and energetic work program for PW and insure that all able-bodied PW are engaged in work or purposeful vocational training.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress. Work programs are now instituted at all the PW camps and PW who work are paid at the rate of 8 piasters a day.

b. Analysis of Progress. The work program is limited by the funds available and the number of QC personnel available to guard the work details. As a result of the limited guard force, less than 50% of the prisoners can work at one time.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. Work programs will remain at present levels unless QC personnel are increased.

d. Corrective Actions. More QCs are being recruited and trained.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J-1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 89 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

Sub-Program Manager: Chief, Advisory Division, J1

Sub-Program Title: RVNAF Personnel Programs

Sub-Program Objective: To enhance RVNAF effectiveness through personnel programs designed to identify, select, train, employ, and reward capable individuals, to make the most effective use of the leadership capabilities within RVNAF.

1. (U) Statement of Objective: Continue programs in CY 1968 to commission qualified NCOs as Aspirants of the Regular and Regional Forces.

a. Review of Progress: The chart at page 94 shows progress in this area.

b. Analysis of Progress: Overall RVNAF progress is good with the exception of special battlefield promotions for Regional Forces. Three times as many Regular Force NCOs have been commissioned during the first six months of CY68 compared to the total number during entire CY67. Likewise, five times as many Regional Forces NCOs were commissioned during first half CY68 compared to the number during CY67.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends:

(1) This source of experienced officer material needs further exploitation, especially for the Regional Force.

(2) Civilian educational background in selection process should be de-emphasized in favor of demonstrated leadership qualities.

d. Corrective Action: MACV is pressing RVNAF officials to liberalize and expand the "special" promotions.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: To ensure continued selective identification and annual advancement of deserving personnel of the Regular and Regional Forces.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The charts at pages 95 and 96 reflect the Regular and Regional Forces' promotions, respectively, for CY67 and first half of CY68.

(2) Armed Forces Day Promotions - The number of promotions for officers of the Regular Force was one of the largest ever made.

(3) Battlefield Promotions - Special battlefield promotions show progress, but numbers are still considered low.

(4) Time in grade - JGS is currently studying time in grade criteria for officer promotions.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Officer Candidate Schools - Increased output for CY68 is expected to result in more than 10,000 graduates.

(6) Reserve Officer Integration - The quota for reserve officer integration for CY68 has been announced at 2,860. This represents a substantial increase over the 294 integrated in CY66 and the 263 in CY67. Acceptance lists are not published until December of each year.

b. Analysis of Progress: There is a growing awareness in JGS of the requirement to improve leadership and improve grade imbalances to keep pace with the expansion of RVNAF. The lowest three officer grades are more than 10% overstrength in the Regular and Regional Forces, whereas the higher officer grades are 50% understrength.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: It is expected that RVNAF will reach the authorized FY69 force goals for officer and NCO total end strength. The remaining problems will be to correct grade imbalance and improve quality of leadership.

d. Corrective Action:

(1) Reduce time in grade requirements to six months for at least the ranks of aspirant, 2LT and 1LT.

(2) Liberalize and expand "special" promotions.

(3) Initiate action to correct serious senior officer shortage particularly in area of higher level command and staff positions.

3. (U) Statement of Objective: Awards and decorations: Recognition of deserving individuals, particularly RF/PF with the goal of exceeding CY67 figures, and to simplify awards and decorations regulations and forms by consolidation and standardization.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) There was a significant increase in approved awards and decorations during the period Jan-May 68 in comparison with a similar period in CY67. This chart depicts progress being made.

APPROVED AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

	<u>REGULAR FORCE</u>	<u>REGIONAL FORCE</u>	<u>POPULAR FORCE</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>
*CY68	34,336 (18.6)	8,459 (10.4)	3,153 (4.1)	45,948 (13.4)
*CY67	20,476 (12.8)	3,749 (5.2)	1,375 (2.0)	25,000 (8.4)
	+68%	+126%	+129%	+79%

*Jan-May Figures

() Rate/1000 Assigned Strength

PAGE 91 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) JGS has decentralized award authority for RF/PF awards and sub-delegated authority to sector and sub-sector commanders for certain awards.

(3) JGS has created the Unit Citation Emblem and Streamer to be awarded to units for outstanding combat achievement or exceptional meritorious service.

(4) Awards and decorations branch, J1/JGS is collating all memoranda relating to awards and decorations. Publication is expected in October 1968. This will result in one or two directives replacing about 150 now in use. It will also simplify the forms for recommending deserving individuals for awards/decorations.

b. Analysis of Progress: Progress is good for all forces, but rate of awards for RF/PF are still considered too low in comparison with the Regular Force. This is partially due to the great number of small unit engagements of short duration and defensive in nature where heroic actions are not so easily determined.

4. (U) Statement of Objective: To establish five new APOs (2 - IV Corps, 3 - II Corps) to provide improved postal service in areas with increased troop concentration.

a. Review of Progress: The five new APOs have been established and were put into operation by 15 June 68. These new APOs have replaced five of the 27 roving two-man postal delegations and will provide a higher level of postal service.

b. Conclusion and/or Trends: The need for improvement in postal services is a continuing requirement. New goal (s) will be established for remainder of CY68.

5. (U) Statement of Objective: To decentralize preparation of military identification means (ID cards, tags) to lowest practicable level; ALC, division, R&I centers.

Review of Progress:

(1) 28 ID tag embossing machines have been received. Distribution is planned to all ARVN divisions, Marine division, R&I centers and major training centers. Machines are programmed to reach using units by 15 August, allowing time for translation of operating manual so that manuals and machines are received together.

(2) AG/JGS Advisor is requesting manufacturer to provide a complete

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

list of replacement parts, indicating those parts most frequently used. AG/JGS will be advised to build up a supply of parts for replacement purposes.

(3) ID card preparation has been decentralized to divisions and/or R&I offices and branches of sectors. This is an improvement over CY67 procedures that required units to send cards to R&I centers for signature and lamination.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J1

PAGE 93 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMISSIONING OF NCOs

	Direct Appointments		SP Battlefield Promotions		SP Officer Candidates		SP "Other" Promotions		Totals	
	1967	Jan-Jun68	1967	Jan-Jun68	1967	Jan-Jun68	1967	Jan-Jun68	1967	Jan-Jun68
Regular Force	379	1,337	12	65	273	255	0	490	664	2,147
Regional Force	100	306	2	6	0	167	*	52	102	531
Totals	479	1,643	14	71	273	422	0	542	766	2,678

*Figures not available

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

REGULAR FORCE PROMOTIONS

	ANNUAL PROMOTIONS	ARMED FORCES DAY NATIONAL DAY PROMOTIONS	BATTLEFIELD PROMOTIONS	NON-BATTLEFIELD PROMOTIONS	TOTAL PROMOTIONS
JAN-JUN 68	4,177	2,121	110	72	6,480
OFFICERS					
CY 1967	5,908	1,319	146	177	7,550
JAN-JUN 68	4,217	1,639 (3,800)	1,234	3,903	10,993 (3,800)
NCOs					
CY 1967	9,610	820	641	NONE	11,071
JAN-JUN 68	5,508	2,694 (17,000)	2,472	19	10,693 (17,000)
EM					
CY 1967	53,924	1,900	3,170	NONE	58,994

() Quotas allocated to CTZ, actual promotion reports expected in Aug 68.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

REGIONAL FORCE PROMOTIONS

	ANNUAL PROMOTIONS	ARMED FORCES DAY NATIONAL DAY PROMOTIONS	BATTLEFIELD PROMOTIONS	NON-BATTLEFIELD PROMOTIONS	TOTAL PROMOTIONS
JAN-JUN 68	790	438	85	5	1,318
OFFICERS					
CY 1967	3,187	*	11	56	3,254
JAN-JUN 68	1,447	235	171	92	1,945
NCOS		(3,800)			(3,800)
CY 1967	3,813	*	46	290	4,149
JAN-JUN 68	10,436	555	494	33	11,518
EM		(17,935)			(17,935)
CY 1967	23,713	*	516	739	24,968

* Figures included in annual promotions, separate figures not available.

() Quotas allocated to CTZ, actual promotion reports expected in Aug 68.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Procurement

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: To improve the responsiveness of the RVNAF Procurement procedures.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Contract Administration and Document Control.

Goal: Development of new payment procedures. Organization of new Contract Administration and Liquidation Section in the Central Procurement Office. Appointment of Contracting Officers.

Analysis of Progress: Very little progress has been made in payment procedures or in appointment of contracting officers. Recorganization of CPO has been approved by the Ministry of Defense. CLC has given authority to Tech Services for small purchases under 200,000 \$VN.

2. (C) Element: Development of a Specifications Program.

Goal: Establishment of adequate and proper contract specifications.

Analysis of Progress: Since 1 Jan 68, 21 specifications have been approved and are to be published; 4 specifications have been forwarded to CLC for approval; 52 specifications are presently in final draft form, and 43 specifications are currently being prepared.

3. (C) Element: Inspection Procedures.

Goal: Development of inspection and acceptance procedures. Action to reduce the time frame for contract award procedures. Establishment of small-business procurement procedures.

Analysis of Progress: Regulations have been developed establishing procedures for the receipt of supplies and the processing of related receiving reports and inspections.

Projection: RVNAF procurement system is becoming more responsive and can be expected to improve as evidenced in the accomplishments since 1 Jan 68.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Advisory Division, J1

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Strength

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To encourage the most effective use and the conservation of RVNAF manpower, and to measure the degree of success in these efforts, by comparison of actual personnel situations with several established objectives.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Statement of Objective: RVNAF actual versus authorized strength by component.

a. Review of Progress:

<u>Component</u>	<u>GOAL FY68 UAL</u>	<u>ACTUAL 30 JUN 68</u>	<u>% ACHIEVED</u>
ARVN	321,056	357,959	111.5
VIN	17,178	16,952	98.7
VNMC	8,271	10,992	132.9
VNAF	17,198	17,240	100.3
RF	185,871	197,917	106.5
PF	167,640	164,284	98.0
TOTAL	717,214	765,344	106.7

b. Analysis of Progress. General mobilization and an increase in volunteers provided more than enough personnel to achieve the FY68 Force Level.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: Maintain average assigned strength of the maneuver battalions of the Infantry divisions, Airborne Division, Rangers and Marines at or near authorized level.

a. Review of Progress:

	<u>31 DEC 67</u>	<u>30 JUN 68</u>
Inf Div	87%	88.9%
Abn Div	76%	90.2%
Rangers	80%	86.5%
Marine Bde	98%	92.2%
	84.75%	89.45%

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Analysis of Progress: Improvement was noted in eliminating the disparity between the average maneuver battalion strength of the four categories shown above. At the end of 1967 the range extended from 76% for the Airborne Division to 96% for the Marine Brigade. On 30 June 1968 the range extended from 86.5% for the Ranger Battalions to 92.2% for the Marine Brigade, or 5.7% as contrasted to 20% for the previous period. The average strength for all categories increased 4.7 to 89.45%.

3. (C) Statement of Objective: Maintain average present for duty (PFD) strength of the maneuver battalions at 90% of authorized strength.

a. Review of Progress:

	<u>31 DEC 67</u>	<u>30 JUN 68</u>
Inf Div	80%	81.4%
Abn Div	69%	75.4%
Rangers	71%	80.3%
Marine Bde	<u>91%</u>	<u>80.3%</u>
	77.75%	79.35%

b. Analysis of Progress: Improvement was noted in eliminating the disparity between the average maneuver battalion PFD strength of the four categories shown above. On 31 Dec 67 the range extended from 69% for the Airborne Division to 91% for the Marine Brigade. On 30 Jun 68 the range extended from 75.4% for Airborne Division to 81.4% for the Infantry Divisions or 6% as contrasted to 22% for the previous period. The average PFD strength for all categories increased 1.6% to 79.35%. This small increase is considered significant due to the influx of personnel, many of whom are still in training, and activation of new units during this period.

4. (C) Statement of Objective: Bring average present for operations (PFO) strength of the maneuver battalions to 80% of the authorized strength.

a. Review of Progress:

	<u>31 DEC 67</u>	<u>30 JUN 68</u>
Inf Div	76%	73.5%
Abn Div	58%	72.0%
Rangers	67%	71.5%
Marine Bde	<u>83%</u>	<u>71.2%</u>
	71%	72%

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 99 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Analysis of Progress: Improvement was noted in eliminating the disparity between the average maneuver battalion PFO strength of the four categories shown above. On 31 Dec 67 the range extended from 58% for the Airborne Division to 83% for the Marine Brigade. On 30 Jun 68 the range extended from 71.2% for the Marines to 73.5% for the Infantry Divisions or 2.3% contrasted to 25% for the previous period. The average PFO strength for all categories increased 1% to 72%. Even this small increase is considered significant due to the influx of personnel and activation of new units during the period.

5. (C) Statement of Objective: Bring the number of average maneuver battalions achieving 70% PFO criterion to 100% of the total number of units authorized.

a. Review of Progress:

	<u>Ave Jul-Dec67</u>	<u>Ave Jan-Jun68</u>
1 Div	7	12
2 Div	8	9
51 Sep Regt	2	4
22 Div	11	9
23 Div	8	9
42 Sep Regt	2	3
5 Div	11	5
18 Div	9	7
25 Div	6	3
7 Div	8	11
9 Div	5	1
21 Div	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
	86	73

b. Analysis of Progress: While there is a significant decrease in the average number of battalions achieving 70% PFO during the period Jan-Jun 68 this is primarily due to the losses sustained during the TET offensive and the average number decreasing in the first quarter. As a result of mobilization and increased number of volunteers the average maneuver battalions achieving 70% PFO during the months of May and June were 86 and 90 respectively.

6. (C) Statement of Objective: To reduce the number of deserters from RVNAF units, and to decrease the number of escapees from battle-field labor units.

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress:

(1) A comparison of average monthly desertions, desertion rates, deserters returned, and net loss rates for CY66, CY67, and CY68 (Jan-Jun) are shown on the chart at page 103.

(2) Total monthly reported desertions for RVNAF rose sharply in Feb and Mar. After Mar, monthly desertions declined slightly but leveled off at a rate of over 11,000 per month.

(3) Total numbers of deserters returned increased significantly in Feb and Mar, during the amnesty period, and then declined sharply. Over 8,000 deserters were returned to military control during the amnesty period 8 Feb to 15 Mar 68.

(4) The amnesty period during Feb-Mar 68 restored all battlefield laborers to duty. The number of convicted deserters sent to labor units since the amnesty period is too insignificant for review at this time.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The VC TET offensive is considered to be the major causative factor for the sharp rise in reported desertions. The offensive was initiated at a time when large numbers of RVNAF personnel were on leave or pass. Therefore many servicemen were caught away from parent units. Some were killed or wounded in action and subsequently reported by units as deserters. Others through fear, concern for their families, or due to the confusion caused by the offensive, failed to return in time to their units and were reported as deserters.

(2) Increased mobilization is another factor causing the sharp increase in desertions. Since Feb, larger number of youths have been brought into service. Past analysis have shown that most desertions occur during the first three months of service. This situation was compounded by shortened training time, less time for indoctrination and fear of combat probably magnified by the continuing VC offensive.

(3) The return to duty of about 20,000 undesirables (deserters, draft dodgers, battlefield laborers, and military delinquents) during Feb and Mar, as a result of the GVN amnesties, created additional problems for commanders and compounded the overall situation.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Major efforts in the past by MACV/JGS officials to reduce desertions have not had the desired effect. Root causes for RVNAF desertions have not been eliminated.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 101 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Past leniencies and periodic amnesties have had a serious and prolonged detractive effect on efforts to curb desertions.

d. Corrective Action:

(1) JGS is enforcing again Decree Law 15/66 which authorizes the trial and punishment of deserters following the amnesty period which ended 15 Mar 68.

(2) JGS has authorized rewards for military and civilians who denounce deserters.

(3) Increased monies have been authorized to OPMG/JGS for deserter apprehension programs.

(4) JGS has organized staff teams to inspect and survey major units to determine the causative factors for desertions. A comprehensive check list has been developed to expedite compilation of data. A standing committee also has been formed and is currently reviewing data and preparing recommendations.

(5) JGS has dispatched a memorandum to subordinate units directing:

(a) Parent Units - To ensure all personnel are granted leaves particularly annual leave, to provide transportation for personnel on leave, provide information to those going on leave as to procedures to be followed.

(b) Special Zones, Sectors and Special Sectors - To establish a Guidance Section to guide and assist servicemen on leave, and to provide transportation and quarters for those waiting for transportation.

(c) All Headquarters, Corps, CTZs, Divisions, DTAs, Special Zones and Sectors to conduct frequent inspections of Guidance Sections to ensure satisfactory results.

(6) JGS has directed a major expansion of PolWar indoctrination efforts in R&I Centers, Training Centers and in units down to company level. Efforts are to be directed towards developing discipline, patriotism, esprit de corps, leadership, and anti-communist sentiments.

(7) JGS has directed all Deputy Chiefs of Staff/PolWar at Sectors to frequently inspect all RF/PF units, determine deficiencies, make on the spot corrections or to submit comments and recommendations to Sector Commanders. Problems that cannot be resolved will be forwarded to JGS.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RVNAF DESERTION CONTROL

	<u>AVERAGE NUMBER OF DESERTIONS PER MONTH/AV RATE PER 1000 ASSIGNED</u>			
	<u>CY 1966</u>	<u>JAN-JUN 1967</u>	<u>CY 1967</u>	<u>JAN-JUN 1968</u>
Regular Force	5,314/16.8	3,437/10.7	3,446/10.5	5,885/15.7
Regional Force	1,290/ 9.2	1,499/10.6	1,451/10.1	1,976/11.6
Popular Force	3,097/22.3	1,967/13.6	1,919/13.4	2,320/14.9
RVNAF	9,701/16.2	6,911/11.4	6,816/11.1	10,181/14.5

	<u>TOTAL DESERTERS RETURNED/AV MONTHLY NET LOSS RATE PER 1000 ASSIGNED</u>			
	<u>CY 1966</u>	<u>JAN-JUN 1967</u>	<u>CY 1967</u>	<u>JAN-JUN 1968</u>
Regular Force	*/16.8	1,759/ 9.8	3,877/ 9.5	15,391/ 8.6
Regional Force	*/ 9.2	*/10.6	**206/10.0	2,697/ 9.0
Popular Force	*/22.3	*/13.6	*/13.4	*/14.9
RVNAF	*/11.8	1,759/10.9	4,083/10.5	18,088/10.1

* Figures not available

** Figures available only from Sep 67

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACoFS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Supply Procedures

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: To improve the responsiveness of the RVNAF supply system in reacting to operating level shortages.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Evaluation of transportation priorities to insure maximum utilization of the transportation capability.

Goals:

- a. Increase of direct shipments of supplies from off-shore sources to up-country ports.
- b. Activation, augmentation and equipping of transportation units to provide greater movement and handling capability.
- c. Continue to encourage use of KBC postal system for the shipment of small items (repair parts) to relieve the burden on the transportation system and to expedite the shipment.

Analysis of Progress:

a. Command and Advisor emphasis is placed on efficient utilization of available transportation. Direct shipments of supplies and equipment from CCIUS to Area Logistics Command Depots is utilized to prevent double handling where possible and reduce the transportation tonnage backlog at Saigon Port. Coordination of in-country movements are being accomplished through the Monthly Transportation Movements Conferences and Weekly Ammunition Movements Conferences at DCSLOG, JGS, RVNAF. In order to coordinate shipments of incoming cargo RVNAF representatives periodically attend the TTA/MSTS Ships Priorities and Destinations Meetings held three times per week at HQ, MACV.

b. Direct shipment of material to up-country ports has increased significantly. As an example, direct shipments from off-shore sources to II ALC increased from an average of 2,423 s/t per month during the last six months of CY67 to an average of 6,061 s/t during the first six months of CY68 (an increase of 200%). Even more significantly, receipts in May and June 68 averaged 10,302 s/t per month which, if continued, would be an increase of 500% over 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

c. The direct shipments program as it pertains to medical supplies has been an unqualified success. Since its inception early in FY67, over 300 lines which constitute 80% of the total tonnage have been direct shipped from the US Army Medical Depot Activity Ryukyu Islands to the 5 field medical depots. During the past 6 months the flow of requisitions, the receipt of status information, and the receipt of the supplies have reached the peak of efficiency, with the only improvement possible in the administrative processing of the requisitions by the base depot.

d. Emphasis is placed on the allocation and distribution of available equipment assets to transportation units. In some cases loans of US equipment have been secured to equip transportation units pending receipt of MASF equipment. This insures continuous operations.

e. During the period 15 January to 30 March 1968, sixteen C119 aircraft were received by WNAF. On 10 May 68, following crew training, seven of these aircraft were placed on regular scheduled flights. In addition to the increased capability, better control and greater utilization has significantly increased the airlift tonnage. The average monthly air lift in 1967 was 220 s/t as compared to the current 1968 monthly average of 596 s/t.

f. The 20th Terminal Service Detachment at Qui Nhon has been programmed for an increase of 71 personnel from 104 at present to 175 by September. This additional strength will increase the capability of the unit by approximately 65%.

g. During the first six months of CY 1968 a Medium Truck company was activated and located at Qui Nhon. This unit, to date, has received only 1 each 5 ton tractor and 11 each 12 ton S&P trailers out of a total of 60 tractors and 120 trailers authorized. The drivers and mechanics are trained and on hand waiting for the equipment to be received. This unit in full operation will almost double the lift capability of the II ALC.

h. Use of both the KBC and US APO postal systems has reduced the burden on the transportation system and has expedited the shipment of repair and other small items.

i. The postal systems are used by all technical services for the shipment of small items. For example, almost 7.5 tons of signal equipment was shipped via the postal systems during the first 6 months of 1968. The KBC system is used more extensively than the US system, although it is not as efficient. At present, the effect of this use of the postal system on improvement in the supply system is not measurable.

CONFIDENTIAL

j. Continued improvement is being made in this area. There are certain limitations however which hamper the use of the postal system. These are not major however and can be attributed to inconvenience of postal facilities. This is being overcome gradually and mail service is improving. Continued Command emphasis should be encouraged in this area.

2. (C) Element: Unrealistic order-ship time.

Goal: Continued advisor emphasis to JGS regarding the establishment of procedures to analyze and readjust in-country order-ship times on a recurring basis.

Analysis of Progress:

a. In-country order-ship times are adjusted periodically by Technical Services and reviewed by Central Logistics Command.

b. JGS has not changed its position that RVNAF transportation can meet a 45 day CST goal. During Jan - Mar 68 the average OST was 56 days and during Apr - June 68 this time was 61 days. About 15 days are consumed in transmitting requisitions to the base depot, processing them for fill, preparing the transportation request, and moving the items from the servicing port to the CSC. Transportation sources in RVN cannot meet a 30 day average shipment time, and special attention is not given to transportation requests until they are over 45 days old.

c. Advisors have discussed the problem of in-country OST with RVNAF supply counterparts and with the JGS Central Logistics Command advisors. Although advisor emphasis has resulted in greater base depot responsiveness when cargo is called forward for transportation, as well as faster preparation of transportation requests by the base depot it is felt that the in-country OST problem is caused by the lack of sufficient command emphasis on timely preparation of transportation requests for items released from the base depot, and by short falls in transportation movement capability.

d. The class II and IV stock position has improved throughout the past six months, and percentage of 100% fill of customer R/O requisitions have averaged between 93% and 96%. Ordnance and Engineer field depots have not received the ideal 85% fill from main depots. If the OST used in RO computations could vary in a realistic manner, then stock levels would also be more realistic. Continued review and revision of in-country OST should be based on actual experience.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) Element: Local Procurement Problems.

Goals:

a. Continued monitoring of, and increased emphasis on, proper requisitioning and follow-up procedures by advisors at all levels. The assignment of additional advisors now authorized for A&DSL Companies will materially assist in the supply support of Regional and Popular Force units.

b. Improve quality assurance procedures in acceptance of locally procured products by technical services.

Analysis of Progress: The MACV Commercial Consumables Transfer Program Committee and Technical Service Advisors continuously review items supported by MASF to insure that they are kept to a minimum. Where items can be procured locally, action is taken to reduce MASF support by the amount available from procurement. However, two obstacles prevail: lack of manufacturing facilities or qualified producers, and inability of the advisors to convince Vietnamese personnel that many items do not have to meet US production standards to be acceptable items. Although substantial progress has been made in this area over the past year, many manufacturing facilities were lost as a result of the TET Offensive. Because of this many items formerly purchased in Vietnam will require additional MASF support until the damaged facilities are repaired and returned to production.

4. (C) Element: Implementation of efficient supply procedures, including equitable allocation of controlled items of supply and timely follow-up supply action.

Goals:

a. Command emphasis on the proper distribution of supplies and equipment in accordance with approved TOE authorizations.

b. Improve supply reporting system to provide more timely and significant information necessary for improved responsiveness of the supply system.

Analysis of Progress:

a. Increased attention is being given to making sure that the RVNAF units follow up through their own supply channels in order to make the RVNAF supply system respond to customer inquiries. In many cases,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 107 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

however, units are reluctant to follow up on requisitions. This problem is being remedied by asking the advisor to visit the supporting depot or supply point with his counterpart to resolve local supply problems. The Central Logistical Command is in the process of conducting a study for utilization of the existing AC, JGS, Data Processing Center and obtaining additional card punch machines, verifiers and sorters for the Base Depots. If obtained, they will facilitate requisition and follow up action.

b. Advisor emphasis on proper distribution of supplies and equipment continues. A priority distribution system insures that equipment is distributed quickly and accurately immediately upon receipt. This prior planning cuts the time between arrival in-country and receipt by the using unit. A monthly supply status print out is furnished on those RQN for which status is available. For those outstanding requisitions for which no status is available, follow-up action is initiated. This improves supply response and assists timely receipt of supplies.

c. The Major Items Supply Management Agency, Office Chief of Ordnance, is currently reporting expected receipts of controlled major items of equipment to the RVNAF JGS to effect more timely distribution to using units. Further, a monthly report is made by CCO to the JGS on expected due-ins of major items of equipment. Once these major items are confirmed for arrival, the Office Chief of Ordnance makes recommendations to the JGS for their allocation and distribution to using units. This system is reducing delays experienced in the past. Continued emphasis is needed in this area to insure timely distribution of major items under the ARVN modernization program.

d. OM/CAD is making a concerted effort to review all RVNAF TOE's and determine the present status of TOE equipment throughout RVN. However, difficulties are being experienced in determining the equipment status of individual units. Command emphasis is required at all levels to assure that units receive equipment in accordance with approved TOE authorizations since in-country total authorizations cannot be exceeded in order to allow over-equipped units to retain their unauthorized equipment.

e. US supply advisors at the 40th Engineer Base Depot review all requisitions submitted to CCMUS and Japan. The requisitions are edited for correct R/O computation, current price, and the correct exception data if the requisition is submitted AC5. If status is not received within twenty days of the date the requisition is submitted a follow up card is sent to the supply source.

CONFIDENTIAL

f. During the past six months there has been intensive emphasis placed by medical supply advisor on proper requisitioning and follow-up procedures. This emphasis has been most apparent in the requisitions for direct shipment items. Status on all direct shipments made by the US Army Medical Depot Activity, Ryukyu Islands to the field medical depots is received in MILSTRIP format and distributed by the 70th Medical Base Depot. It is felt that much progress has been made in this area during the period by the VN depot personnel, not only at the base depot, but the field medical depots as well.

g. Advisor personnel are monitoring and emphasizing to their counterparts the need for proper requisitioning and follow-up procedures. Experience has shown that these areas do require emphasis by the advisor to avoid protracted delays. The Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams (MALT) are concentrating their efforts at the A&DSL companies to improve logistical support to RF/PF forces. In addition, DSU advisors and DSU Commanders make liaison visits to A&DSL companies to emphasize proper requisitioning procedures and to encourage continuous follow-up by all supported units. Parallel follow-up through advisory and ARVN channels is common practice between DSU, supported units and base depots.

h. Transition to transceiver capability should be accomplished slowly and in stages. There is a psychological as well as a technical barrier to be overcome in the transitioning from a manual mode to an electrical/mechanical mode. For example, because of the lack of potentially qualified personnel to install, operate, and maintain ADP equipment plans to provide this equipment to the RVNAF QM NICC have been curtailed. The implementation of this goal at the present time would impose great problems on the limited staff of OCQM to cope with a sophisticated and entirely new concept of supply operation. Suggest as a first stage that the application of a business accounting machine, such as the National Cash Register NCR-500 be studied. The Ordnance Advisory Division is employing an editing machine that has generated interest from use by the ARVN personnel of the 20th Base Depot. Once personnel are accustomed to working with simplified electrical/mechanical editing devices, they could then be in a position to transition to equipment with greater versatility that would provide useful supply data, such as is envisioned by the above goal.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training (less NAVADVGP and AFADVGP Responsibilities).

1. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: National Defense College.

Statement of Objective: To train 15 outstanding RVNAF officers in Vietnamese national and military policy in CY 68.

a. Review of Progress: Class Number 1, scheduled to begin in February, was delayed by the Tet offensive and began on 6 May 1968 with 20 students (12 Army, 2 Air Force, 1 Navy, and 5 career government civilians). One additional career government civilian joined the class later.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The courses are progressing satisfactorily. As of 30 June, Course II, "The Free World in Relation to Vietnam" was being taught. In addition to historians and experts of industrial and developing nations, ambassadors from most of the Free World nations have presented lectures, served as panel members, or participated in committee problems.

(2) Preparations for the next three courses are progressing in a satisfactory manner.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Despite a late start, the National Defense College is developing in an outstanding manner.

(2) The faculty and students are of a high caliber and are establishing an excellent initial reputation for the college.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The National Defense College has received high level support and interest from the Vietnamese government and military establishment. It will prove to be a valuable addition to the Vietnamese national education system.

2. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Vietnamese Military Academy.

Statement of Objective: To accomplish construction of expanded facilities as scheduled in 1968.

a. Review of Progress: The Architect-Engineer (AE) design of the first of four buildings, under the supervision of U.S. Navy Facilities

CONFIDENTIAL

Engineering Command (OICC), is complete. AE design on the remaining three continues with estimated completion dates of 24 Aug, 15 Oct, and 30 Oct 68. AE design on three buildings, under the supervision of ARVN Engineers, are standard ARVN design and are on hand. Construction was scheduled to start on two buildings in Jun 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: Design progress is satisfactory. Construction has not started on schedule. Construction bids on the academic building could have been let on 15 May. However, the request for release of 550,000,000\$VN of the programmed 800,000,000\$VN has been at the office of the Prime Minister, RVN, waiting for approval since late May. These funds are Joint Support Credits and cannot be used for other purposes. However, the National Assembly does not want any large sum of money spent until completion of a budget review.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Every day from 15 May 68 that passes without release of funds is a day of construction lost, and one additional day behind schedule. The budget review and release of funds should come in September.

d. Corrective Action: Action is continuing through US and Vietnamese channels to secure the release of funds.

e. Projection: The completion of the first building, a new academic building, will be delayed past the scheduled date of Jan 69.

Statement of Objective: At the Vietnamese Military Academy, to complete transition to a four year curriculum by 1969.

a. Review of Progress: Recognition and preparation for the CY 68 academic year was interrupted during the period 30 Jan - 19 Feb 68. During this period the Staff and Faculty and Cadets were involved in security and tactical operations in the Dalat area. Classes were resumed with a three day delay. Overall transition to a four year curriculum was not seriously affected and is proceeding on schedule.

b. Analysis of Progress: The transition to a four year curriculum is proceeding satisfactorily.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Minor delays and scheduled changes will not seriously affect the program.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The transition to a four year program should continue to make satisfactory progress.

3. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Command and Staff College.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Statement of Objective: To train 450 qualified officers in the Advanced and Intermediate Command and Staff Course during CY 68.

a. Review of Progress: During the first half of CY 68 one class of 40 students was graduated. This class was short 35 students because of the Tet offensive. The overall objective for the year has been revised to 325 students.

b. Analysis of Progress: The one class scheduled to graduate during the first half of the year graduated on schedule but with reduced students. The reduction was caused by the need for officers in the field as a result of the Tet offensive.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Subsequent classes are expected to operate at or near capacity. However, overall output for the year will be reduced.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The Command and Staff College will graduate approximately 325 students in CY 68.

4. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: NCO Academy.

Statement of Objective: To train 8,450 students in CY 68.

a. Review of Progress: As a result of the increased ARVN force structure, the objective for the NCO Academy has been increased to 12,885 students in CY 68. As of 30 Jun 4,165 had been trained.

b. Analysis of Progress: The increased requirement has been met without undue difficulty. The physical plant at the NCO Academy has been augmented with tents for billeting the additional students. Prefab buildings have been approved and ordered but not yet constructed. Candidates now take 9 weeks of basic training at Quang Trung before coming to the NCO Academy. The NCO Course proper has been reduced to 9 weeks.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: The NCO Academy is capable of meeting the revised objective for CY 68.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The NCO Academy will produce the required number of trained NCO's for CY 68 if sufficient input is provided.

5. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Infantry School

Statement of Objective: To train 18,445 students during CY 68.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress: The objective for the Infantry School has been changed to 11,075 students in CY 68. This revision was made necessary in view of the maximum capability of the school to train students. As of 30 June, 3,254 students had graduated.

b. Analysis of Progress: The first class of 1,000 students under the revised OCS program entered training on 17 June. The revised program consists of 9 weeks of basic training at Quang Trung Tng Ctr. The top trainees in this basic training then attend 15 weeks of OCS at the Infantry School, while the remaining trainees attend the NCO Academy. A new class of approximately 1,000 will begin monthly through Dec.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The revised OCS program is progressing satisfactorily. Competitive selection procedures should produce a better graduate.

d. Corrective Action: N/A.

e. Projection: The Infantry School should meet its required objective for CY 68.

6. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Junior Military Academy.

Statement of Objective: To provide academic education for 1,400 students during CY 68.

a. Review of Progress: During the first half of CY 68 1,065 students were enrolled. The shortfall is caused by attrition and students drafted into the Armed Forces. Progress continues to be made in improving the course of instruction. Closer liaison has been established with the Vietnamese Military Academy with the ultimate goal of providing a substantial input to that institution.

b. Analysis of Progress: The Junior Military Academy is showing continued improvement. The academic standards are still below desired levels.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Continued emphasis needs to be placed on improving academic standards.

d. Corrective Action: Current improvement programs will be continued.

e. Projection: The school will continue to improve qualitatively in CY 68.

7. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Armor School.

Statement of Objective: To train 975 students during CY 68.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress: The programmed objective has been increased to 1961 students. During the first six months, 671 students were graduated. However, classes were interrupted for 6 weeks because of the Tet offensive. Additionally, the school has been required to provide students and tanks as security forces in Saigon for periods of 5 to 7 days at a time.

b. Analysis of Progress. The school is operating satisfactorily and producing the required quantity and quality of student. Interruptions to training because of security requirements will have a detrimental effect if continued.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The school is operating satisfactorily.

d. Corrective Action: N/A.

e. Projection: The school will meet its objective in CY 68 unless use of the students as security troops increases, and delays training.

8. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Armed Forces Language School

Statement of Objective: To train 3,820 students in English in CY 68.

a. Review of Progress: During the first six months, 1,660 students were graduated from the school. Classes were interrupted for three weeks in early February because of the Tet offensive. During this offensive the facilities of the school suffered extensive damage, including the complete loss of several buildings and all of the language laboratory.

b. Analysis of Progress: Despite the loss of class time and facilities, the School is continuing to train students at the programmed rate.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: It is essential that the school facilities be replaced or that it be moved to another more suitable location. The crowded conditions will adversely affect training if allowed to persist.

d. Corrective Action: The Central Logistics Command (CLC) of the RVNAF JGS is attempting to locate other facilities for the school. Thus far they have had no success. These efforts must be continued and new facilities found within the next few months.

e. Projection: The language school is expected to assume an expanded role as the Vietnamese Air Force requirement for language training increases over the next two years.

9. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Artillery School

Statement of Objective: To train 2,400 students during CY 68.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress: During the first six months, 1,464 students were trained.

b. Analysis of Progress: The Artillery School continues to be one of the best ARVN schools in terms of effective training.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The school is capable of fulfilling its objective if students are provided as programmed.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The school will continue to be one of the best ARVN Schools.

10. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Military Dog Training Center.

Statement of Objective: To train 270 dogs and handlers during CY 68.

a. Review of Progress: During the first six months, 83 dogs and handlers were trained. A delay in training was caused by a shortage of dogs during the period. This was the result of a failure to initiate proper procurement action by ARVN, but has now been corrected. However, dogs scheduled to arrive in June are not yet available. A significant delay in their arrival will greatly reduce the school's capability of meeting its objective.

b. Analysis of Progress: There are no serious problem areas. Qualitatively and quantitatively the school is a satisfactory training facility.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The school is capable of meeting its objective for CY 68 if sufficient dogs can be procured.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The school will meet its objective for CY 68 if sufficient dogs can be procured.

11. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Band School

Statement of Objective: To train 220 Military band students in CY 68.

a. Review of Progress: During the first six months, 67 students were trained.

b. Analysis of Progress: The school did not operate at programmed capacity because of a failure to provide sufficient input.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The objective will not be met unless

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

sufficient input is provided.

d. Corrective Action: Programmed input quotas must be met by ARVN.

e. Projection: The programmed objective will not be met in CY 68.

12. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Training Material Translation

Statement of Objective: To reduce the 18 month backlog of translation of training literature and film by 35% in CY 68.

a. Review of Progress: Currently there is a backlog of 133 items to be translated, or approximately 20 months. During the period 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1968, 70 items were translated and 31 were cancelled by the requestor. There is no significant backlog in the translation of films.

b. Analysis of Progress: It has not been possible to increase the number of translators due to their non-availability. There are currently 12 vacancies for translators. Since the last report 102 items have been received for translation. The unit of work measurement is the number of pages translated. Items received for translation vary greatly in the number of pages that they contain. One large item to be translated may represent two months work.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The backlog of material for translation is increasing and a further increase is projected unless additional translators can be hired.

d. Corrective Action:

(1) Efforts are continuing to locate and employ additional translators.

(2) A program to review those items that have been waiting translation to insure that they are still required has been initiated.

(3) The priority system has been maintained.

e. Projection: The backlog will increase over the remainder of the year.

13. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Offshore Training.

Statement of Objective: To process 932 ARVN personnel for offshore Schools in CY 68.

a. Review of Progress. During the first 6 months 475 ARVN personnel were processed and departed for training. This represents 92 percent

CONFIDENTIAL

achievement of the goal.

b. Analysis of Progress: The bulk of the training cancellation occurred during and immediately following the Tet offensive. ARVN operational necessity dictated most cancellations. English language qualified alternates were not available for late substitutions.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: Operational necessity during the Tet offensive had the most significant adverse effect on the program. No significant change could be noted in ARVN's failure to provide qualified alternate students.

d. Corrective Action: Continuing emphasis will be placed by advisors at all levels to encourage compliance with recently published ARVN operating instructions which require student nominations to exceed requested training spaces by 50 percent. This will provide alternates and reduce cancellations.

e. Projection: Some latent adverse impact can be expected as a result of continued operational necessity throughout ARVN. This effect should be offset by a greater availability of qualified alternate students and possibly a broader base of student selection as a result of mobilization recalls.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 117 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

14. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: ARVN, Regional Force and Popular Force Training Base

Statement of Objectives:

- (1) To maintain a training center base adequate for the needs of the Vietnamese ground forces and with a capacity to support the CY68 training program.
- (2) To determine the adequacy of the base to accommodate planned force structure increases.

a. Review of Progress:

- (1) During the months preceding January 1968, the CTC controlled training centers had a capacity of 40,140. Because of the ARVN build-up, CTC directed the capacity of the nine CTC controlled training centers be raised to 48,700. In addition to this increase, the ten division training centers and one popular force training center were assigned a new mission of ARVN/RF recruit training. Their capacity was raised from 8,500 to 19,000; thereby providing a total rated capacity of 67,700.
- (2) The Popular Force Training Center base is composed of 31 training centers. The capacity of this base is approximately 14,500; however, a plan to consolidate the PFTCs into 19 expanded centers will increase the capacity to 21,600.

b. Analysis of Progress:

- (1) The average utilization of the training base was 94%.
- (2) Due to the increased recruit input to the training base, close monitorship and frequent visits were made to all training centers during the 1st half of CY68. Results of these visits found that although facilities of most training centers were crowded, the planned in-training load had not exceeded the programmed load. These visits also confirmed that the conduct of training was not adversely affected by the increase in training center capacities.
- (3) The programmed and actual inputs to the base during the first half of CY68 were as follows:

<u>Type Training</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Recruit	85,631	85,478
Battalions (old/new)	12	11
RF Cos (old/new)	138	105
Other	11,476	9,935

c. Conclusions and Trends:

- (1) Almost maximum use was made of the training base; particularly during the period following Tet.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) The training base capacity is adequate to meet stated objectives.

(3) If necessary, the training base capacity is sufficient to meet additional increases in the training program.

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: If programmed inputs continue as scheduled, the base will remain at a near capacity level throughout CY68 with the peak occurring in mid-July.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 119 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

15. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Utilization of Division Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train members and units of the division in subjects of a supplemental and advanced nature and those additional courses of instruction approved by JGS for inclusion in the division training program.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) During the first half of CY68, a total of 22,985 soldiers received training in the division training centers. Because of the ARVN build-up and increased emphasis on recruit training, JGS assigned the mission of ARVN/RP recruit training to the division training centers. Of the 22,985 soldiers trained thus far, 66.84 percent were ARVN/RP recruits.

(2) In addition to the nine week BCT/AIT recruit program of instruction, the training centers conducted courses of instruction in ambush/counter-ambush techniques, squad leader, NCO, intelligence and interrogation principles and heavy weapons instruction.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) To meet the increase in recruit training, the capacity of the division training centers was raised from 6,000 to 15,000 and a program to train 58,347 recruits was established. The changes were effective on 1 May.

(2) Even though many of the training centers did not have adequate facilities and cadre available to meet this increase immediately, internal adjustments during the subsequent months alleviated these problems, i.e., DTC cadre strength was increased, and additional facilities were constructed.

(3) As a result of the recruit input, specialized training for division soldiers has decreased. During the comparable period of CY67, approximately 8,400 division soldiers entered the training centers for specialized training as compared to 7,621 thus far in CY68.

(4) Utilization of the DTCs ranged from excellent to average during the first half of CY68.

c. Conclusions and Trends:

(1) Good use was made of the DTC capacity during this reporting period. Adjustments necessary to meet increased input were accomplished with little difficulty.

(2) Recruit training was satisfactorily conducted. This FOI will continue to be conducted at the DTCs through the remainder of CY68.

d. Corrective Action: None to report

e. Projection: The utilization of the division training centers will continue to improve.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

16. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Utilization of Popular Force Training Centers

Statement of Objectives: To evaluate PF training by reviewing monthly training reports and conducting training inspections.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The utilization of the PF training centers during the first half of CY68 fell below the one-time rated capacity of 14,500.

(2) Input to the PF training centers during the first half, CY68 are as follows:

<u>Type Training</u>	<u>Input</u>
PF Platoon Leader	1,102
PF Squad Leader	2,342
PF Recruit	10,483
PF Special	4,342

(3) A PF training center consolidation plan was implemented during this period.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Factors causing the shortfall of the PF training accomplishments were the Tet offensive and failure of corps and sectors in filling programmed training quotas.

(2) The Popular Force soldier has not achieved desired levels of training proficiency. Substandard living conditions, poor pay, inadequate command support, and inappropriate training programs contribute to this problem.

(3) Because of the large number of PF training centers and the existing facilities, there is little standardization in training.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Utilization of existing PF training facilities was poor.

(2) There was little standardization in the PF training.

(3) There was a general lack of interest shown in support of PFTCs at all levels of command.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) CTC/JGS is in the process of consolidating PFTCs from 31 to 19. The consolidation was originally scheduled for completion by Jul 68, but has been extended until 31 Aug 68.

PAGE 121 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Twelve of the 19 centers to be retained will be expanded to a capacity of 1,500 - 2,000. CTC plans to assume control of these 12 centers on 1 Aug 68. Consolidation will provide improved training facilities and standardization of training.

(3) Training of PFTC cadre at the Vung Tau School began in late Feb. The first of three increments of 400 men completed their training on 25 Apr. The second increment is currently in training.

(4) PF POIs have been revised and include a graded evaluation exercise at the completion of training. The revised POIs were applied to all PF training after 1 May.

e. Projection: Considerable improvement in the PFTC program should be realized in the second half of CY68.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

17. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: In-Place Training

Statement of Objectives: To review and revise, as necessary, in-place training directives; to determine through inspections compliance with directives, and to evaluate the quality of training and unit combat effectiveness by use of an Army Training Test.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) During the Tet offensive, in-place training ceased in all four Corps Tactical Zones. Resumption of training after the Tet offensive was extremely slow.

(2) On 9 April, CTC directed Corps/Divisions and Sectors to resume in-place training. On 26 April, MACV sent a message to Corps SAs directing they take immediate action with their counterparts to establish an effective training program for RF/PF. This message was paralleled by a letter to CofS/JGS urging command emphasis be placed on RF/PF in-place training.

b. Analysis of Progress: Since 1 January, a total of 52 inspections and 51 staff visits were made by JGS/MACV/CTC personnel. Fifteen were devoted to inspecting in-place training. Significant strengths and weaknesses revealed by these inspections are:

(1) Responsibility for training is placed on the individual unit commander.

(2) ARVN units are aware of the training requirements outlined in CTC Memo 3737, dated 26 June 1967.

(3) Many unit commanders and their advisors recognize the importance of establishing an in-place training program.

(4) Command emphasis is still lacking on in-place training.

(5) Operational requirements (offensive and security operations) preclude sufficient time to conduct a training program.

(6) CTC in-place training directives do not include a provision for testing.

(7) Most commanders believe that compliance with existing directives requires unit but not individual training.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The in-place training program is an effective means of increasing unit effectiveness.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 123 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) The in-place training program, with the exception of isolated cases, has not been totally resumed since Tet and is therefore ineffective.

(3) Improvement is being realized in in-place training due to the formation of mobile advisory teams (MAT, GMTT, IMPACT).

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) In-place training directives are being reviewed by CTC. Efforts are being made to incorporate a testing device into the in-place training program.

(2) Inspections by CTC/MACV personnel are scheduled for the second half of CY68.

(3) Continued emphasis on in-place training will be made through command and advisory channels.

(4) The Territory Forces Evaluation System (TFES) has been revised to allow rapid identification of RF/PF units failing to meet the minimum requirements established by CTC directives.

(5) The System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) Quarterly Evaluation will be used to identify ARVN units failing to conduct minimum in-place training requirements.

e. Projection: Inspection priority will be given to units reported on the TFES and SEER as failing to accomplish required in-place training. The purpose of the inspection will be to determine what corrective action has been taken or is required, and what assistance can be given to raise the training effectiveness of the unit.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Training of ARVN Battalions and Regional Force Companies in Support of Revolutionary Development

Statement of Objectives: To retrain all ARVN battalions by 30 November 1968 and all Regional Force companies by 1 March 1968, and to determine the effectiveness of the Revolutionary Development Refresher (RDR) training program by conducting frequent inspections and evaluating reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) All ARVN maneuver battalions were scheduled to complete training by 31 July, and all other battalions by 30 November. Due to the Tet offensive the time schedule was set back. As of 30 June, 57 of 145 maneuver battalions and 12 of 114 other battalions completed refresher training. In May 1968, JGS, extended the completion date for training all battalions until 31 March 1969.

(2) CTC also extended the completion date of the RF Co RD from 1 March to 31 May. Eight hundred and twenty-one of 906 RF companies have completed training.

(3) In late 1967, CTC/JGS conducted a follow-on RDR training program. The joint JGS/MACV planning committee held two meetings during May and finalized the program for training Mobile Training Teams (MTT). The RF RDR MTT School started 26 June, and RDR training is scheduled to begin on 29 July 1968. A conference to orient advisors on the RF RDR program is scheduled for 8-10 July.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) RD and RDR training continues to be an effective field program.

(2) The program has resulted in improved understanding of all personnel toward the RD program, improved military/civil relations, and improved tactics and techniques.

(3) Problem areas include insecure training environment; inadequate command and staff supervision at Corps, Division, and Sector; poor practical exercises, and operational requirements taking precedence over training requirements.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The RD Mobile Training Team (MTT) program has achieved major worthwhile results. Command emphasis has been somewhat negligent on the resumption of RD and RDR training since the Tet offensive.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) Continued emphasis will be placed on RD and RDR training through command and advisory channels.

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 125 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) The RF RDR MTT Advisors Conference will serve to orient advisors on the program so they may effectively assist their MTTs.

e. Projection: All ARVN battalions should receive RDR training by 31 March 1969. Approximately 50% of all RF companies should receive RDR training by the end of CY68.

CONFIDENTIAL

19. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Battalion Retraining Program

Statement of Objectives: To conduct refresher training for 35 battalions and determine the effectiveness of this training through ATTs and end of training reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CY68 training schedule, revised 1 May, decreased the number of battalions to be trained from 43 to 35. This decrease was caused by tactical conditions during and following Tet, and because the revised training program emphasized new unit and recruit training.

(2) Programmed input to date is five. Actual input is four.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Programmed objectives were not met. Battalions could not be released because of the Tet offensive and those in training were recalled by parent units because of operational requirements.

(2) Battalions are tested with the ATT to determine combat effectiveness. All battalions tested have been rated combat ready; however, deficiencies in areas such as night operations indicate need for additional training.

(3) The battalions are rated on leadership, tactics, night operations and small arms weapon qualification. These areas present a comprehensive appraisal of the combat potential of the unit.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The battalion retraining program was successful both before and after the Tet offensive.

(2) Training of maneuver battalions has been improved.

(3) Close review and monitorship of the refresher FCI has improved the utilization of battalions while training at the training centers.

(4) Battalion retraining has been realistically accomplished to train every member.

d. Corrective Actions: More effort will be exerted to insure the battalion officers and noncommissioned officers participate actively in all phases of the training program.

e. Projection: The quality of ARVN battalions will continue to improve in proportion to the amount of refresher training received.

CONFIDENTIAL

20. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: ARVN Infantry Company Training

Statement of Objectives: To train 13 new ARVN infantry companies programmed in the FY68 force structure increase.

a. Review of Progress: Programmed objectives were met.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Twelve companies were trained at Dong Da NTC and 6 were trained at Van Kiep NTC. Some interruption occurred during the Tet offensive; however, training was resumed and completed.

(2) The companies were evaluated on leadership, tactics, night operations and weapons qualification. All received satisfactory ratings.

(3) Personnel scored well in small arms qualification.

(4) Initially, officer and NCO participation and assistance in the training effort was unsatisfactory; however, there was marked improvement as the training progressed.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Programmed objectives were met and training was satisfactory.

d. Corrective Action: Officer and noncommissioned officer participation and assistance in all phases of the training program was emphasized.

e. Projection: None

CONFIDENTIAL

21. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: ARVN Regimental Reconnaissance Company Training

Statement of Objectives: To train 34 Regimental Reconnaissance Companies and determine the effectiveness of the training program through review of training reports and ATTs.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CY68 training program, revised 1 May, increased the number of reconnaissance companies to be trained from 22 to 34.

(2) Four national training centers are programmed to conduct this training; however, only one (Van Kiep NTC) has thus far received companies for training.

(3) Programmed input to date is 12. Actual input is three.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Three companies have completed training. The initial impression is one of much interest in the program. Personnel assigned to these companies were well motivated and receptive to training.

(2) Reconnaissance companies are given an ATT to determine combat readiness. All companies tested were found to be combat ready. Deficiencies noted indicate a need for additional in-place training after departure from the training center.

(3) Unit officers and noncommissioned officers maintained a superior record of training attendance, and were aggressive and effective while supervising and participating in unit training.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The reconnaissance company training program has been successful; however, input to the training centers has fallen below programmed levels. Units trained to date were highly motivated.

(2) Active and aggressive leadership by unit officers and noncommissioned officers results in more effective training and a better trained unit.

(3) The ARVN Regimental Reconnaissance Company training will continue to improve. This will occur through POI reviews, lesson plan improvements and instructor familiarity with the course of instruction.

d. Corrective Action: Training Directorate/CIC will closely monitor reconnaissance company input to the training centers.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 129 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Projection:

(1) Reconnaissance company training will be successful and will continue to improve.

(2) The program of 34 companies to be trained may not be met.

22. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: RF Company Training

Statement of Objectives: To train 101 new RF companies and retrain 107 old RF companies and determine the effectiveness of this training through APTs and review of end of training reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CY68 training program, revised in May, reduced the number of old RF companies scheduled to be trained from 240 to 107 and the number of new RF companies from 112 to 101.

(2) The training program does however provide for training additional companies, as required, by programming RF company spaces into the training schedule.

(3) Programmed and actual inputs for the 1st half, CY68 were as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
Old RF Company	54	21	33
New RF Company	84	84	None

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The Tet offensive delayed RF company training for the 1st Quarter CY68. Units programmed for attendance at training centers were retained by military sectors for operational missions, and some RF units already training were withdrawn from the training centers. Most of the units withdrawn were returned to complete their training at a later date.

(2) Reduction of the recruit BCT/AIT portion of the new RF company PCI from 12 to 9 weeks resulted in an overall reduction of the new RF company training period from 17 to 14 weeks.

(3) RF units completing training during this reporting period scored highest in general subjects training. Satisfactory performances were made in leadership and tactics. Considerably poorer scores were received in weapons and night operations training.

(4) A standardized end of training ATT was developed and distributed to the training centers in 2nd quarter 68. The first tests were begun in May 1968 of 24 RF companies tested, 22 were rated satisfactory and 2 unsatisfactory.

(5) RF companies reported for training without major equipment shortages.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The number of units available for training depends on the ability of sectors to recruit sufficient personnel to form new units. In addition, the sector must be secured so RF companies can be released for training.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Once M16A1 rifles are received at the training centers, and RF companies are equipped with these weapons, weapons training should improve considerably. Based on statistical review, 87.32% soldiers qualify when firing of the M16 versus 70.12% that qualify when firing the M1 rifle.

d. Projection:

(1) RF company training will continue to improve, particularly, in the area of weapons training.

(2) Programmed input will be met.

23. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Recruit Training

Statement of Objectives: To train 208,011 recruits as replacements for ARVN and RF units, and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and end of training reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CY68 training program, revised 1 May, increased the number of recruits to be trained from 96,034 to 208,011.

(2) To accommodate this increase in recruits programmed to be trained, all CTC controlled training centers were tasked with training both ARVN/RF recruits, and the ten division training centers and one PF training center were given the ARVN/RF recruit training mission.

(3) The recruit POI was decreased from 12 to 9 weeks to assist in producing individual replacements at a faster rate. The reduction of the POI was done selectively and after intense review so that the effectiveness of training would not be compromised.

(4) Programmed input to date is 85,631. Actual input is 85,478.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The RVNAF build up and pro-government fervor in the wake of the Tet offensive resulted in large numbers of volunteers and conscriptions into ARVN.

(2) The increase in training center base capacity from 48,640 to 67,700 allowed the large numbers of recruits to be received and trained at the training centers without materially affecting other programmed training.

(3) The reduction of the recruit POI to nine weeks resulted in the elimination of the BCT/AIT proficiency test. Consequently, no statistical analysis of recruit training can be made with the exception of weapons qualification data.

(4) Because of the new family of weapons being introduced into ARVN/RF, weapons training has assumed additional emphasis, i.e., introduction of the Quick Kill Marksmanship program into the Recruit POI. However, this program will not be implemented until the training centers are equipped with sufficient number of M16s. Data currently available indicate that individual weapons qualification will increase approximately 15 percent with the M16.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Recruit training is being conducted satisfactorily.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 133 OF 265 PAGES

(2) The nine week FOI is adequate for producing well trained soldiers; however, further reduction will be opposed.

(3) Training will increase in effectiveness once the centers have received new weapons.

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection:

(1) Programmed goals will be met.

(2) Quality of the recruit PCI meets the standards and needs of RVNAF.

24. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Individual Training - ARVN Reserve NCO Training Course

Statement of Objectives: To train 6,400 individuals in the ARVN NCO preparatory course to produce individuals knowledgeable in basic military subjects before attending the National NCO Academy, and to determine the effectiveness of this training.

a. Review of Progress: Program was combined with OCS preparatory course in May 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: NA

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: NA

d. Corrective Action: NA

e. Projection: NA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 135 OF 265 PAGES

25. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Officer Candidate Preparatory Training

Statement of Objectives: To train 21,074 officer/NCO candidates in basic and advanced individual training and determine the effectiveness of this training through an end-of-course proficiency test and end of training reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The OCS and NCO preparatory courses started during the 2nd Quarter, CY68.

(2) Experience gained while processing the first classes caused a modification in this training concept, i.e., all recruits that met the educational standards for leadership positions were grouped into a single class.

(3) Because of the consolidation of the two programs into one, the programmed input for CY68 was increased from 9,500 to 21,074.

(4) Programmed input to date is 7,574. Actual input is 6,507.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) In Apr 68, it became apparent that sufficient manpower was available to fill both OCS and NCO course quotas with holders of Baccalaureate I and II degrees. The NCO Preparatory Course was discontinued and the OCS Phase I class enrollment was doubled to 2,000 students for each class.

(2) Upon completion of Phase I training, the top 1,000 graduates of each class of 2,000 students are sent to the Thu Duc Infantry School and the remainder are sent to the Nha Trang NCO Academy.

(3) End-of-course proficiency tests determine whether recruits take Phase II training at Thu Duc for officer candidates or NCO training at Nha Trang.

(4) Results of tests administered to the first class show that a high percentage scored well in all areas. Nine hundred and eighty-seven were sent to Thu Duc and 1,724 were sent to Nha Trang.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Officer candidate preparatory training is progressing satisfactorily.

d. Corrective Action: Close monitoring of the POI and programmed input is being conducted by the Training Directorate/CTC.

e. Projection: With continued emphasis on candidate selection, the program should continue to be highly successful.

26. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Individual Training - RF NCO Refresher Training

Statement of Objectives: To train 1,347 RF NCOs during CY68 in basic military knowledge required to lead a rifle squad, and to determine the effectiveness of this training through training inspections and evaluation of training reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CY68 Training Program, revised 1 May, increased the number of RF NCOs to receive refresher training from 966 to 1,347.

(2) The Tet offensive caused the scheduled starting date of this POI to be delayed until June; however, actual input and training began in May.

(3) Programmed input to date is 247. Actual input is 144.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Three training centers are scheduled to conduct RF NCO refresher training during CY68 - Van Kiep National Training Center and Cao Lanh and Phu Cat Regional Force Training Centers.

(2) This course is one of the principle providers of qualified NCO's to the Regional Forces.

(3) Although the revised CY68 training program increased the number of RF NCOs to be trained, an average shortfall in programmed input during CY66 and 67 of approximately 32% would indicate this program will not be met.

(4) The excellence of the end of course proficiency test and provision that directs automatic reduction for those NCOs failing the course, results in high quality students who are motivated to do their best.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) RF NCO Refresher Course instruction is highly satisfactory.

(2) NCO input to the course has not met programmed level.

(3) RF unit commanders are reluctant to release their NCOs for an eight week period.

d. Corrective Action: Training Directorate/CTC will closely monitor NCO input to the training centers.

e. Projection:

(1) Course of instruction will continue to produce highly qualified RF NCOs.

(2) Based on CY66 and 67 data and shortfall during 1st half CY68, programmed input will not be met.

PAGE 137 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

27. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: ARVN Interpreter Preparatory Course

Statement of Objectives: To train 2,912 individuals in basic military subjects prior to attending the Armed Forces Language School, and to determine the effectiveness of this training.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CY68 training program, revised 1 May, increased the number of individuals programmed to attend the 5 week BCT POI from 1,200 to 2,912.

(2) Programmed input to date is 1,922. Actual input is 1,650.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) ARVN interpreter preparatory training is conducted at Quang Trung National Training Center. Programmed objectives for the first half of CY68 have not been met; however, it is anticipated the 72 man shortfall will be made-up during the remainder of CY68.

(2) Those selected to attend the interpreter course undergo the five week recruit BCT program of instruction and then attend an eight week course of instruction at the Armed Forces Language School.

c. Conclusion/Trends: Mobilization increased the need for interpreters.

d. Corrective Action: None to report.

e. Projection: The course will continue to produce individuals knowledgeable in basic military subjects prior to attending the Armed Forces Language School.

28. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Individual Training - Certificate of Proficiency
Course 1 (CCL)

Statement of Objectives: To train 2,400 ARVN CCL course students programmed for CY68 who are proficient in basic military subjects and capable of leading rifle squads or performing technical functions, and to determine the effectiveness of this training.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CY68 training program, revised in May, reduced the number of soldiers to receive CCL training from 3,000 to 2,400.

(2) Because of the large numbers of recruits input to the training centers immediately following Tet, CCL training was reprogrammed to start during the latter part of the 2nd Quarter CY69.

(3) Programmed input to date is 600. Actual input is 153.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Commanders having individuals qualified for CCL training were reluctant to release them to attend the course of instruction after Tet. As a result, CCL classes were late in forming, or when formed, were not filled to programmed strength.

(2) CCL trainees were found to be professionally qualified and mentally capable of receiving the instruction.

(3) Training center advisors report this instruction is among the best given at the training centers. Instruction conforms to CTC POIs and often offers new military subjects in advance of actual publication, e.g. training on the new family of weapons and technique of combat in built-up areas.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Instruction will continue to be of high quality and certificate holders will be among the best qualified graduates of the CTC controlled training centers.

d. Corrective Action: Training Directorate in conjunction with CTC will closely monitor programmed input to insure objectives are met and that sufficient CCL graduates are produced.

e. Projection:

(1) This course should continue to produce well qualified soldiers.

(2) Programmed objectives should be met.

29. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Individual Training - LRRP Training

Statement of Objectives: To train 400 men in LRRP techniques; determine appropriate TOE for LRRP teams, and determine the effectiveness of training.

a. Statement of Review:

(1) The CY68 training program schedules training for 5 LRRP classes of 80 students each; however, an unprogrammed class started training in April. If programmed goals are met during the remainder of CY68, the programmed input will be exceeded by one LRRP class.

(2) Training is programmed to begin in July. With the unprogrammed class already in training, this POI is approximately 20% ahead of program.

(3) In April, TOE 4-770, Reconnaissance Company Infantry Division, was revised to include one LRRP platoon. Recommendations for the organization, equipment, and concept of employment was approved by CofS, JGS.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) LRRP training is conducted at Duc My RTC and as in-place training.

(2) Graduates of the courses conducted at Duc My RTC are awarded the LRRP badge and receive a certificate of course completion.

(3) Personnel receiving LRRP training in-place must be tested at Duc My RTC before credit for completion is given.

(4) The course is 5 weeks in duration and is patterned after the Special Forces RECONDO course conducted at Nha Trang. Training incorporates 3 patrols utilizing ground, air, and water insertion and exfiltration.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Standards of LRRP training are being held at the highest level. All personnel are tested at one training center with the exception of those trained by AATTIV at Van Kiep NTC. Testing at one location serves to standardize procedures taught at the various locations.

d. Corrective Action: None to report.

e. Projection: This training will continue to provide well trained and highly motivated LRRP personnel.

30. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Individual Training - Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Training by Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Statement of Objectives: To train selected ARVN division personnel in the techniques of long range reconnaissance patrolling.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) On 27 March, CTC accepted an Australian proposal to establish a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Course to be presented by the Australian Army. Training is conducted at Van Kiep NTC.

(2) The first class of forty soldiers from the 25th ARVN Division started training on 3 June under a nine week POI. Additional classes are scheduled as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Report</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>End</u>	<u># of Students</u>
18th Div	2/68	29 Jul 68	5 Aug 68	7 Oct 68	40
5th Div	3/68	30 Sep 68	7 Oct 68	9 Dec 68	40
7th Div	1/69	30 Dec 68	6 Jan 69	10 Mar 69	40
9th Div	2/69	3 Mar 69	10 Mar 69	12 May 69	40
21st Div	3/69	5 May 69	12 May 69	14 Jul 69	40

b. Analysis of Progress: Training has been very satisfactory. The Commander of the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam, stated that his instructors consider this group to be the finest ARVN soldiers with whom they have worked.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Personnel undergoing training will be assigned to the division reconnaissance company upon completion of the course. This will enhance the division's reconnaissance capability.

(2) CTC stated that graduates will be eligible for the same entitlements as graduates of the LRRP course conducted at Duc My Ranger Training Center.

d. Corrective Action. None.

e. Projection. The program has not reached the point where a valid projection can be made; however, trainee interest is high and based on the initial success of the course, training should produce highly qualified soldiers.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 141 OF 265 PAGES

31. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Individual Training - Quick Kill Program

Statement of Objectives: To train sufficient cadre who are qualified to present Quick Kill instruction, and to implement the marksmanship program.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) In March, a POI which included 8 hours of Quick Kill marksmanship instruction was distributed to the training centers.

(2) Quick Kill kits were issued to training centers and schools during the period March - May.

(3) A cadre training program was conducted at Quang Trung National Training Center 24 - 30 June 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The plan to implement the Quick Kill marksmanship program into CTC POIs in January could not be met. This was caused by late receipt of Quick Kill kits and the cessation of training during the Tet offensive.

(2) The program has been resumed with the issuance of kits and the cadre training program conducted at Quang Trung NTC; however, Quick Kill training will not commence until training centers are in receipt of sufficient M16A1 rifles to conduct a complete marksmanship program.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: CTC does not desire to implement the Quick Kill program until the 76 hour POI for M16 rifles is implemented.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) CTC directed all training centers to submit to JGS/CTC their total requirement for M16A1 rifles by 30 May.

(2) CTC has requested that sufficient M16A1 rifles be issued to the training centers as soon as possible.

e. Projection:

(1) The Quick Kill program will be initiated when M16A1 rifles are issued to training centers.

(2) The number of hits on target during night firing for those trained in Quick Kill should approximately double over those who have not received this training.

CONFIDENTIAL

32. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Quang Trung National Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and review of end of training tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Five POIs are programmed to be conducted at Quang Trung NTC during CY68.

(2) During the period immediately following Tet, the number of recruits sent to the training center exceeded the training centers capability to furnish adequate living facilities. This condition existed for approximately one month, and has since been resolved.

(3) Programmed and actual input to the four POIs are as follows:

POI	Programmed Input	Actual Input	% of Total Programmed Input CY68
Recruit	18819	20944	53.24
OCS Prep	4574	6507	30.88
LPC	992	887	38.75
Interp	1922	1540	52.88

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Training was temporarily interrupted during the Tet offensive.

(2) Training conducted for the first six months of this year has been satisfactory.

(3) The OCS/NCO Preparatory program has been well received and is progressing satisfactorily.

(4) The actual input of recruits exceeded anticipated load.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) A significant increase in trainees motivation was observed during this period. This is concluded to be the result of the Tet offensive and its' affect on the citizens of South Vietnam.

(2) There has been noticeable improvement in most areas of training being conducted at the training center.

d. Corrective Actions: Programmed and actual input to the training were receive close monitorship.

e. Projection: Continued improvement in the quality of trainees produced under the current program.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

33. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Dong Da National Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals and units as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and review of end of course tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress: Ten POIs are programmed to be conducted at this training center during CY68. Programmed and actual input to these courses are as follows:

<u>POI</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Total Programmed Input CY68</u>
Recruit	4351	4465	39.34
CC1	150	0	0
CC2	Scheduled to start in Aug		
Bn Ref	3	3	33.33
New Bn	4	4	100.00
Old RF			
New RF	8	8	100.00
Inf Co	12	12	100.00
Recon Co	3	0	0
Wpn Plts	Scheduled to start in Jul		

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Training effectiveness was reduced during and after Tet. Damage to training areas and facilities as well as continued enemy activity required the training center discontinue training for a four week period.

(2) Training resumed in early March under tight security restrictions; however, this did not materially affect the conduct of training.

(3) ARVN Infantry battalions programmed for refresher training did not arrive as scheduled. One newly formed battalion was withdrawn for combat operations; however, this unit did return to the training center to complete its program of instruction.

(4) New weapons POI's were tried at Dong Da NTC and later adopted by the Central Training Command. Introduction of the M16 rifle into ARVN training was first conducted at this training center.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends:

(1) Trainees and soldiers of units have received good quality instruction.

(2) Destruction to facilities during Tet did not seriously affect training.

(3) A significant increase in trainee motivation was observed during this period. This is concluded to be a result of the Tet offensive and its affect on the citizens of South Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Corrective Action:

- (1) Close monitorship of trainee input.
- (2) Continued repair of training facilities.

e. Projection: Training conducted at Dong Da NTC will continue to improve.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

34. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Van Kiep National Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals and units as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and review of end-of-training tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress: Eleven POIs are programmed to be conducted at this training center CY68. Programmed and actual input to these course are as follows:

<u>POI</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Total Programmed Input CY68</u>
Recruit	6137	7422	57.95
RF NCO	73	72	26.37
CC1	150	110	24.44
CC2	Not scheduled to begin until August		
Bn Ref	2	1	10.00
New Bn	1	1	100.00
Old RF Co	0	0	
New RF Co	8	19	82.61
Inf Co	6	6	100.00
Recon Co	0	0	
Weapons Plat	3	0	0

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Training was disrupted during the first two weeks of February because of enemy activity. When training resumed, it was superior to that given before Tet.

(2) ARVN Infantry and Airborne battalions programmed for refresher training did not arrive as scheduled. Two battalions that did enter training were withdrawn in mid-cycle because of operational requirements. Each returned later to complete its POI.

(3) Van Kiep experienced a significant increase in trainee input.

c. Conclusions/Trends:

(1) A general improvement in the quality of training presented was noted during this period.

(2) POIs having unit input were disrupted more frequently than those having individual input.

(3) Graduates were given high quality instruction with few distractions.

CONFIDENTIAL

- d. Corrective Action: None to report.
- e. Projection: Van Kiep will continue to improve the quality of its courses, field training maneuvers, and graduates.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 147 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

35. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Chi Lang National Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals and units as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and review of end-of-training tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress: Six POIs are programmed to be conducted at this training center CY68. Programmed and actual input to these courses are as follows:

<u>POI</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Total Programmed Input CY68</u>
Recruit	10135	12129	64.40
CC1	Not scheduled to begin until July		
CC2	Not scheduled to begin until October		
Bn Ref	Not scheduled to begin until July		
Weapons Plat	Not scheduled to begin until July		
Recon Co	3	0	0

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) This center was not attacked by the enemy during Tet; however, enemy action directed against the provincial capital, district headquarters, and land resupply routes leading to the training center caused the training center commander to cancel training for two weeks and maintain maximum alert against the enemy threat.

(2) After Tet, emphasis and increased interest given training by the training center staff and cadre caused it to be superior in effectiveness to that formerly given.

(3) Chi Lang was scheduled to conduct training under seven POIs during this period; however, only one, recruit training, was conducted. Input to other POIs was either delayed or rescheduled for later input.

(4) The center's student capacity rose considerably, beginning in April, when CTC increased the rated capacity.

c. Conclusions/Trends:

(1) Enemy activity during Tet motivated an improvement in training instruction and effectiveness.

(2) Presenting a single POI permitted the cadre to improve their expertise in its presentation.

(3) Overcrowded post facilities will continue as long as the number of trainees is sustained.

d. Corrective Action: None to report.

f. Projection: Chi Lang will continue to graduate well qualified soldiers for ARVN units and RF military sectors of IV Corps.

CONFIDENTIAL

36. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Lam Son National Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals and units as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and review of end-of-training tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress: Seven POIs are programmed to be conducted at this training center CY68. Programmed and actual input to these courses are as follows:

<u>POI</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Total Programmed Input CY68</u>
Recruit	10995	11924	47.52
CC1	150	0	0
CC2	Scheduled to begin August		
Bn Ref	Scheduled to begin July		
New Bn	1	1	25.00
Wpns Plt	Scheduled to begin July		
Recon Co	3	3	42.85

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Training has been effective and uninterrupted during this period. All units that completed training to date have been satisfactory.

(2) The rated capacity of the training center was increased to accommodate the increase the recruits due to the ARVN build-up.

(3) M16 familiarization and Quick Kill training was authorized by CTC at this center because of a general shortage of .30 caliber ammunition.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Training has been satisfactory during the period.

(2) There has been a significant increase in motivation since the Tet offensive resulting in a more receptive trainee. This has been evidenced by better scores in general subjects and marksmanship.

(3) Complete alleviation of the ammunition shortage is expected in August with steady improvement to that time.

d. Corrective Action: Supporting ALC has been tasked to supply minimal needs in training ammunition.

e. Projection:

(1) Training will continue to be satisfactory.

(2) M16's will be received for training and the "Old family" of weapons, i.e., M1 rifle, carbine, and BAR, will no longer be taught.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

37. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Phu Cat Regional Force Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals and units as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and review of end-of-training tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress: Five POIs are programmed to be conducted at this training center during CY68. Programmed and actual input to these courses are as follows:

<u>POI</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Total Programmed Input CY68</u>
Recruit	2626	1531	21.48
RF NCO	174	49	28.16
CC1	150	0	0
Old RF Co	Spaces left open - unit not designated as old or new RF Co		
New RF Co			

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Training continued satisfactorily during this period except for a brief interruption during the Tet offensive.

(2) Assigned cadre strength was inadequate to meet the increase in personnel undergoing recruit training. Phu Cat Regional Force Training Center was also assigned the mission of training ARVN recruits in addition to RF recruits.

(3) During this period, a leadership preparatory course of instruction was initiated at the training center. This is unprogrammed training. Graduates of the course will be temporarily assigned a training center cadre.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends:

(1) Training at PCRFTC has been satisfactory.

(2) ARVN recruit training will continue.

(3) All trainees appear to be motivated.

d. Corrective Action: None to report.

e. Projection: Continued improvement of training cadre and courses should increase the quality of the soldiers trained.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

38. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Duc My Ranger Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals and units as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training by reviewing end-of-training tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress: Five POIs are programmed to be conducted at this training center during CY68. Programmed and actual input to these courses are as follows:

<u>POI</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Total Programmed Input CY68</u>
Recruit	4952	3971	39.16
JMS	141	153	20.25
LRRP	0	152	38.00
Tae Kwon Do	30	30	100
En Ref	Scheduled to start July		

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Training has been satisfactory and has progressed uninterrupted for the entire period.

(2) Increase in rated capacity of this center resulted in a shortage of cadre. This was overcome by the temporary attachment of 50 personnel who had received training at the Malaysian Jungle School.

(3) Duc My RTC has been tasked with testing all LRRP trainees not trained at the RTC with the exception of those personnel trained by the AATTV at Van Kiep NTC. Sufficient cadre are available to conduct LRRP training; however, sufficient cadre are not available to conduct simultaneous training and testing.

(4) The training center's capacity was increased after Tet.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Training has been satisfactorily conducted.

(2) All trainees are ranger volunteers and very well motivated.

d. Corrective Action: None to report.

e. Projection:

(1) Training will continue to be satisfactory.

(2) M16 rifles will be received and training with the M1 rifle, carbine and BAR will be discontinued.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 151 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

39. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Trung Hoa Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals and units as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and review of end-of-training tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress: Two POIs are programmed to be conducted at this training center during CY68. Programmed and actual input to these courses are as follows:

<u>POI</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Total Programmed Input CY68</u>
Recruit	1240	1292	47.15
Bn Ref	Scheduled to begin August		

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Training was adversely effected during the Tet offensive. From February through mid-March there were no trainees at Trung Hoa RTC.

(2) The mission of Trung Hoa RTC was changed. Before Tet, only battalion retraining was conducted; after Tet, mission of ranger recruit training was added.

(3) One battalion was trained during the reporting period. Other battalions scheduled for retraining could not be released because of tactical commitments. The retrained battalion was evaluated as combat ready.

(4) Recruit training had serious limitations, i.e. numerous mortar attacks during the hours of darkness, and 10 percent casualties in the training companies. Loss of training time was held to a minimum; however, training effectiveness was marginal.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends:

(1) Battalion retraining was satisfactory.

(2) Recruit training was only marginally satisfactory because of the tactical situation.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) Additional fortification material has been procured for the purpose of constructing protective shelters for trainees. This should reduce the number of casualties.

(2) The 25th Infantry Division (US) has positioned an artillery battery radar and a 100 foot target requisition tower at Trung Hoa.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) CTC has recommended that Trung Hoa be closed as a training center and that all ranger training be conducted at Duc My RTC. Dir, Tng Dir concurred.

e. Projection: Pending determination of continuance as a training center.

CONFIDENTIAL

40. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Cao Lanh Regional Force Training Center

Statement of Objectives: To train individuals and units as scheduled by the CY68 training program and determine the effectiveness of this training through inspections and review of end-of-training tests and reports.

a. Review of Progress: Five POIs are programmed to be conducted at this training center CY68. Programmed and actual input to these courses are as follows:

<u>POI</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Total Programmed Input CY68</u>
Recruit	2837	1786	19.25
RF NCO	0	23	5.11
CC1	Scheduled to start July		
Old RF Co	Spaces for 30 companies were programmed, no units are designated		
New RF Co	19	19	

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) While no attack of any significance was launched directly against the center during Tet, increased enemy activity made the use of outlying training areas at night exceptionally dangerous, especially for new RF company training. The quality of night training was poor because of its being restricted to close-in-areas. Night training will become more realistic once outlying training areas are secured.

(2) In March the center was assigned the additional task of training ARVN recruits. The center was required therefore to reallocate personnel resources in order to provide cadre to supervise ARVN draftee companies. This burden was slightly relieved, late in the reporting period, when graduates of an unprogrammed leadership preparatory course assumed cadre responsibilities.

(3) Requests from the Training Center Commander to change the center's status from RF to national were not favorably considered by CTC primarily because of manpower limitations. Accordingly, the center operated under a 1965 TOE, designed for a "Corps RF/FF Training Center (Type A)," without equipment and cadre comparable to that available at national training centers.

c. Conclusions/Trends:

(1) Training performance during this reporting period was affected by increased enemy activity, the requirement to operate under an outdated TOE, and the assignment of an additional training task.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Command emphasis on increased security, sanitation, beautification, and police in the last four months of this reporting period has significantly improved the morale of cadre and trainees.

d. Corrective Action: None to report.

e. Projection: Cao Lanh will continue to improve the quality of its training as security forces are able to regain control over additional training areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

41. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: POIs Used at CTC Controlled Training Centers

Statement of Objectives: To conduct a continuous review of all POIs taught at CTC controlled training centers.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) A program of review has been established by the Training Directorate to insure that POIs are reviewed not less than annually.

(2) Changes are recommended when new techniques are developed.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) POI reviews have been instrumental in advising ARVN of required and recommended changes.

(2) A recent change has been the addition of a combat in cities block of instruction to all individual and unit POIs.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: A continuous review of the POIs is necessary and meaningful. It is the best method of insuring up-to-date information and instruction is offered to trainees.

d. Corrective Action: Increased emphasis is being placed on ARVN to adopt a program of continuous review.

e. Projection: Review of POIs will receive greater emphasis and instruction will improve at training centers.

CONFIDENTIAL

42. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Ranger Training

Statement of Objectives: To review and publish in-place training directives; to improve officer and NCO leadership; to revise Ranger doctrine and revise training documents and to evaluate training by inspection visits.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) On 15 Apr, the Ranger Command submitted an in-place training plan to JGS. This plan was approved on 2 May.

(2) Two officer leadership courses were conducted in January; however, because of the Tet offensive and the operational status of the Ranger Battalions, these classes have not been conducted since Tet.

(3) Training literature on combat in cities, in-place training and new weapons training has been published.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The approved in-place training plan was distributed to the Ranger Groups and started on 1 June. The plan directs that seven days in-place training be conducted every two months.

(2) Although the officer leadership classes have not been conducted since Tet, the course (approximately 81 hours) was found to be most valuable and will be reinstituted as soon as operational requirements are reduced.

(3) Ranger doctrine is under continuous study; in this regard, the Ranger TOEs have been reviewed, modified and submitted for approval.

(4) All Ranger Battalions have been inspected at least once since January. The Ranger Commander and his staff are aware of the importance of frequent inspections.

c. Conclusions and Trends: The Ranger training programs are adequate to meet current requirements.

d. Corrective Action: None to report.

e. Projection: There will be increased emphasis placed on new weapons training, and the technique of fighting in highly urbanized areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

43. SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Ranger Personnel

Statement of Objectives: To raise Ranger unit average strength from 86% to approximately 100%, and to insure appropriate distribution of skilled personnel within the Ranger Command.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Average assigned unit has been raised to 97 percent.

(2) Priority has been placed on assigning the most effective officers at Company, Battalion and Group Command.

b. Analysis of Progress: During the period following Tet, an unusually large number of men volunteered for Ranger assignments. This situation, coupled with an increased Ranger recruiting effort, insures that adequate numbers of soldiers will be available for Ranger assignments.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Ranger strengths have been raised to 97 percent of the authorized level.

(2) A more effective distribution of leaders has been made to insure effective leadership at company, battalion and group levels.

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: If volunteers continue to apply for Ranger assignments and the recruiting effort is maintained, Ranger units will remain a strong, well trained, and highly motivated fighting force.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Director, Training Directorate

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Technical Service Training Program

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE: Develop a self-sustaining RVNAF Technical Service training program.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element: Reduce the offshore training of RVNAF technical service personnel.

Goals:

- a. Develop and implement an Advanced Course Program of Instruction within each RVNAF technical service school.
- b. Determine current weaknesses in the in-country technical service training program and implement measures to strengthen the program.
- c. Determine long-range requirements for RVNAF technical service offshore training and develop a program for only those courses not available in-country.
- d. Analysis of Progress: Requirements developed for the FY69 program for offshore training have been reevaluated and confirmed. The FY70 program will be developed with the Office Chief of Ordnance Training Office, using the same guidelines and requirements projections. Most spaces in both FY69 and FY70 programs will be filled by officers and NCOs who will return to instruct at the Ordnance School in courses needing qualified instructors and current information on U.S. materiel. Remaining spaces are for courses not taught in-country.

2. Element: Improve administration and operation of RVNAF Technical Service Schools.

Goals:

- a. Revise TOE of RVNAF Technical Service Schools based on projected student inputs.
- b. Develop and initiate an instructor training program.
- c. Determine library and reference requirements for each Technical Service School and obtain the required publications.
- d. Determine long-range facilities requirements for the RVNAF Technical Service School and initiate necessary actions to obtain these facilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The work performances of graduates from in-country service schools have disclosed several areas that require emphasis on change in training programs. Graduates are not able to systematically trouble-shoot an item of equipment to determine causes of malfunctions. Technical inspection procedures on an item, before and after repairs are made, are neither thorough nor systematic. There is a need for more emphasis on practical application instead of theory. More repetitive drill training is needed on supply and maintenance procedures.

(2) Decreased student input has been a problem for some time. The Ordnance School Commandant and the advisor have made field visits and given briefings to visiting Ordnance field commanders, encouraging them to select and send their personnel to the Ordnance School.

(3) A working agreement was developed and finalized with U.S. 1st Logistical Command on 24 January 1968, which provided OJT in electrical equipment repair and in electronic maintenance calibration. Letter, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, AVCA GM-CE, dated 24 January 1968, subject: Instrument Repair Support for ARVN applies. Selected ARVN Signal personnel from ARVN Signal Support Battalions currently undergoing training, should form the nuclei of a maintenance calibration capability within RVNAF in the future.

(4) Generally the graduates of the technical service schools are used by their units as instructor personnel to provide CJT to unit personnel. Advisor personnel are training ARVN personnel as instructors on new items of equipment being introduced into the ARVN inventory.

(5) There is no formal instruction training program at the ARVN Ordnance School. The primary reason for the lack of such a program is the relatively low quantity of incoming instructor personnel. During the first six months of CY68 approximately eight new instructors were assigned to the school. Each of these were given, as a part of initial orientation to the school, instructor training.

(6) A Methods of Instruction Class for QMS instructors is planned for October 1968. The QMS Advisor recommended to Schools and Doctrine Division, MACV Training Directorate on 4 July 1968 that a centrally conducted methods of instruction class be initiated by Central Training Command with mandatory student quotas for each service school.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACofS, J4

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Training and Equipment Assistance to RVN, Military Security Service (MSS)

(C) Statement of Objective: To provide technical equipment and specialized training to the Military Security Service (MSS) to assist them in becoming an effective, proficient counterintelligence organization.

a. Review of Progress: MSS was issued about 99% of the programmed equipment during the last reporting period. The remainder of the programmed equipment was issued during the current reporting period, with the exception of a small quantity of equipment destined for the II CTZ. Personnel of the 135th Advisory Detachment reviewed the draft TO&E for the MSS and deleted all out-dated equipment and inserted required items of equipment and additional equipment not previously authorized. Field trips to various CTZs were curtailed somewhat during the reporting period because of the combat situation. Personnel of the 135th Advisory Detachment and 525th counterpart personnel in the CTZs presented an average of 24 hours per month formal training to MSS personnel in specialized subjects such as clandestine listening devices, trace metal detection kit, 16mm Bell and Howell movie camera, surveillance, sabotage and countersabotage, fingerprinting, and VIP security and in other subjects such as qualification in various weapons and the English language. Personnel of the 135th Advisory Detachment initiated a bilateral source control program and traveled to all Corps MSS offices and presented formal source control training to MSS personnel. Personnel of the 135th Advisory Detachment and 525th MI Group counterpart personnel gave an average of 1140 hours per month on the job training for the reporting period. During the reporting period, 42 MSS officers were trained at the USARPACINTS, Okinawa, in the DAME/DASE/Photo Course; Security and Counterintelligence Course; Collection Course; and the Development and Use of Military Intelligence Course. During the reporting period, 54 Warrant Officers attended a course of instruction at MSD for security officers in the Revolutionary Development Security program. During the reporting period, MSD presented two four-week basic security courses to a total of 128 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.

b. Analysis of Progress: The increase in formal and on the job training during the reporting period was possible because of the assignment of additional US personnel to the 135th Advisory Detachment, which allowed more time for counterpart activities and on the job training presented to MSS personnel who did not previously have a US counterpart. The increase in the training presented to MSS personnel has been reflected in the quality of information received from the MSS and the greater cooperation extended to the US Army Intelligence by the MSS. Off-shore training of MSS officers has been an asset to the training program of MSS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 161 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Conclusions and Trends: The equipment issued to MSS has received maximum use as demanded by operations and has continued to increase their effectiveness in the intelligence and security fields. The training program as currently being carried out has been effective in developing a more efficient organization. The issuance of equipment coupled with the training program have given the MSS a greater incentive for increased cooperation with US Army Intelligence.

d. Corrective Actions: The off-shore training program is under review by the 135th Advisory Detachment to include a specific needs course tailored for MSS officer personnel. The Basic Security Course is being reviewed to insure that up-to-date instruction is being presented.

e. Projection: The balance of equipment will be issued during the next reporting period as indicated in paragraph a, above, and the training program will continue with emphasis on the new course for officers as described in paragraph d, above.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

CONFIDENTIAL
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Operations Advisory Branch

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Training of Medical Service Personnel

1. (U) Statement of Objectives: Review and evaluate all programs of instruction (POI) and lesson plans developed in 1967, and all similar material as it is developed.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The school advisor and appropriate officers on the staff of the Command Surgeon MACV reviewed every program of instruction developed during 1967 and those POI's which have been prepared for the current year. This material is of high quality and should satisfy future requirements for the RVNAF Medical Service.

(2) The additional efforts applied to lesson plans have resulted in a great improvement and continual emphasis is being placed in this area.

b. Analysis of Progress: A complete program of instruction has been developed for every course taught at the Military Medical School. They have been developed with adequate lead time for each course and are thorough and comprehensive. Lesson plans have been completed.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Development of POI's is adequate and no future changes are anticipated at this time.

(2) Lesson plans have been improved.

d. Corrective Actions: Actions taken appear to be adequate and no further corrective actions are anticipated at this time.

e. Projection: The POI's as developed will improve training at the Military Medical School.

2. (U) Statement of Objectives: Encourage greater use of training aids, audio-visual aids and practical exercises in various courses of instruction.

a. Review of Progress: Throughout 1967 & 1968 considerable emphasis has been placed on the use of training aids, audio-visual aids

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

and practical exercises. Records in the training section show an increase in the use of training and audio-visual aids.

b. Analysis of Progress: The traditional instruction in Vietnam has centered around the lecture methods. Progress has not been rapid but has been noted with the increased use of demonstrations and training films as instructional aids.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Progress has not been as slow as anticipated in the last report. Instructors have recognized the value of audio-visual aids, particularly training films. Because of the importance of improved teaching techniques the program must be continued.

d. Corrective Actions: A Method of Instruction course was conducted for the purpose of improving teaching techniques. The School Advisor has discussed this problem on numerous occasions with the Director of Training and the School Commandant. The Deputy Command Surgeon has made the School Commandant aware that he is extremely interested in this program and this interest has resulted in increased command emphasis.

e. Projection: Teaching methods will change and will attain the desired improvements within one year.

3. (U) Statement of Objective: Obtain required items currently authorized in the Vietnamese Army Supply and Equipment List (VAMSEL) to support training (Demonstration equipment, medical texts and desks).

a. Review of Programs:

(1) All medical texts have been requisitioned and new texts have been authorized for the school VAMSEL. The majority of requisitioned material has not been received at this time.

(2) Invoices have arrived on training aids shown to be on order in the last review and analysis, and a limited amount of training aids have arrived.

(3) Desks mentioned in the last report have been constructed: but construction deficiencies were discovered resulting in a postponement of delivery.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Analysis of Progress: Considerable progress has been made since the last report.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Substantial gains have been made in this area. It is being maintained with no difficulty.

d. Corrective Actions: No change in corrective actions is contemplated.

e. Projection: More effort will have to be expended, follow-up on the actions have been initiated.

4. (U) Statements of Objectives: Search for new and improved ways of developing leadership among the students, staff and faculty.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The pilot project aimed at improving leadership which was mentioned in the last review and analysis is still in effect.

(2) The school commandant has assumed a stronger leadership role in his relationship with subordinates.

(3) NCO's in the Enlisted Student Battalion are functioning more effectively in their positions.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The pilot project has proved very successful and will continue indefinitely.

(2) Comments noted in the last review and analysis are still applicable to the present situation.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Progress has been made and a genuine awareness and concern has been created. Even though there is considerable room for improvement, top leadership has begun to tackle the problem and more improvement should be visible.

d. Corrective Actions: Frequent discussions with the School Commandant and many staff officers has been reasonably successful. The pilot project has also produced significant results.

PAGE 165 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Projection: Progress will be slow but effort must be continued in order to develop more capable leadership.

5. (U) Statement of Objective: Work for improvement of the entire physical plant so that training may be adequately supported.

a. Review of Progress: Progress in this area is sporadic and improvements noted in the last report were not of a lasting nature. Daily housekeeping maintenance has not been effective and windows, water faucets and light bulbs continue to be either broken or missing.

b. Analysis of Progress: The program for preventive maintenance mentioned in the last report is in a development stage. Even though many items have been repaired or replaced there is still much room for improvement.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Past actions have not improved the situation to a marked extent; however progress is expected through the corrective action in para d.

d. Corrective Action: The School Administrative Officer has fixed responsibility for the maintenance of physical areas among concerned school cadre and student leaders. As of this time very little damage has been done to existing material and action is being taken to repair materials damaged in the past.

e. Projection: A marked and continued improvement is expected to result from this new program. The school cadre has become individually concerned in the program.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Command Surgeon

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G1 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Accuracy of Strength Reports.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To increase the efficiency and accuracy of staff procedures within the Division G1 staff section.

1. **Element:** Establishment of a system for categorizing wounded and sick personnel.

Statement of Objective: To suggest and assist in establishing an efficient system for the disposition of CAT I, II, III and IV personnel.

a. **Review of Progress:**

(1) Regular medical board meetings are being held to consider the disposition of individual cases.

(2) Each Monday the assistant G1 assembles all personnel on convalescent leave or pass for reclassification. On each succeeding weekday the assistant G1 reassembles and reclassifies those individuals scheduled for reclassification during that week.

b. **Analysis of Progress:**

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: None.

(3) Lack of Resources: None.

c. **Conclusions and/or Trends:**

(1) The medical board and the G1 reclassification sessions will properly handle the disposition of CAT I, II, III and IV personnel.

(2) No revision of this element is necessary.

2. **Element:** Establishment of a "zero-defects" type program in personnel administration.

Statement of Objective: To increase the overall effectiveness of the G1 section by promoting a "zero-defects" type program in all administrative reports.

a. **Review of Progress:**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(1) Administrative personnel have been made aware of the extra work load they cause for themselves by submitting inaccurate reports.

(2) Advisory personnel have taught the G1 personnel records section proper filing techniques resulting in time saved and influencing more attention to detail.

(3) The Division G1 has been personally conducting classes each month since January 1968 covering procedures, as set down by the Vietnamese JGS, for improving strength accounting and reporting. These classes are mandatory for all administrative personnel down to and including battalions and separate companies.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: None.

(3) Lack of Resources: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Under the direction of the Division G1 and with assistance from advisory personnel inaccuracies will decrease.

(2) The objective of this element is extended until 31 December 1968.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: Continuing emphasis is being placed on preventing inaccuracies. A decrease in the work load and time lost should occur in the future.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-4 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Airborne Division Hospital.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To provide adequate medical facilities for Division personnel who become wounded or sick.

1. Element: Expansion of the bed capacity of the hospital.

(C) Statement of Objective: To expand the bed capacity of the hospital to 100 beds.

a. Review of Progress: A 60 bed hospital annex will be officially opened on 11 July 1968 bringing the total bed capacity to 110. In case of emergency, bed capacity can be expanded to 160 beds.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: None.

(3) Lack of Resources: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The expansion of the hospital capacity will insure more comfortable conditions for the patients, thus adding immensely to the morale of the Division's sick and wounded.

(2) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: None.

2. Element: Issue of orthopedic traction equipment and surgical instruments.

(C) Statement of Objective: To obtain adequate equipment and facilities for the treatment and management of fractures.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Ten beds with fracture frames have been obtained.

(2) An orthopedic surgeon has joined the hospital staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: None.

(3) Lack of Resources: It is difficult to obtain some of the necessary orthopedic equipment, e.g., some sizes of Kirschner wires, through ARVN medical supply channels.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The addition of more orthopedic equipment and the presence of an orthopedic surgeon will improve care for fracture patients.

(2) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: None.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-3 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Airborne Division Training

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To meet the Airborne Division's personnel requirements with well-trained airborne personnel through an efficient airborne training school and basic training system. To provide scheduled retraining of the combat units of the Division.

1. Element: Recruit training program of airborne volunteers.

Statement of Objective: To provide the Airborne Division with well-trained, highly motivated airborne volunteers.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) During the reported period, a total of 2621 airborne recruits completed basic training at Quang Trung National Training Center. This is an increase of 1195 personnel trained as compared to the totals of the last reporting period.

(2) After the recent Communist TET offensive, Quang Trung NTC increased its' capability to train four 600 man airborne recruit training classes simultaneously, as compared with the previous capability of training four 400 man classes.

(3) A special recruit training class of 1200 trainees was conducted by the Van Kiep NTC, on a one time basis, to absorb some of the training load at Quang Trung NTC in order to fulfill the Division's requirements following the Communist TET offensive. This class completed training on 30 June 1968.

(4) With the increased training load at Quang Trung NTC, the quality of training received by the recruits has not been affected. Training is described as outstanding by the commanders and staff throughout the Division. No apparent decline in combat effectiveness has been noticed upon intergration of newly trained recruits into units engaged in operational missions.

b. Analysis of Progress: No deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources exist.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The recruit training program conducted by Quang Trung NTC is adequate and will continue to meet the needs of the Division for trained infantry replacements.

(2) No revision of the objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projections: The airborne recruit program will continue with the desired results that it has achieved in the past.

Statement of Objective: To meet the minimum quarterly recruiting goal determined by the Joint General Staff.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) During the third quarter, FY68, the Division recruited 2540 volunteers, exceeding the JGS goal of 1000 recruits by 1540 personnel.

(2) During the fourth quarter, FY68, the Division recruited 4036 volunteers, exceeding the JGS goal of 1500 recruits by 2536 personnel.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The Communist TET offensive resulted in a high influx of volunteers for the Airborne Division.

(2) No deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources exist.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The Airborne Division is conducting a highly successful recruiting program and is adequate for the needs of the Division.

(2) No revision of the objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The Airborne Division recruiting program is expected to continue with the desired results that it has achieved in the past.

2. Element: Airborne Training Program of Airborne Volunteers.

Statement of Objective: Provide airborne qualified personnel required to meet the Division's replacement requirements.

a. Review of Progress: During the period 1 January to 30 June 1968, the Airborne Division jump school graduated a total of 3333 airborne qualified personnel. In comparison to the previous semi-annual report this is an increase of 1161 personnel.

b. Analysis of Progress: No deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources exist.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: No revision of the objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The airborne training program is expected to continue with the desired results that it has achieved in the past.

Statement of Objective: To improve and modernize the facilities, techniques and procedures utilized in airborne training.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) During the month of May, the Airborne School constructed one swing landing trainer within the jump school training area.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The Airborne Division Jump School facilities are adequate to provide outstanding training for trainees attending jump school. They include the 34 ft tower, the swing landing trainer, the suspended harness, the 4 ft parachute landing fall platform and the 150 meter slide trainer. With the exception of the slide trainer, these facilities are modeled after existing facilities used at the U.S. Army Jump School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

(2) No deficiencies, critical problems, or lack of resources exist.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The Airborne Division Jump School requested construction material in January 1968 in order to construct a second 34 ft tower. The tower will be constructed by the Airborne Division Engineer Company with assistance from the Support Command (VN). The construction of this tower will enable Airborne Trainees to make more practice jumps from the 34 ft tower prior to jumping from aircraft.

(2) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The Airborne Division Jump School will continue to improve and modernize facilities, techniques and procedures.

Feb 69

3. Element: Retraining of the Division Units.

Statement of Objective: To provide retraining at Van Kiep NTC for a minimum of one Airborne Battalion during each quarter of the calendar year.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The 3rd Airborne Battalion completed its retraining at Van Kiep NTC on 19 January 1968.

(2) The 9th Airborne Battalion entered Van Kiep NTC on 8 April and trained until 7 May. At that time the battalion was moved to Saigon to engage enemy forces in the Saigon-Tan Son Nhut area. During the 2nd Communist offensive operational commitments of the Battalion have precluded its return to Van Kiep for the final two weeks of training.

b. Analysis of Progress: No deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources exist.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The goal of retraining one Airborne Battalion per quarter was not met during this reporting period due to the operational commitments of the Airborne Division during and since the Communist TET offensive.

(2) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The Van Kiep retraining program will continue to be extremely valuable to the Airborne Battalions.

Statement of Objective: To provide retraining at the Duc My NTC for each artillery battery a minimum of one time every two calendar years.

a. Review of Progress: During the last two calendar years, all Airborne Division Artillery Batteries have been trained or retrained at Duc My NTC. Units conducted training as listed below:

	<u>Initial Training</u>	<u>Retraining</u>
A Battery	1 May 66-4 Jun 66	18 Dec 66-1 Jan 67
B Battery	20 Feb 67-17 Mar 67	
C Battery	9 Oct 67-30 Nov 67	

b. Analysis of Progress: No deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources exist.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The training and retraining program at Duc My NTC is adequate and will continue to meet the needs of the Division in providing highly trained Artillery Batteries.

(2) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The Artillery retraining program at Duc My will continue with the desired results that it has achieved in the past. "A" Battery of the recently activated 2nd Artillery Battalion will enter initial training in July 1968.

Statement of Objective: To provide retraining for airborne battalions that have lost their combat effectiveness as a result of a large number of casualties sustained during combat operations. Retraining to be accomplished as soon as the battalion has received an adequate number of replacements.

a. Review of Progress: During the TET offensive, several airborne battalions lost their combat effectiveness due to heavy casualties, however, retraining of these battalions was not possible due to operational commitments.

b. Analysis of Progress: No deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources exist.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The goal of retraining units that have lost combat effectiveness was not accomplished as desired.

(2) Presently, all airborne battalions are rated as combat effective. Continued operational commitments should further improve unit effectiveness.

(3) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: As a result of the availability of adequate replacements and extensive operations conducted, combat effectiveness of all airborne battalions will continue to improve.

Statement of Objective: To provide familiarization training for all of the Division's personnel in the conduct of parachute jumps from different types of aircraft (i.e., C-119, C-123, and C-130).

a. Review of Progress: The Airborne Division jump school has mock-ups of the C-47, C-119, C-123, and C-130 aircraft. All jump school students are familiarized with all of the aforementioned aircraft during their training at the jump school. All airborne battalions have been instructed to construct mock-ups of the standard type of jump aircraft prior to 1 September. A training team from the Airborne Division jump school has been organized and will visit each battalion when the battalions are located in their base for rest and training. All personnel in the battalion will be familiarized with the standard jump aircraft at that time.

b. Analysis of Progress: No deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources exist with the current and proposed training at this time.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) All students graduating from the Airborne Division jump school are trained in the conduct of parachute jumping from different types of aircraft.

(2) All personnel assigned to Battalions and Division units will be trained in the conduct of parachute jumping from different types of aircraft.

(3) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The mobile training teams will be able to familiarize all jumpers that have completed jump school with the technique used in jumping from new or different types of aircraft at the units home base. The Airborne Division Jump School will continue with the desired results that it has achieved in the past.

4. Element: Selection of Qualified Candidates to participate in the Off-Shore School Program.

Statement of Objective: To identify, select and train candidates who's demonstrated performance indicates that they would benefit from the off-shore schools program.

a. Review of Progress: During this reporting period the Division had the following number of personnel attend off-shore schools: Three officers attended the Basic Infantry Officer's Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; one officer attended the Basic Artillery Officer's Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; one attended the Psychological Warfare Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; one attended the Intelligence School at Singapore; eighteen officers attended the Jungle Warfare School in Malaysia, and one non-commissioned officer is presently attending a 24 week course in parachute maintenance at Fort Lee, Virginia.

b. Analysis of Progress: Those personnel who have participated in the off-shore program have benefited the Division from the instruction they received; this is especially true for the leadership training.

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: The Division personnel status is not sufficiently stable to permit specific selection of personnel to attend the off-shore schools. Due to the heavy operational commitment of the Airborne Division, individuals cannot be taken out of critical slots to attend language training or language tests. To alleviate this problem, the Advisory Detachment is continuing to emphasize the following:

(a) To place qualified personnel in the language training program in a timely fashion.

(b) Not to ask for allocations unless they intend to fill them.

(c) If not capable of filling a requested allocation, cancel the request in sufficient time to permit another ARVN unit to fill the space.

(3) Lack of Resources: Timely availability of qualified personnel.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The Airborne Division has made an effort to request and fill allocations for off-shore schooling that will be beneficial to it's overall combat effectiveness. However, availability of best qualified personnel continues to be a problem.

(2) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Projection: The availability of best qualified personnel will continue to be a problem.

5. Element: Training of personnel who are assigned to the Division and fill specialized positions and are not able to attend the appropriate training school. This is essential in the expansion of the Engineer, Signal, and Medical Companies where the required number of specialized personnel are not available.

Statement of Objective: Conduct on-the-job training for personnel assigned to the Division to fill specialized positions that requires school trained personnel prior to 1 February 1968.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The Airborne Division has a Division wide OJT program.

(2) Priority has been given to engineer, signal and medical units that have been expanded during the reporting period. Selected personnel are being assigned to these units in order to fill key slots and continue the OJT program.

(3) During the month of January the following number of personnel were trained with the OJT program.

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>
Engineers	0	8	17
Signal	2	4	31
Medical	8	9	11

b. Analysis of Progress: No deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources exist.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The goal to conduct on the job training of specialized personnel assigned to positions that require school trained personnel was met.

(2) The objective of this sub-program is extended indefinitely.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: With the approved expansion of the Airborne Division in FY69, the Airborne Division OJT program will receive greater emphasis in order to train personnel for key slots where the required specialized personnel are not available. The OJT program will continue, and will be quite valuable to the Airborne Division in the future.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-5 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Dependent Housing.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To obtain adequate housing for the dependents of the soldiers assigned to the Division.

1. Element: The construction of new housing to replace facilities which are beyond rehabilitation and relieve over crowded situations due to a lack of sufficient housing.

Statement of Objective: To have sufficient housing for all dependents of the Division by 31 December 1968.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The Airborne Division required 5409 family housing units in December 1967. Since that time, the need for family housing has increased to 6195 units while only 2603 units are now available. This housing shortage has increased because the assigned strength of the Division has been increased by approximately 2400 soldiers over this 6 month period. Also the Commanding General of the Airborne Division allows a soldiers' family to remain in government housing if the soldier has been killed or permanently handicapped.

(2) Construction of family housing has been accomplished by the individual units on a very limited basis with whatever construction materials that can be obtained. During the last 6 months, approximately 200 units were built throughout the Division. This demonstrates that the Vietnamese soldiers will attempt to better themselves with whatever means are available when official assistance cannot be obtained. The 6th Battalion located at Vung Tau best exemplifies this with the 200 family unit construction project currently underway. With the enthusiastic aid of an American Engineer Company, 60 units have been completed and 60 more are presently under construction. This project was not administered thru ARVN G-4 channels, but owes its success to the determination of the Battalion Commander and Battalion Advisor to provide for the dependents.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: This immense housing shortage has existed for some time. To properly provide for the needed housing, funds must be allocated in the annual ARVN budget. Each year this is requested and each year it is refused. Assistance has also been requested from Gia Dinh Province to provide construction materials to build the needed housing on a self-help basis. Programs exist to help build housing for Hoi Chanhs, refugees, and RF/PF families, but nothing presently exists to help the families of the ARVN soldiers.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(2) **Critical Problems:** With the establishment of the 2nd Brigade Base Camp at Long Binh, only 250 family units have been authorized. Contractors have begun construction of these units in the latter part of June and will be completed in October 1968. These 250 units are not sufficient for a battalion, much less a brigade and further plans to provide the needed family housing have not yet been formulated.

(3) **Lack of Resources:** The Division can build the needed housing if the construction materials are available. Requests for these materials thru normal channels are refused and the material to build the needed housing is otherwise unobtainable.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) During the next 6 months, the Division strength will increase by approximately 1200 troops and this will put a greater demand on the family housing. Until the time comes when action to correct this immense problem is provided by GVN Funded Construction, this housing shortage will exist. Whether this housing project is built by contractors or on a self-help basis by the individuals, only a large increase in assistance will change the present housing situation of the Division.

(2) The objective of this sub-program is extended indefinitely.

d. Corrective Action: The lack of family housing within the Airborne Division cannot be corrected by the Division. Support must be obtained from outside of the Division, thru the annual budget to adequately provide for the dependents.

e. Projection: Presently, the Division has approximately 40% of the required family housing and no large improvement is foreseen.

2. Element: The rehabilitation of existing housing structures in order to give resident families housing which meets minimum standards.

Statement of Objective: To establish a continuing program of housing rehabilitation in order that the housing standards within the Division remain at a consistently high level.

a. Review of Progress: No official program of housing rehabilitation presently exists.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) **Deficiencies:** None.

(2) **Critical Problems:** None.

(3) **Lack of Resources:** The lack of materials and channels to obtain these materials for this use are not available. Presently, rehabilitation of the family housing is conducted only on a limited basis and is accomplished by the individual tenant with what ever resources he can obtain.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The housing rehabilitation in the Division will not change until funds or material become available.

(2) No revision of objective is necessary.

d. Corrective Action: The ability to provide the funds or material for this use lie outside the Division. Only if the current requests are fulfilled can this program be established.

e. Projection: None.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G1 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Desertion Rate.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To reduce the desertion rate in the Airborne Division.

Element: The institution of a leave and pass policy that would provide, for a reasonable number of personnel, sufficient time to visit families, relatives and friends.

Statement of Objective: To reduce the desertion rate in the Airborne Division through an active impartial leave and pass policy by 30 June 1968.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The CG, Airborne Division, instituted a policy whereby each battalion could have 30 men on a 10-day leave at all times.

(2) Due to problems discussed below the desertion rate did not decrease.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies:

(a) Because of casualties suffered during the VC TET offensive the Division received several hundred "undesirable" replacements, including men pressed into service from military prisons. Many of these replacements deserted.

(b) Initially the CG's new leave policy appeared that it would help reduce the desertion rate, but when the Division became heavily committed during and since the TET offensive it became necessary to curtail leaves and passes considerably.

(2) Critical Problems: It has been reported that upon becoming airborne qualified many personnel desert and join the CIDG to earn more money. The average airborne recruit earns about 4000 piasters (only 295 piasters of this is airborne pay) per month, whereas the average CIDG member earns between 7000 and 8000 piasters. The G1 advisor will initiate action through the G1 to curtail recruiting of airborne personnel by the CIDG and to increase the airborne pay of the lower enlisted grades of the Airborne Division.

(3) Lack of Resources: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) When the commitments of the Division permit more leaves and passes the desertion rate should decrease. It has decreased considerably since April 1968.

(2) Since March all replacements have been desirable volunteers. As they join the ranks of the Division, the desertion rate should decrease.

(3) The objective of decreasing the desertion rate is extended until 31 December 1968.

d. Corrective Action:

(1) If personnel who deserted from the Airborne Division were refused a position in the CIDG, this would eliminate this reason for desertion.

(2) Presently Vietnamese airborne pay works on a system similar to US flight pay, i.e., it is based on rank and time in service. For a Vietnamese PFC with over one year's service airborne pay amounts to only 18% of his base pay, whereas his US equivalent's airborne pay is 40% of his base pay. It is felt that if the airborne pay for the lower enlisted Vietnamese grades were to be increased, this would act as an incentive for personnel to remain with their unit.

e. Projection: The increased implementation of the new leave policy as commitments decrease should cause the morale of the division personnel to rise and the desertion rate to drop.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-5 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Education.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To increase the quality of instruction and the capacity of the facilities in order to provide a higher quality education to more children of the Division, thus making them more valuable to society.

Element: The construction of facilities with a capacity of 700 students to relieve the over crowded conditions which presently exist, thereby increasing the quality of the education offered.

Statement of Objective: To have school facilities for 700 students completed and in operation by 31 December 1968.

a. Review of Progress: New classrooms for 800 additional students will be completed by the fall school term. The 6th Battalion in Vung Tau completed a 5 room school in April which accommodates 600 students on a double shift basis. The new buildings replaced an older facility which had a capacity of 400 students. Five classrooms are under construction in the Division area at Tan Son Nhut. Four of them are 90% completed, while the remaining one is 50% finished. When all five rooms are completed for the fall school term, the new rooms will increase the capacity by 600 students.

b. Analysis of Progress: Neither the Division school addition nor the 6th Battalion school were finished by GVN construction, but owe their success to the efforts of the Division Chaplain and the 6th Battalion Commander. A lack of construction materials presented the most critical problem for the completion of the school rooms.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The objective of providing school facilities for 700 students will be accomplished within 2 months.

(2) During the last 6 months the Division strength was increased by approximately 2400 troops and will increase by approximately 1200 more troops in the next 6 months. A new base camp has been established at Long Binh for the 2nd Brigade. The most critical need for school facilities in the Division in the near future is in the 2nd Brigade. The education objective must be revised to provide school facilities for 2000 students of the 2nd Brigade. Presently, only one battalion has moved their dependents into the area, and the remainder of dependents will move when quarters become available.

d. Corrective Action: Bring the school requirements of the 2nd Brigade to the attention of higher headquarters to request the proper facilities thru GVN funded construction.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

e. Projection: As the new 2nd Brigade base camp is developed, the school facilities must be provided for the dependents.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PAGE 185 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-3 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Expansion of the Airborne Division

(C) SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To expand the Airborne Division into a force more capable of sustained independent actions on division, brigade or battalion level and provide for greater flexibility in the employment of the Division.

1. (C) Element: Organizing, training, and equipping a ninth Airborne Battalion (designated the 11th Airborne Battalion) in the Airborne Division.

(C) Statement of Objective: Organize and equip the 11th Airborne Battalion by 15 January 1968. Conduct six weeks of unit training at Van Kiep National Training Center by 24 February 1968, and be ready for operational commitment by 1 March 1968.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Organization and equipping of a ninth airborne battalion, (designated the 11th Airborne Battalion) in the Airborne Division, was completed on 13 January 1968.

(2) The 11th Airborne Battalion entered Van Kiep NTC on 15 January 1968, and graduated 29 March 1968. Due to the TET offensive, training was interrupted from 1 February to 6 March 1968, during which time the battalion was operationally committed.

b. Analysis of Progress: There were no deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources that affected the organization, equipping and training of the 11th Airborne Battalion.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The goal to organize, equip, and train the 11th Airborne Battalion was met. The Battalion was committed to operations and was rated combat ready.

(2) This objective is deleted from the sub-program.

d. Corrective Actions: None.

e. Projection: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) Element: Organizing and equipping a Support/Supply Company in the Airborne Division.

(C) Statement of Objective: Organize and equip a Support/Supply Company within the Airborne Division by 1 February 1968. Develop and train the Support/Supply Company through training exercises for an operational mission.

a. Review of Progress: The organization of the Support/Supply Company was completed on 30 January 1968. Development and training of the company continues through on-the-job training.

b. Analysis of Progress: Organization of the company proceeded as programmed. However, in the area of training and equipment, critical problems and lack of resources exist. As of 30 June 1968 critical shortages of equipment exist which seriously detract from the training and operational readiness of the unit. Shortages of major items of equipment are as listed below:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
Trk, $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton M606	10
Trk, 1 Ton M601	5
Trk, $2\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	5
Trk, $2\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Shop-van M609	3
Wrecker, 5 Ton	1
Tool Kit, auto fuel & electric repair	3
Tool Kit, Small arms repair	3
Tool Kit, Welding, orgn maint	1
Shop Set, Fld Maint, Instrument and fire control	1
Tool Kit, Arty repairman, ord	3
Shop Set, fld maint, welding	1
Shop Set, fld maint, spare parts storage set 2	4
Tool Kit, Auto maint, ord	14
Tool Kit, Master Mechanic	2
Shop Equipment, contact maint, trk mtd	6
Machinegun, 50 cal	7
Tool Kit, auto mech	6
Tool Kit, gen use tools, TE 33	6
Tool Kit, electrician, No 1	3
Generator, 1.5 KW, GED, AC	2
Lubricating & Servicing unit, Trk mtd, 15 CFM	1
Welding Shop, cargo, Trk mtd, 300 amp	1

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The goal to equip and train the Support/Supply Company has not been met due to shortages of major items of equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 187 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Further expansion of this company has been approved effective 1 July 1968.

(3) The objective is extended to 31 December 1968.

d. Corrective Action: Personnel advising ARVN units responsible for issuing the listed critical items should closely monitor stock levels to insure speedy delivery of those items as they become available. Without the listed items it will be impossible for the S & S Company to properly accomplish their mission.

e. Projection: The Support/Supply services available to the Division is greatly improved and should continue to improve upon further expansion, training and equipping.

3. (C) Element: Expansion of the Artillery Battalion.

(C) Statement of Objective: Increase the support capabilities of the Artillery Battalion through expansion of the battalion from a 12 Howitzer battalion (4 Howitzers per battery) to an 18 Howitzer battalion (6 Howitzers per battery) and increase the force structure of the Artillery Battalion from 368 to 428 personnel.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The Artillery Battalion received six additional howitzers on 15 January 1968. The battalion now has effective support capability of 18 howitzers.

(2) Personnel increases in the force structure were completed on 1 January 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: There were no deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources that affected the expansion.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The goal to increase the support capabilities of the Artillery Battalion was met. The increased fire power greatly enhanced the combat effectiveness of the Airborne Division.

(2) A further revision of the force structure of the Artillery Battalion, was deemed necessary. An increase of 47 personnel for a total force of 475 was requested and approved for FY69. The battalion is now organized under a revised TO&E of 475 personnel.

(3) This objective will be deleted from the sub-program.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Corrective Actions: None.

e. Projection: A further expansion for the Airborne Division Artillery is projected. A Division Artillery Headquarters and the 2nd Artillery Battalion have been approved for activation during FY69 and the 3rd Artillery Battalion approved for FY70.

4. (C) Expansion of the Airborne Division Headquarters and Support base.

(C) Statement of Objective: To increase the capabilities of the headquarters and support base to support the Division in sustained independent operations.

(1) Increase the force structure of the Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company from 282 to 368 personnel.

(2) Increase the force structure of the Engineer Company from 176 to 250 personnel.

(3) Increase the force structure of the Signal Company from 124 to 285 personnel.

(4) Increase the force structure of the Medical Company from 234 to 354 personnel.

(5) Increase the force structure of the Airborne Training Center from 54 to 72 personnel.

(6) Increase the force structure of the Military Police Detachment from 30 to 40 personnel.

a. Review of Progress: Approved increases for above units were effective on 1 January 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: There were no deficiencies, critical problems or lack of resources that affected the expansion process. There is notable improvement in the capabilities of the enlarged units.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The goal to expand the Airborne Division Headquarters Support Base by increasing the force structure was met.

(2) A revision of the force structure of the Engineer Company, Airborne Division, was again deemed necessary. An increase of 45 personnel for a total force of 295 was requested and approved for FY69. The company is now organized under the revised TO&E of 295 personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) A revision of the force structure of the Medical Company, Airborne Division, was again deemed necessary. An increase of 309 personnel for a total force of 663 was requested and approved for FY69. The company was redesignated a battalion and is now organized under the revised TO&E of 663 personnel.

(4) A revision of the force structure of the Military Police Detachment, Airborne Division, was again deemed necessary. The organization of a Military Police Company with an increase of 20 personnel for a total force of 60 was requested and approved for FY69. The company is now organized under the revised TO&E of 60 personnel.

(5) The objective is retained with an extended date of 31 December 1968 to allow for further expansion, equipping and training of units listed in paragraph C.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: Continued progress will be made in increasing the capabilities of the Division Support Base.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-4 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Maintenance and use of Military Assistance Program (MAP) supported equipment within the Airborne Division.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To increase the Division's combat capability by analyzing and assisting in the improvement of the Division logistic and maintenance programs.

1. Element: Monitoring of the maintenance of MAP equipment.

(C) Statement of Objective: To insure that the maintenance of MAP supported equipment is such that all equipment remains combat ready at all times.

a. Review of Progress: There have been no occasions when an excessive amount of equipment was not combat ready due to poor maintenance procedures.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: None.

(3) Lack of Resources: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Because of the pride in receiving modern US equipment, such as the M16E1 rifle and the M60 machinegun, maintenance activities have been excellent.

(2) The objective of monitoring maintenance procedures is extended indefinitely.

d. Corrective Actions: None.

e. Projection: Excellent maintenance of MAP supported equipment should continue even when new types of equipment are issued.

2. Element: Maintaining spare parts and maintenance records.

(C) Statement of Objective: To assist in the establishment of proper procedures for requisitioning spare parts and maintaining accurate up-to-date prescribed load lists (PLL) records.

a. Review of Progress:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 191 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) Procedures for requisitioning spare parts and maintaining PLL records are barely satisfactory.

(2) Advisory personnel have not been available to assist in the training of those personnel concerned with record keeping.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: Division personnel lack the necessary knowledge for properly maintaining PLL records. Due to operational commitments and shortage of advisory personnel in the maintenance field it has been impossible to spend the necessary time in training personnel maintaining PLL records. This will be done as soon as possible.

(2) Critical Problems: The present Division Supply Advisor is scheduled to depart on 24 August 1968. Without this advisor it will be extremely difficult to provide the technical assistance needed.

(3) Lack of Resources: Sections concerned with preparing requisitions and maintaining PLL records are under-staffed. The TO&E of the Division Support and Supply Company has been augmented with 50 more personnel slots, however it will take several months to properly train these new personnel when they are assigned.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) With sufficient guidance from advisory personnel requisitioning and PLL procedures should improve considerably.

(2) The objective of assisting in this field is extended indefinitely.

d. Corrective Action: With assistance from higher headquarters in making qualified personnel available to fill authorized slots in the G-4 advisory section, action can be taken to provide the necessary training to insure correct records keeping procedures.

e. Projection: In anticipation of receipt of modern US equipment this area will require close monitoring by advisory personnel to insure spare parts availability.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-4 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Modernization of the Airborne Division Equipment.

(C) SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To improve the combat effectiveness of the Airborne Division through the introduction of modern equipment.

1. (C) Element: To replace old series weapons with the M16E1 rifle and the M60 machinegun.

(C) Statement of Objective: To equip with and train in the use and maintenance of the M16E1 rifle and the M60 machinegun the nine (9) airborne infantry battalions of the Division.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Each infantry battalion has over 75% of their authorized M16E1 rifles (706/bn) on hand.

(2) The Airborne Division presently has 270 M60 machineguns on hand. This is more than adequate to arm the infantry battalions.

(3) The personnel of the Division have been well trained in the use and maintenance of the M16E1 rifle and the M60 machinegun.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: None.

(3) Lack of Resources: Spare parts for the M16E1 rifle and the M60 machinegun are in short supply in the ARVN ordnance supply channels.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The increased firepower of the M16E1 rifle and the M60 machinegun has added to the confidence and aggressiveness of division personnel.

(2) The lighter weight of these weapons has decreased fatigue.

(3) The infantry battalions have sufficient M60 machineguns and M16E1 rifles to arm their present operational personnel.

(4) The objective of this element is extended to 31 December 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 193 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Corrective Action: As records for prescribed load lists (PLL) and authorized stockage lists (ASL) are properly established, spare parts should be made available as soon as possible through ARVN ordnance supply channels.

e. Projection: A complete issue of the M60 machinegun and the M16E1 rifle will optimize the effectiveness of the Airborne Division.

2. Element: Issue the M72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW), 40mm cannister and 105mm cannister ammunition for the Airborne Division.

(C) Statement of Objective: To secure authority to draw M72 LAW, 40mm cannister and 105mm cannister ammunition for the Airborne Division and train the personnel in its use.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The Division has been receiving M72 LAWs since the 1st VC TET offensive. Division personnel are well trained in the use of the M72 LAW.

(2) 40mm cannister ammunition recently became available for issue to the Division. Each battalion has been issued approximately 200 rounds as an initial issue. Training will be conducted with this ammunition in the very near future.

(3) The 105mm cannister round is not presently available to ARVN.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: None.

(3) Lack of Resources: M72 LAW and 40mm cannister rounds are not available in desirable quantities. At such time when stockage levels of this ammunition reach appropriate levels, the Division should be issued more in order to train new personnel and to conduct combat operations.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The acquisition of the M72 LAW has increased the combat capability of the Division particularly in the street fighting which it has conducted in the Saigon area since TET.

(2) The addition of the 40mm cannister round to the Division ammunition stocks will add to the effectiveness of defensive positions and ambush operations.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(3) The objective of acquiring the 105mm cannister round for the Division is extended through 31 December 1968.

d. Corrective Action: When stockage levels permit, M72 LAW and 40mm cannister ammunition should be issued to the Division' in larger quantities. The Division is experiencing a personnel increase and more ammunition will be needed to familiarize these new personnel. The Airborne Division has been and will continue to be committed in areas containing numerous enemy troop therefore this ammunition would be put to proper use.

e. Projection: The continued issue of the M72 LAW and the 40mm cannister round and the acquisition of the 105mm cannister round will add much to the combat effectiveness of the Division.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Adviser, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PAGE 195 OF 265 PAGES

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-4 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Troop Billets.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To increase and maintain the morale of Division personnel by providing them with adequate housing.

1. **Element:** Construction of a new base camp for two battalions and a brigade headquarters.

Statement of Objective: To have the construction undertaken on 9 December 1967 at Long Binh Hill for a brigade headquarters and two battalions completed by the end of FY68.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Construction of billets and the base standpipe was completed by the end of FY68.

(2) The base deep-water well is still being dug and is scheduled for completion around 1 August 1968.

(3) The base camp has not had its power source (generator) or water pump installed.

(4) One battalion and a brigade headquarters will move into the new base camp during the first week of July 1968, and another battalion will follow by the first week of August 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: None.

(2) Critical Problems: The base generator and water pump are not available in country. As soon as these items become available they should be installed by the contractor.

(3) Lack of Resources: The generator and water pump discussed in the above sub-paragraph.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The base camp should be completely operational with generator and water pump by 30 September 1968.

(2) The objective of construction of this base camp is extended until 30 April 1969. A third battalion area is scheduled to be constructed beginning in late January 1969.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

d. Corrective Action: Engineer advisors at the Vietnamese JGS should monitor the availability of generators and water pumps in country and insure that those items authorized for this base camp are installed as soon as possible.

e. Projection: Completion of this base camp will do much to relieve the over crowded conditions caused by increased numbers of assigned personnel and the activation of new units in the Division.

2. Element: Construction of new troop billets and rehabilitation of existing billets.

Statement of Objective: To assist in effecting a plan for constructing and maintaining adequate new troop billets and rehabilitation of old billets through self-help program.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The Division G-4 is fully aware of all needed troop housing and has submitted requests for construction to JGS. He re-emphasizes the problem of troop housing at JGS meetings every Monday.

(2) Personnel are available to participate in a self-help program and requests for materials have been forwarded for consideration.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: Joint General Staff authorized many strength increases for present units and the activation of several new units for the Division. It appears that the necessary consideration for providing adequate facilities for these new troops was not made.

(2) Critical Problems: As new units are activated and old units expanded, troop billets will become overcrowded.

(3) Lack of Resources:

(a) Funds are not available to begin new construction.

(b) Most self-help items have been diverted for use in refugee housing projects.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) New construction and rehabilitation projects will be greatly curtailed until refugee problems are solved.

(2) The objective of this element is extended until the end of FY69.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



d. Corrective Action:

(1) In the future when strength expansions are foreseen, adequate plans should be made to provide troop facilities prior to the expansions.

(2) Funds should be made available for new construction and self-help programs as soon as possible.

e. Projection: As funds and materials become available, construction and rehabilitation will commence immediately to bring about the proper living conditions for Division personnel.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.



SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: G-5 Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Widows Aid.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To furnish additional assistance to the widows of soldiers killed while assigned to the Division so that they may continue to provide for their families.

1. **Element:** The establishment of a system to provide adequate employment for the widows of the Division.

Statement of Objective: To establish an efficient system by 1 June 1968.

a. **Review of Progress:** Employment opportunities have become available at the Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base thru the Civilian Employment Office. Obtaining the necessary security clearances for employment at an American installation is difficult and lengthy, but not impossible. Approximately 20 widows have been employed while many more are awaiting clearances.

b. **Analysis of Progress:**

(1) **Deficiencies:** Sufficient employment opportunities for the widows do not exist.

(2) **Critical Problems:** Problems with obtaining employment for widows are wide and varied. Very few of the widows have any training that would help them obtain employment and those who do can easily obtain employment on their own. Many of the widows have a full time job managing their household and taking care of her many children. Employment opportunities for unskilled labor are in low supply, but in great demand by civilians applying for employment.

(3) **Lack of Resources:** None.

c. **Conclusions and/or Trends:**

(1) Presently, Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base is the only source of employment the Division Social Welfare Office provides for the widows. Other means of employment are necessary, but are unobtainable or unknown at this time.

(2) The objective of this sub-program is extended indefinitely.

d. **Corrective Action:** Maintain emphasis on obtaining security clearances for widows to work at American installations and continue to check with agencies who can provide necessary employment. Develop a training program to train the widows for specific jobs.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PAGE 199 OF 265 PAGES

e. Projection: Providing adequate employment will continue to be a problem for the Social Welfare Office, but with the establishment of training programs, more employment opportunities will become available.

2. Element: The establishment of a training program to teach the widows of the division a trade which will assist them in locating adequate employment in order to support their families.

Statement of Objective: To establish a training program capable of training 50 widows a month in a trade by 31 December 1968.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) A 3 month sewing course has been organized by the Division Social Welfare Office and presently has 20 women enrolled. This will provide them the ability to obtain employment in the local dependent market area once the course has been completed. This is the only training program currently provided for the widows.

(2) Six typewriters have just been obtained for the purpose of establishing a 3 month typing class for the widows. Completion of this course will enable the widows to obtain suitable employment.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: Sufficient training programs for the widows do not exist.

(2) Critical Problems: Obtaining qualified instructors to teach a trade and providing the necessary equipment to teach are the main problems in establishing a training program. The instructor and sewing machines for the sewing course were provided thru Gia Dinh Province.

(3) Lack of Resources: None:

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The present training program is being expanded with the addition of the typing classes. Other types of training program need to be organized once the typing program has been established.

(2) The objective of the sub-program is extended indefinitely.

d. Corrective Action: Other training programs will be investigated and provided for the widows when feasible.

e. Projection: The training programs for widows will be expanded when qualified instructors and training equipment becomes available.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Vietnamese Navy Counter Sea Infiltration
and Counter Coastal Transshipment operations

a. Element: Encouraging better utilization of existing Vietnamese Navy assets in support of surveillance operations.

b. Statement of Objective: To increase Vietnamese Navy participation in Market Time to 8 stations by 1 July 1968 by increasing utilization of assets and by procuring additional boats.

i. Review of Progress. In November 1967, the Vietnamese Navy assumed 4 Market Time stations. In March 1968 two more stations were assumed. These six stations are manned with existing Vietnamese Navy assets.

Four PCFs were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 19 July. The Vietnamese Navy will assume two additional Market Time stations on 1 August with these boats.

2. Analysis of Progress: Minor delays were experienced in meeting the Sub-Program goal date of 1 July 1968. As a result of delays in commercial shipping schedules, PCF delivery was not made until 4 July 1968. Vietnamese manning of two additional stations on 1 August will meet the Sub-Program goal of 8 stations.

c. Conclusion. The performance of Vietnamese Navy ships presently manning Market Time stations is excellent. The prospective PCF crews are highly trained and motivated. It is anticipated that their performance in Market Time will be even better than that of the Vietnamese Navy ships presently on station.

d. Projection: No delays or problems are anticipated in filling the final Sub-Program goal of manning 12 stations by January 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

Element: Expand the recently completed survey of initial PCF support facility requirements to include the total PCF program.

a. Statement of Objective. To determine repair facilities support capability of the entire VNN force and program equipment to ensure adequate support.

1. Review of Progress. The re-evaluation of repair assets was limited to a study of the qualitative and quantitative requirements of the An Thoi repair facility. Evaluation of other repair facilities capabilities was postponed in order to better evaluate them based on experience with PCFs at An Thoi.

2. Survey of the An Thoi repair facility assets indicated requirements for additional machinery and equipment. This material has been programmed. Pending the arrival of the necessary equipment, arrangements have been made to accomplish PCF repairs at the local U.S. repair bases.

b. Analysis of Progress: Limitation of the study to a single repair facility was considered more realistic than a complete study of Coastal Zone repair facilities. Presently programmed PCFs are being used in the 4th Coastal Zone. Based on firm delivery schedules and planned basing, programming of equipment for the other repair facilities will be developed. In addition, contingency plans indicate that these expenditures may not be required and that existing U.S. repair facilities might be more profitably utilized.

Procurement of the machinery and equipment required to outfit the An Thoi repair facility lags behind boat delivery. This will not delay implementation of other Sub-Program element goals. U.S. repair facilities will be used in the interim.

c. Conclusion: A complete evaluation of the An Thoi repair facility will not be possible until all programmed equipment is delivered. Available data will be used to program material for other repair facilities.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Creation of Salvage capability within the Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS:

a. Element. Planning for a salvage capability within the Vietnamese Navy.

1. Statement of Objective: To develop a Salvage Team TO&E and to submit it to JGS for approval in December 1967, to develop a basic Salvage Training syllabus by 30 April 1968, and to program five off-shore training quotas for the seven week diving school at Subic Bay, R.P. in February 1968.

b. Review of Progress. Reconsideration of the entire area of explosive ordnance demolition, salvage, and LDNN (UDT), by the Vietnamese Navy led to the development of a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for an underwater mission company comprised of the above units. Delayed by the TET offensive the review was completed in May and the TOE forwarded to JGS for approval in June 1968. A salvage training syllabus has been prepared in English and off-shore training for nine salvage divers has been programmed. Liaison with the U.S. Navy Harbor Clearance Unit in Subic Bay resulted in establishment of fine rapport in determining equipment and training requirements.

c. Analysis of Progress: The TOE developed reflects the excellent staffing accomplished by the VNN. It is a realistic, supportable document. The salvage training syllabus will complete translation in early July and will serve as a fine guide in training prospective members of the salvage team. Lack of sufficient English language comprehension has complicated salvage diver training. Liaison with HCU-1, Subic Bay R.P. has revealed that with the assistance of two, U.S. trained, Vietnamese salvage officers the requisite training can be successfully completed.

Another complication encountered is the problem of passports and visas for trainees. Status of Forces Agreements require that the Republic of Vietnam make all the required arrangements with the Republic of the Philippines for training of Vietnamese Nationals at a U.S. facility in the Philippines. As this is a slow and time consuming process, unforeseen difficulties may preclude conducting the training in the Philippines and necessitate reprogramming at a CONUS facility. A further delay can then be expected.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 203 OF 265 PAGES

d. Conclusions:

1. A translation of the training syllabus was completed 15 July.

2. Salvage diver training appears to be the hurdle that must be overcome. Positive action by the VNN, JGS and GVN for passports and visas must be accomplished in a timely fashion to ensure trainees can commence the course of instruction as scheduled.

3. TOE review by the JGS is sadly behind schedule. A major effort is required to push TOEs in review to the concerned commands. It is believed that a maximum of 30 days would constitute a realistic time frame for JGS review of proposed TOEs.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

PAGE 204 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Increased Vietnamese Navy participation in river assault and river patrol operations on Republic of Vietnam inland waterways

a. Element: Encouraging closer coordination between RVNAF ground commanders and Vietnamese Navy RAG Commanders.

1. Statement of Objective: To achieve a minimum of 60% craft utilization in their primary mission.

2. Review of Progress: Continuous liaison has been maintained between the Riverine Area Commanders, RAG Commanding Officers and the RVNAF Troop Commanders with improved utilization as the end result.

3. Analysis of Progress: In May the participation of RAGs in River Assault and River Patrol operations rose to 70% of the available RAG craft; in the first three weeks of June the percentage dipped to 61%, however these percentages are both in excess of the 60% sub-program objective submitted on 23 December.

4. Conclusions: Continued liaison must be maintained to effect a continued high utilization factor. More emphasis must be placed on the primary mission of river assault operations.

b. Element: Prepare facilities and train personnel for the acceptance, by the Vietnamese Navy, of 16 PBRs and 8 ASPBs in 1968.

1. Statement of Objective: To qualify 16 PBR crews by 30 April 1968; to qualify 8 ASPB crews by 31 October; to establish adequate repair and support capability for the PBRs and ASPBs prior to their delivery.

2. Review of Progress: 12 PBR crews have been qualified who are manning the 8 PBRs in-country. Qualification of additional PBR crews will be completed by Vietnamese Navy training personnel prior to the receipt of 4 PBRs in September and 4 PBRs in December.

3. Analysis of Progress: The crews of the first 8 PBRs although individually trained require additional team training and area orientation. Training of these crews as team members, able to conduct independent operations, is in progress and will be completed by 31 July.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A repair facility for the PBRs has not yet been completed at Cat Lai. As an interim measure repairs will be accomplished at Eastern Repair Facility. Eight civilian workers, attached to Eastern Repair Facility, have received special instruction in PBR repair.

4. Conclusions:

It is anticipated that the eight Vietnamese Navy PBRs will assume independent patrol duties by 1 August. Four PBRs are scheduled for delivery during the last month of each quarter until a total of forty have been received. Future assumption of independent patrol duty by PBRs should be accomplished in a much shorter period than was required for the first eight received.

Since the first Vietnamese Navy ASPBs are not scheduled to arrive in-country until Calendar Year 1969 the program schedule for the ASPBs has been delayed accordingly. The best information available indicates that 4 ASPBs may be received in February, 8 in March and 8 in April.

The repair facility at Cat Lai will be operational by 1 January 1969.

5. Projection: It is anticipated that the acceptance by the Vietnamese Navy of a total of 16 PBRs in 1968, 16 in 1969 and 8 in 1970, will continue in an orderly manner. The acceptance of ASPBs in 1969 should impose no foreseeable difficulties.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

PAGE 206 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Vietnamese Navy LDNN Utilization in UDT and SEAL Operations with RVNAF

a. Statement of Objective. To recruit 100 to 120 candidates for LDNN training by 1 January 1968.

1. Review of Progress: Ninety-eight candidates were recruited by 15 January 1968.

b. Element: Training of selected volunteers in underwater demotition and SEAL operation techniques.

1. Statement of Objective. To qualify a minimum of thirty-nine additional personnel in the conduct of these operations by the end of April 1968, and to continue operations training of extant LDNN personnel.

2. Review of Progress: Thirty-nine additional personnel qualified in basic UDT operations and graduated on 22 June 1968. SEAL type operations (less the air phase) training commenced on 5 July 1968.

3. Analysis of Progress: The training class commenced twelve weeks of training on 8 January 1968, but due to the VC TET offensive, training was delayed approximately eight weeks. Graduation took place on 22 June 1968. Although 39 trainees have been qualified in basic UDT operations, two of these trainees were Army personnel and cannot be retained by the Navy. The result is a net gain of 37 personnel. On 5 July 1968 56 trainees (37 graduates of Class III and 19 original LDNN personnel) commenced four weeks of advanced LDNN (SEAL) type operational training. Currently the LDNN is experiencing a critical shortage of equipment, particularly weapons. Fifty M-16s have been programmed for the LDNN and are expected to arrive in-country about 15 July 1968. Eight M-60 machine guns are required, and these have been programmed through MASF but an in-country arrival date is not yet available. Requests to JGS for authorization for the VNN to draw this equipment through ARVN supply have been made.

4. Conclusions: Due to the delay in the initial UDT training as a result of TET, the objective date of 30 April has been revised to 5 August 1968.

c. Element: Commencement of independent SEAL type operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Statement of Objectives. To assign LDNN fire teams to operate with other Vietnamese units by May 1968.

2. Review of Progress: Training was delayed approximately eight weeks as a result of the VC TET offensive. The UDT training class was graduated on 22 June 1968. The advanced SEAL training will be completed on 5 August 1968.

3. Conclusions: The objective date of May 1968 has been changed to 5 August 1968.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

PAGE 208 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Improvement in the Effectiveness of Logistics Support in the Vietnamese Navy

OBJECTIVES: To Improve the Effectiveness of Logistics Support in the Vietnamese Navy

1. Establish a logistics organization with a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to have direction of major field activities.
2. Establish procedures for executing the functions of Logistics Group.
3. Establish adequate staffing and training of the logistics organization.
4. Establish an underway logistics replenishment system for resupply of the coastal groups, utilizing the organic logistics lift capability of the Vietnamese Navy.

REVIEW OF PROGRESS

1. The Navy Logistics Group at Headquarters level is fully operational under a Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics. All logistics functions have been centralized in one staff element invested with the authority to prescribe procedures, formulate plans and to oversee their execution. The authority granted by CNO is sufficient to provide direction to the logistics efforts of the VNN.
2. Auxiliary Supply Depots are being established at eight locations. The organization and equipment required for the depots has been determined and personnel have been assigned. The range and depth of stock required by each depot to carry out its mission has been determined by the field supply advisors and the Vietnamese Navy Supply Center. The stock required has been shipped to four Auxiliary Supply Depots and is now staged for shipment to two more.

PAGE 209 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Procedures have been established and promulgated for the operation of the logistics group, the zone and riverine area logistics staffs and the Auxiliary Supply Depots. The operating instructions for the Auxiliary Supply Depots are included in a "Requisitioning Guide" which outlines the requisitioning procedures for customers.

4. Personnel requirements are reflected in the FY69 Force Structure. The Navy Supply Center's three week training program in supply methods and procedures has graduated four classes. The last class developed a nucleus of trained personnel for the Auxiliary Supply Depots.

ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS

1. All programs were delayed due to the TET Offensive. Although the VNN sustained no serious material damage, energies were diverted from long range programs to immediate problems. Since TET, the logistics lift capability of the VNN has been heavily committed to support of ARVN.

2. The establishment of an underway logistics replenishment system has been delayed because of TET and the continued deterioration in the Navy Shipyard's ability to overhaul and convert vessels. The conversion of the HQ-451 to a stores replenishment ship is now scheduled for completion on 1 August 1968 vice June 1968.

3. The POL storage and resupply system is progressing on schedule. All the YOGs have the capability of carrying a limited quantity of packaged POL products which is adequate for the needs of the coastal zones. One of the three YOGs has been fitted with a constant tension rig for heavy weather refueling of LCM-6 refuelers. One of eight LCM-6 hulls has been converted to a refueler, successfully tested, and is now stationed at Coastal Group 36. The seven remaining LCM-6 hulls will be converted at the rate of two per month commencing in August 1968.

4. The overall purpose has been to decentralize material assets and authority and, concurrently achieve centralized direction to the logistics system. Decentralization of material assets required the establishment of field depots and an effective distribution system. To

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

date the decentralization of material assets is only partially completed. Procedures have been promulgated to decentralize requisitioning authority to the unit level but due to delays in establishment of the Auxiliary Supply Depots and the Underway Replenishment System they are not full in effect as of now.

CONCLUSIONS OR TRENDS

1. The logistics support of remote bases has improved during the past year because of command attention. The reorganization of the logistics systems of the Vietnamese Navy is proceeding at a satisfactory pace. A viable logistics organization with a network of decentralized auxiliary supply depots is now a reality.

There is a shortage of adequately trained enlisted and officer supply personnel.

To enhance the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy's Auxiliary Supply Depots the JGS/CLC must allow them to act as a retail stock point for common material.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The slippage experienced during the reporting period has been largely beyond the control of the VNN. Field Supply Advisors will continue to give priority to the Auxiliary Supply Depots, proper utilization of the new supply procedures, and on-the-job training. A transportation element attached to the VNNSC or VNN N-4 will control and handle the flow of material from Saigon to the field.

The Naval Advisory Group currently has an initiative to determine the skills available in the VNN and identify shortcomings, which will result in more effective utilization of available skills and permit the establishment of training programs to correct shortfalls.

The establishment of a Class A Supply Course is a necessity. Off shore training for selected junior officers in supply areas must be continued. The JGS should resolve the question of the Field Supply Depots being authorized to carry common items to enhance the overall supply capability of the VNN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECTIONS

The effectiveness of the decentralized logistics system has not been fully tested but indications are that increased material availability close to the consumer will facilitate the work of repair facilities and the maintenance of the junk and river forces. An inability to stock common items in the Auxiliary Supply Depots will limit the self-sufficiency of units/commands out of Saigon and ties the overall effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy Logistics system to the responsiveness of the Army of Vietnam Logistics system.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

PAGE 212 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Management Improvement in the Vietnamese Naval Shipyard and Making Careers Attractive to Civilian Personnel

OBJECTIVE: Raise the output of the Vietnamese Navy Shipyard to the level necessary to support the ships and craft of the Vietnamese Navy by improvements in management techniques and by attracting and holding skilled workmen in the employ of the Shipyard

a. Review of Progress

(1) Qualitative. During the past six-months the quality of shipyard work has been improved even though additional skilled personnel have been mobilized into the Armed Forces and other skilled personnel have departed the Shipyard for more lucrative employment on the outside. Shipyard production declined sharply during the TET Offensive as many workers were unable to get to the Shipyard. The Shipyard was closed down completely for two weeks in February.

The pay raise scales proposed by VNNSY were greatly reduced by the MOD Interministerial Council and the final proposal presented to the Prime Minister for signature will not solve the Shipyard's hiring and retention problems.

A second apprentice training groups is scheduled to graduate in September. A new apprentice training group will also begin instruction at this time.

(2) Quantitative. During this reporting period six (6) ships have completed overhaul with four (4) more nearing completion, thirty-five small craft have completed overhaul and seven (7) additional junks have been launched. The Shipyard also completed one hundred and sixty-eight (168) ship Restricted Availabilities and eighty-seven (87) small craft Restricted Availabilities during this period.

The shipyard still requires a large input of skilled workers in order to produce the quantity of work
GROUP 4 - DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS Enclosure (1)
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 213 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

which is required to maintain the Vietnamese Navy. The total number of Shipyard workers has decreased from 1965 personnel on 1 January to 1560 on 30 June against an authorized T&E/Allowance of 2354 personnel.

One hundred and sixty (160) personnel who commenced Apprentice Training in November 1967 will graduate in September. If the Shipyard is able to retain these personnel after graduation either through the military mobilization return plan or through career incentives, they will alleviate to a small degree some of the Shipyard's problems. Qualifying examinations will be administered on 15 August for the next group of Apprentice Trainees which should number approximately one hundred and eighty (180) personnel.

(3) Timeliness. The Shipyard is still unable to meet assigned overhaul and availability schedules. This can be attributed mainly to lack of production manpower, however, a number of overhauls/availabilities have also been delayed awaiting spare part/material support. Much of the problem of spare part support results from the fact that many of the equipments are obsolete and not supported in the Supply System thus requiring a special contract when a part is requisitioned.

(4) Economy. The cost of performing work has remained relatively constant during this period.

b. Analysis of Progress

(i) Management

(a) The Shipyard Commander is actively utilizing his authority to accept or decline additional work for the Shipyard. This has been necessary due to the lack of manpower and the number of critical repairs needed on the ships and craft of the Vietnamese Navy to keep them operational.

(b) A more aggressive program of processing and monitoring work is being followed by the Ship Superintendents with the urging and monitoring of the Advisors. Analysis of work requirements, although still weak in the overall management of the Shipyard, should continue to improve. The Shipyard is instituting an advance

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

planning and material ordering program for ship and craft overhauls, utilizing work standards developed from previous overhaul experience on like ships and craft.

(c) A reorganization of the Shipyard proposed by the Naval Advisory Group is under study by the Vietnamese Navy. Tentative plans are to implement the new organization, similar to that of a U.S. Naval Shipyard, in the near future. This move should significantly improve the management and supervisory capability if the Advisory Unit can impress on the Shipyard the need for the authority that must go with the responsibility at different management levels.

(2) Personnel

(a) The employment level has continued to decline during the reporting period. No improvement can be expected in the near future unless a substantial pay raise and/or Shipyard autonomy is realized.

(b) Classification and wage study MTT experts have been requested to train and assist the shipyard in classifying shipyard personnel into equitable working levels in the new Shipyard organization. To make this program effective Shipyard autonomy and/or a complete revamping of the GVN Civil Service System at the Shipyard is a necessity.

(3) Resources. The physical plant does not significantly limit the productive capacity of the Shipyard. Minor improvements continue to be made in these areas. During this reporting period the four marine railways were overhauled by RMK under contract by OICC.

c. Conclusions and Trends. Employment and productivity have declined during the past six months. Little improvement is expected, even though further management improvement and training is being programmed by the Advisory Unit, unless Shipyard autonomy and/or a change in the Shipyard GVN Civil Service System is realized. Shipyard reorganization plus the programmed Mobile Training Teams and USAID provided instructors will continue to provide management and technical improvement. However, for the Shipyard to meet overhaul/availability schedules, to maintain the Vietnamese

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Navy in a more complete operational status and to realize the full industrial potential available, it is mandatory that manpower resources be increased and retained.

d. Corrective Actions

(1) Formal training for the apprentices will be continued and the training upgrade the skill-level of the present work force will be stressed.

(2) Mobile Training Teams are scheduled for FY69 in all aspects of Shipyard Production, planning, wage and classification of personnel and fiscal techniques.

(3) Improvements in the physical plant will be programmed as required.

(4) The Naval Advisory Group will continue to press for Shipyard autonomy and/or a significant change in the Shipyard Civil Service System and a substantial pay raise for the shipyard workers so that the hiring and retention rates can be improved.

(5) Under the Mobilization Law strong representation to the GVN and JGS for assignment of 1200 draftees with various skills, to the shipyard must be made. Concurrently those personnel drafted must be reassigned to the shipyard to ensure the combat readiness of the Vietnamese Navy.

e. Projection. Until the basic problem of shipyard hiring and retention of skilled personnel is resolved major improvements can not be realized. The Advisory Unit will continue its efforts in training, management, technical, planning, production, logistics and fiscal improvements with the aim to further increase the efficiency of the shipyard organization.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Training

Statement of Objective: To develop a modest training publication translation capability in the Vietnamese Navy by 30 June 1969

a. Review of Progress: Translation of training publications are required for a variety of purposes in the Vietnamese Navy, which does not have a translator pool. The only translator resources available to the Training Bureau are through the MACV Training Directorate translator pool. The Vietnamese Navy has a requirement for translation of 26 technical manuals and publications for maintenance and operation of equipment aboard newly delivered River Patrol Boats (PBR) and Patrol Craft, Fast (PCF). About one-third of this material was accepted by the MACV Training Directorate pool, on a priority basis. Total lead time required for priority translation is about nine months.

b. Analysis of Progress: MACV translation of PBR/PCF manuals has been completed but quality of the output is poor and extensive editing is required. The editing is being done by understaffed activities such as the Vietnamese Navy Technical Bureau and the Communications Bureau. Routine translation by the MACV Training Directorate requires 18 months to two years. A translator pool should be established at the Vietnamese Navy Training Bureau. Hiring of civilian translators must be done in competition with private enterprise. Present civil service wage scales are noncompetitive with those offered by private enterprise, consequently civilian translators are not readily available to the Technical Bureau. There are currently thirty publications in translation or awaiting translation, totalling about 7,000 pages.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: As new equipment and weapons are introduced the waiting period for routine translation of training materials by the MACV Training Directorate will be further prolonged. This will have an adverse impact on the entire Vietnamese Navy Training effort.

d. Corrective Action: It has been proposed that a military translator pool be established in the Training Bureau, consisting of six enlisted translators, two typists, and one officer. It is envisioned that the pool could initially translate 200 pages per month and subsequently improve this rate with experience. The current backlog of

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 217 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

material will require 24 months to translate when a 300 page monthly output is achieved. Consequently it is planned to use the pool, if implemented, for priority requirements and continue the current method of processing routine translations.

e. Projection: It is expected that the proposed military translator pool will enhance both the timeliness and effectiveness of the overall training effort of the Vietnamese Navy.

Statement of Objective: To complete underway refresher training for two ships per month during 1968. A total of twenty-four ships will complete training by December 1968.

a. Review of Progress: Since 1 January 1968 nine ships have completed the one week pierside phase, of the two week refresher training course. Two ships completed both weeks of refresher training in early January. Their training had begun in December.

b. Analysis of Progress: To meet the stated goal, twelve ships should have completed refresher training by 1 July. That training should have been the complete two week course. Ships have not been available for refresher training this year because the Saigon Shipyard has been unable to meet its overhaul completion dates and because the operational demand for vessels has not permitted scheduling refresher training. Vietnamese vessels have been operating at a tempo higher than U.S. Fleet units.

c. Conclusion: Until the operational tempo of the Vietnamese fleet subsides and the Saigon Shipyard is able to meet overhaul completion dates, twenty-four ships will not be available to complete the full two week annual refresher training course.

d. Corrective Action: Effective corrective action for this situation lies in the solution of Vietnamese Naval Shipyard employment crisis.

e. Projection: A significant improvement of refresher training scheduling is not immediately foreseeable.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Institute a viable leadership program for the Vietnamese Navy

a. Element: To improve the leadership knowledge and capabilities of officers and petty officers in the Vietnamese Navy in order to increase the effectiveness and combat potential of all units.

b. Review of Progress: The Headquarters Staff, Vietnamese Navy has developed a comprehensive leadership plan for Navy-wide implementation. This plan was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy (CNO VNN) for review in December 1967, and after minor revision the plan was approved in early February 1968. A Naval Leadership Supervisory Board headed by the Chief of Staff and including the Fleet Commander, and various Staff Headquarters department heads, was subsequently established to monitor, control, and recommend changes in the plan to the CNO VNN. Formal lesson plans were printed and disseminated to all petty officers and officers beginning in March 1968. To date an average of one lesson plan has been disseminated approximately every two weeks.

c. Analysis of Progress: While the program and its partial execution is considered to have a growing beneficial effect throughout the Vietnamese Navy, various details of the plan have been neglected. Regular unit discussion sessions required by the plan and a leadership competition program calling for prizes and other incentives have been conducted only on an irregular and informal basis. Printing difficulties have slowed and restricted dissemination of materials required by the plan. The Political Warfare Department currently has the full burden of the program without sufficient personnel or equipment to develop, produce, and distribute printed material.

The POLWAR Department reported the status of the leadership program in June 1968 to the CNO VNN. CNO VNN subsequently directed intensified efforts to implement the plan and directed that this emphasis be disseminated to all unit commanders by letter. Provisions have been established to discipline unit commanders who do not cooperate with the program. A comprehensive report covering evaluation of the leadership plan implementation by all units is to be submitted to the CNO VNN in November 1968.

d. Conclusion and Trends: The leadership training program is considered to now be a viable program which has

PAGE 219 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

enjoyed considerable success despite the disruptions of the approved plan. All units have been receiving lesson plans at approximate two week intervals since March 1968, and these have been distributed to all petty officers and commissioned officers. These lesson plans have been received with great interest by all hands and the leadership discussion sessions have been very popular at units where they have been conducted according to plan. Periodic discussion sessions are held at approximately two thirds of all units. The lesson plans and discussion sessions have given rise to an unprecedented awareness and appreciation of leadership techniques at all levels. It is anticipated that wide spread interest and appreciation will continue to increase with a highly beneficial effect on leadership and discipline throughout the Vietnamese Navy.

The effects of improved leadership are reflected in increased effectiveness of Vietnamese Navy units in both more dynamic performance and the assumption of greater operational responsibility by Vietnamese Navy commanders.

The trend toward increased effectiveness is continuing and will be enhanced as the leadership program is more vigorously implemented according to an adjusted plan. Various minor modifications will be made in the plan in order to correct difficulties encountered thus far.

e. Corrective Action: A high level of advisory attention will be directed to monitoring adjustments in the current plan and related follow up action throughout the remainder of Calendar Year 1968. Advisory attention will encourage coordination and implementation of the plan between the POLWAR, inspection, and training departments in order to satisfactorily distribute the burden of the program.

Arrangements for printing necessary training materials on a timely basis by COMNAVFORV printing facilities has been established. The VNN POLWAR department will soon be able to make use of printing equipment being procured from U.S. Navy sources.

f. Projection: It is felt that a satisfactory level of command attention is currently addressed to difficulties which the program has encountered since its initiation. Recent redirected emphasis from the Headquarters is expected to lead to a concerted, successful program with marked progress for the remainder of the year.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Element: To improve Formal Leadership Training

a. Statement of Objective: Develop new formal leadership courses for officers and petty officers and revise current formal leadership training as required.

b. Review of Progress: Formal leadership programs have been reviewed and a new service-wide leadership program initiated. It is considered that current formal training programs satisfactorily meet existing requirements and do not warrant major revision.

c. Conclusion: The element "to improve formal leadership training" is therefore considered satisfied but will continue to be monitored by the advisory effort.

Element: Promote Career Enhancing Incentives

a. Statement of Objective: To provide sea and shore policies and career planning guidance and counseling for Vietnamese Navymen.

b. Review of Progress: Current sea and shore rotation policy provides for two year assignments with rotation between shore stations, the coastal force, the fleet command, and river assault groups. This policy has not and will not be fully implemented in the foreseeable future because the level of expansion of the Vietnamese Navy establishes assignment priorities in conflict with this policy and precludes the stability of forces required for such a rotation program. The policy is implemented, however, as personnel assignment requirements permit.

Career planning guidance and related counseling is conducted informally at local commands and by the POL-WAR Department Navy-wide. The service-wide Navy leadership program further emphasizes the responsibility of superiors to provide such counseling to subordinates and to foster career motivation, high morale, and to make maximum effective use of personnel assets.

c. Conclusion: It is considered that present practices concerning sea and shore rotation and career guidance counseling satisfactorily meet existing needs within the limits imposed by current conditions.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Marine Advisor

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Vietnamese Marine Corps Construction

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To construct training facilities

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Statement of Objectives: To construct a new Vietnamese Marine Corps Training Center.

a. Review of Progress: The construction of this training center had an original target date for completion of December 1967. The FY 1967 Military Construction Program approved funds for this project but the funds were diverted for higher priority needs. The 1967 Supplemental Fund provided \$52,000 which was utilized for purchase of construction materials for 21 barracks, 2 messhalls, 4 classrooms, 4 latrines and an administration building. The construction of these buildings have been completed. Thus far, all construction has been a combined services effort. United States and Vietnamese sources provide the materials and the VNMC provides the actual labor. All construction is integrated into the Self-Help Program except specialized construction i.e., water treatment, storage and distribution system, electrical generation and distribution system and road building. During the latter part of December 1967, COMNAVFORV reallocated sufficient funds to complete the training center.

b. Analysis of Progress: The new training center was initially occupied on 1 April 1968 due to the lack of facilities at the old training center as well as a large recruit input during April through June 1968. The average recruit census for the last half of the reporting period has been three thousand recruits. The design plans for water treatment, storage and distribution system, electrical generation and distribution system, sewage disposal and road building have been completed by the US Navy, Officer in Charge of Construction. The construction of these facilities is to be awarded by competitive bid to a local contractor. Construction is expected to begin prior to 1 August 1968 with completion estimated within two months. The Training Center is now 55 percent complete.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: Target date for completion of the new training center is October 1968.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: To construct facilities to train the VNMC battalions in amphibious techniques commensurate with the mission of the VNMC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress: To construct an amphibious training center at Vung Tau. Existing buildings will be rehabilitated and/or finished to be utilized as classrooms. In addition a dry net disembarkation platform and a helicopter mock-up will be constructed. This will be a self-help project.

b. Analysis of Progress: Materials have been assembled for construction of the Amphibious Training Center.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: Target date for completion of this project is December 1968.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Marine Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 223 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Marine Advisor

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Vietnamese Marine Corps Medical Support

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To improve medical facilities, equipment and training within the VNMC.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Statement of Objective: To establish training programs designed to improve the capability of all VNMC personnel of the Medical Company, to improve and specialize competence in the many fields in and allied to medicine and toward achieving complete autonomy in support of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

a. Review of Progress: The program of training at a Naval Hospital has been altered to afford one month's course for physicians at the Naval Hospital, Subic Bay, R. P. Due to the workload and the TET Offensive, the course has not been finalized. The course in Preventive Medicine at the Naval Hospital, DA NANG, has been completed by two hospital corpsman.

b. Analysis of Progress: Training programs were curtailed by necessity during and immediately after the TET and May offensives but are gradually regaining momentum.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: It is tentatively planned to finalize and implement the orientation program for physicians at USNH, Subic Bay, R. P. during the last half of calendar year 1968. Further training in preventive medicine at DA NANG will be accomplished as required.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: To operate and maintain facilities necessary to provide definitive and comprehensive medical care to sick or injured VNMC personnel and their dependents as well as to operate an autonomous medical support capability for the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

a. Review of Progress: Although interrupted by the TET Offensive, renovation of existing structures at Camp CUU LONG were completed on 10 April 1968. This included the modification and repairs to an existing building to provide a 30 bed ward. Other structural repairs were made to remaining buildings including the establishment of a six bed Recovery Room and a minor surgery operating room. A water distribution system was installed and the sewage system renovated so as to become functionally adequate. A 20 foot by 48 foot quonset was erected and outfitted as a messhall for patients and staff.

b. Analysis of Progress: Considerable gains have been accomplished toward providing the quality and quantity of medical support to the VNMC. These have all been oriented toward improvement of patient care and comfort.

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: Upgrading of existing facilities is a continuing effort. Construction of a 200 bed dispensary in the THU DUC area is planned and construction will utilize quonset huts which are available. Completion date is currently projected for 30 June 1969. Site selection is currently under study in order to maximize support of battalion base camps.

3. (C) Statement of Objective: To acquire more modern equipment with greater performance capacity to support the additional patient load and variety of medical care rendered to VNMC personnel and their dependents. The present VNMC Medical Company is working with the barest essentials.

a. Review of Progress: Programmed items of equipment scheduled for delivery in June have not arrived. Items of equipment necessary to support the increased VNMC casualties arising out of the TET Offensive were procured from local U. S. and Vietnamese supply sources as required. The patient census rose from a pre-TET average of 20 to a post-TET high of 242 and the patient census has remained almost continuously above 100 since TET.

b. Analysis of Progress: None

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: Non-expendable support equipment and percapita items of expendable supply are issued in quantities commensurate with the TO&E. TO&E revisions have been submitted to more nearly bring the TO&E into alignment with actual requirements. Until such revisions are approved, however, efforts by ARVN support facilities will continue to be geared to the currently approved TO&E.

e. Projection: Additional equipment in support of the expanded organizational structure is programmed for delivery in FY 1970.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Marine Advisor

PAGE 225 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Marine Advisor

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Vietnamese Marine Corps Training

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To study and review present VNMC recruit and NCO training; to establish a refresher course for company grade officers and to study and develop a program of instruction for VNMC Infantry battalions. To consider and study the use of a mobile training team within the VNMC.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Statement of Objective: Conduct a comprehensive and objective study of the present recruit training system to determine if the resulting product meets the minimum acceptable standards of training for subsequent assignment to a VNMC combat unit.

a. Review of Progress: The Joint General Staff, RVN, directed the use of a revised 12 week Program of Instruction for recruit training on 25 March 1967. The program of instruction entails a six week Basic Combat Training Course (BCT) and a six week Advanced Individual Training Course, (AIT). After comparison of the Joint General Staff, RVN, directed twelve week Program of Instruction and the USMC Recruit and Infantry Training Courses it was found that the syllabi are closely paralleled with no differences of any magnitude. Due to the recent TET Offensive the Joint General Staff, RVN directed in March 1968 that recruit training be reduced to a nine week syllabus.

b. Analysis of Progress: Due to the reduction to a nine week training cycle a study was conducted to determine how best to produce a well trained Marine within the shortened time frame. Results of this study indicated that each training day could be lengthened and certain nonessential subjects allotted training time be reduced or curtailed. As a result of this study all essential training required to produce an acceptable Marine are sufficiently covered within the nine week training time frame.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The current nine week as well as the twelve week course of instruction for recruit training produces an acceptable Marine for assignment to a combat unit of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

d. Corrective Action: Emphasis is presently being placed on the improvement in quality and quantity of cadre personnel, training aids, classroom facilities and combat training facilities.

e. Projection: With the refinements in personnel, training aids, classroom facilities and combat training facilities, a great improvement in retention of subject matter by the recruits is anticipated. This is a continuing project with the objective to refine and improve recruit training.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) Statement of Objective: To review and update the present Vietnamese Marine Corps Non-Commissioned Officers Course.

a. Review of Progress: The revision of this course of instruction commenced in December 1967 and is approximately 75 percent complete.

b. Analysis of Progress: Presently the NCO training course under the purview of the training center contains little more than a brief review of general military subjects. It is planned to totally revise the course of instruction emphasizing combat leadership in addition to teaching the normal military skills.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: When the review of the NCO course is completed it is anticipated that the revised course will produce a greatly improved NCO who will return to his parent unit better prepared to accomplish his duties.

d. Corrective Action: A complete review and update of the entire NCO course. Results to be a new course of instruction which will emphasize combat leadership in addition to refresher training in basic military skills.

e. Projection: Target date for completion of the revised NCO course is 1 July 1968. The tentative date for commencement of the first NCO course utilizing the revised syllabus is 1 August 1968.

3. (C) Statement of Objective: To establish a military skills refresher course for company grade officers.

a. Review of Progress: Establishment of this course commenced in December 1967 and at present is approximately 25 percent complete.

b. Analysis of Progress: Presently in the initial stages of study and construction. This course will place emphasis on "lessons learned in combat", aerial observation techniques, use of supporting arms and leadership.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Upon completion of this course the vehicle will be available to conduct a short, comprehensive review course for company grade officers of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

d. Corrective Action: To provide a course to satisfy a critical requirement in the overall training requirements of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

e. Projection: Target date for completion of the course is December 1968.

4. (C) Statement of Objective: To study and develop a short term program of instruction for Vietnamese Marine Corps Infantry Battalions to be utilized when not actively engaged in combat operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 227 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress: Establishment of this course is currently under study.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The release of a VNMC Infantry Battalion from operational status by the Joint General Staff is indeed a rarity. To partly overcome this deficiency of battalion retraining is the major objective of this program.

(2) Infantry Battalions of the VNMC have had no formal retraining for the past eighteen months. Three battalions are scheduled for a six week retraining course at the National Training Center at VAN KEP during CY68. Battalions were scheduled for this training in February and June, but due to combat commitments battalions could not be released for the scheduled training. A battalion is scheduled for this training in September.

(3) The resources of the VNMC are available to attend scheduled battalion retraining at the National Training Center provided they are released from operational commitments by JGS.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Based on past experience the indications are that the battalions of the VNMC will not attend retraining during this calendar year.

d. Corrective Action: The action required to alleviate this training problem is release of the battalions for retraining as scheduled.

e. Projection: It is anticipated that for the foreseeable future the battalions of the VNMC will not be available for formal retraining. The proposed course will be designed to conduct short courses of instruction for these battalions while not actively engaged in combat operations and are located in the general area of the VNMC Training Center. Target date for completion of this course of instruction is December 1968.

5. (C) Statement of Objective: To consider and study the establishment of a mobile training team within the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

a. Review of Progress: A mobile training team concept is presently under consideration and study.

b. Analysis of Progress: With the active operational posture of all VNMC Infantry Battalions, it is nearly impossible to have a battalion released from operational commitments by the JGS for normal battalion retraining. The concept of a mobile training team would not alleviate the situation entirely, but could be used when the battalions are not operating for short durations.

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: This mobile training team would normally be concerned with basic combat skills and lessons learned, but could also have the capability of teaching specialized subjects as the need arises.

d. Corrective Action: The mobile training team concept will not alleviate the battalion retraining requirement in its entirety. However wher combined with the program of battalion retraining proposed on enclosure (10) will provide some formal retraining where none is now conducted.

e. Projection: Establishment of this team commenced in December 1967 and is approximately five percent complete. Target date is December 1968.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Marine Advisor

PAGE 229 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Materiel, AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Increased VNAF Aircraft Maintenance Self Sufficiency

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To increase VNAF Wing and Depot Self-sufficiency. Decrease reparable assets being returned to CONUS for repair. Standardize and modernize VNAF possessed aircraft, and prepare VNAF maintenance activities to repair and maintain new sophisticated replacement aircraft.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element - Repair of Crash/Battle Damaged Aircraft.

Goal - Improve depot capability to restore crash/battle damaged aircraft to a serviceable condition. As of 30 June 1968 forty-one (41) VNAF aircraft were undergoing repair or awaiting repair actions at the VNAF ALW depot, Bien Hoa AB. This workload was beyond VNAF capability, therefore AFGP-MDC initiated actions to restore unserviceable aircraft to a serviceable status. VNAF workforce was augmented with an AFLC depot contractor team, but this assistance has been insufficient to make an impact in the backlog of reparable aircraft. Action has been taken to increase the team from fifty (50) to seventy-five (75) personnel in July August 1968. Additional support is being provided through an AFLC eight (8) man damage assessment team which arrived at the depot on 28 June 1968. Close coordination between VNAF Chief of Maintenance and USAF Advisors has resulted in focusing attention on unserviceable aircraft awaiting maintenance.

Statement of Objective: Repair of crash/battle damaged aircraft. The goal of this element is to improve the quantity and quality of repairs being made or anticipated on aircraft which require maintenance beyond the using organization's capability.

a. Review of Progress: As of 30 June, 41 VNAF aircraft were undergoing repair or awaiting repair action at the ALW depot at Bien Hoa AB. An AFLC civilian contractor team was employed to assist VNAF in repairing these aircraft and returning them to a serviceable condition. The contractor team presently consists of 50 technicians performing maintenance at the ALW depot.

b. Analysis of Progress: The civilian contractor team is in place at Bien Hoa AB and working on mission essential aircraft. An 8 man AFLC assessment team is surveying the crash/battle damaged aircraft and recommending repair or condemnation actions.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) Deficiencies: VNAF depot, plus the AFLC contractor team, is unable to keep abreast of the workload; consequently, the depot backlog of reparable aircraft continues to remain too high. The AFLC depot contractor team is going to be increased from 50 to 75 personnel during July-August time period.

(2) Critical Problems: There are no critical problems that should effect the operation.

(3) Lack of Resources: None

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Trends: The TET and spring offensive was responsible for the large influx of crash/battle damaged aircraft into the depot for repairs. However, VNAF is acquiring newer aircraft in the near future; consequently, they will be assigned additional operational missions which will, in turn, have an impact on the depot's workload. For the remainder of the year, the VNAF depot and the assisting contractor team should eliminate the present backlog.

(2) Need for Revision: Not applicable at this time.

d. Corrective Action: Assignment of the AFLC contractor team and assessment team, plus VNAF training and OJT efforts are firm and helpful actions.

e. Projection: Continued emphasis on depot training and OJT programs to provide qualified technicians to repair crash/battle damaged aircraft is being emphasized by the USAF Advisory Group. The depot manning is being reviewed and additional positions are being recommended to VNAF to provide a working force to become self-sufficient in aircraft repair.

2. (C) Element - Maintenance Data Collection for VNAF

Goal - Establish a maintenance data collection for selected VNAF aircraft and accessories. Maintenance data is urgently needed by VNAF and USAF advisors to plan and organize maintenance policies. Initial efforts are to establish a maintenance data collection program on the F-5 aircraft and the J-85-13 engine. This program has been implemented, however, improvement is needed in the accumulation, analysis and use of analytical data to be more effective. The C-119 aircraft has been included in the program on an annual reporting system rather than the monthly requirement of the K-75 system. Intentions are to include the A-37 aircraft in the program after it enters the VNAF inventory.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Statement of Objective: Establish a maintenance data collection program for selected VNAF possessed aircraft.

a. Review of Progress: The maintenance data collection program has been fully implemented on the F-5 aircraft and the J-85-13 engine. The C-119 aircraft has also been included in this program; however, the data will be reported annually instead of monthly as required by the K-75 system.

b. Analysis of Progress: The data collection system is working, but improvement is needed in the accumulation, analysis, and use of analytical data to be more effective.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: VNAF is in the maintenance data collection. With the introduction of modern aircraft, maintenance data will prove more valuable and effective for efficient aircraft maintenance.

d. Corrective Action: Added VNAF Hq command emphasis on maintenance data collection. Continued training and OJT on the system and its effect. Improve procedures tailored to VNAF needs.

e. Projection: Timely and accurate maintenance data collection, expansion to other aircraft, and better utilization of the products.

3. (C) Element - VNAF ALW Depot Maintenance

Goal - Improve depot maintenance capability to repair aircraft. Depot level repair of unserviceable assets has been unsatisfactory. Production control, quality control, and control of assets beyond depot level repair capability is essential to obtain VNAF self-sufficiency. Weaknesses exist in skill level, manning, equipment and production control. Consequently the depot is capable of mainly field level repairs. Programs underway to improve this situation are; physical facilities are being completed, with completion of a new engine building, comm/nav and instrument shop, AGE (Aerospace Ground Equipment) repair shop, and two new hangars for aero repair. Production control procedures have been implemented and are being closely monitored by the USAF advisors, component repair is being evaluated, and a VNAF NRTS review board is evaluating assets being returned to the CONUS as not being reparable within the depot.

Statement of Objective: Improve depot maintenance capability to repair aircraft components.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Review of Progress: Depot level repair of unserviceable assets has been unsatisfactory. Items beyond field level repair are being forwarded to AFLC in the CONUS for depot level repair.

b. Analysis of Progress: VNAF has established a reparable review board to review and analyze items being returned to the CONUS for depot level maintenance. The problem areas are lack of skilled technicians to perform depot level maintenance, plus assets being returned to the depot from the wing organizations in such a state of repair that repair is almost impossible. Both of the above problems are being closely supervised by the Air Force Advisory Group maintenance personnel.

c. Conclusions: Command emphasis must continue on training and OJT to update the technical skill level of VNAF technicians assigned to the ALW Wing. The depot manning document has been reviewed and recommendations made which will require more training and allow a greater area of selection of skilled personnel.

d. Corrective Action: Training, OJT and increase supervision.

e. Projection: Close surveillance will be maintained on reparable assets being generated at the ALW depot. If the workload becomes out of hand, appropriate measures will be taken by the AFGP-MDC staff to alleviate the problem.

4. (U) Element - Technical Publications

Goal - Improve technical order files and distribution in VNAF. VNAF Headquarters T.O. file was outdated, poor technical order distribution effected, and unqualified personnel assigned to VNAF organizations to maintain the T.O. files in accordance with current directives. USAF advisors assisted VNAF in screening the master file, updating indexes and disposing of outdated publications. VNAF Headquarters has assigned qualified personnel to the libraries and are accomplishing periodic inspections of the Wing's files. Definite improvement has been made, but continued progress must be made before acceptable standards are achieved. USAF advisors will continue to force command emphasis on this problem.

Statement of Objective: Improve VNAF technical publications and distribution system.

a. Review of Progress: During the TET and spring offensives, VNAF NCO's and airmen were assigned additional duties to protect Tan Son Nhut and its environs. Distribution of technical publications practically came to a standstill. AFGP-MDC assigned a USAF NCO to assist the VNAF technical order library update its distribution and files.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

b. Analysis of Progress: All USAF, Navy, and Army technical order/manual indexes screened, outdated/obsolete publications destroyed, and the backlog of publications distributed to the appropriate VNAF agencies. VNAF assisted in the effort and the Technical Publications Branch is back in business.

c. Conclusions: VNAF Hq technical library has to keep its records and distribution current. Close supervision must be exercised by the AF Advisor to insure indexes are maintained in accordance with T.O. 00-5-1 and 00-5-2.

d. Corrective Action: USAF Advisory and VNAF Hq command emphasis in technical order maintenance and distribution to improve VNAF Hq technical library distribution system.

e. Projection: VNAF is keeping pace indexing and distributing incoming publications. The VNAF NCOIC was hospitalized during the TET and spring offensive, causing a severe supervision problem. The NCOIC has returned to duty and the technical order library is improving.

5. (S) Element - VNAF Aircraft Modernization Program

Goal - Improve VNAF maintenance capabilities to support new aircraft. VNAF has received C-119G aircraft to update the transport structure. The F-5 was introduced into the VNAF inventory in June 1967. Two UH-1H helicopters were delivered in June 1968 with a scheduled delivery of helicopters to continue through 1972. A-37 aircraft will be introduced to VNAF in late 1968. VNAF maintenance practices and policies are being revised to keep pace with the modernization program. Air Force advisors are stressing quality maintenance, both field and depot, to support this program. These objectives are being attained through an in-country MTT and "Blue suit" augmentees.

Statement of Objective: Modernize VNAF Aircraft Structure

a. Review of Progress: A C-47 Wing was replaced with reconditioned C-119G aircraft. The F-5 was introduced to the VNAF inventory in June 1967. Two UH-1H helicopters were delivered to VNAF late in June 1968. UH-1H helicopters will continue to be delivered through 1972. The A-37 aircraft will be introduced late in 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: Maintenance on the F-5 aircraft and jet engine declined to such a state that the 23rd Wing at Bien Hoa had to be augmented with a contract team and USAF TDY personnel. Maintenance has improved and the USAF TDY personnel have

SECRET

SECRET

returned to their duty station and the contract team moved from the engine shop. A conscientious training program, plus Hq Command emphasis on quality maintenance accounted for the upswing. Each of the new aircraft being introduced to VNAF will have qualified Contract Engineering Technical Service Personnel (CETSP) for air-frame and engine accompanying the aircraft to assist VNAF in initial take over and maintenance problems.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Organizational and field level maintenance on each new type of aircraft has to be carefully analyzed to prevent a maintenance break-down, which results in a low OR rate. Depot facilities have to be keyed to keep pace with new maintenance problems and conditions. AF advisors should be ready to ask for AFLC assistance if VNAF cannot keep pace with maintenance requirements.

d. Corrective Action: Extensive OJT, careful surveillance by CETSP assigned to the VNAF Wing, and the ability of AFGP staff to respond to acquire qualified maintenance assistance.

e. Projection: Close coordination and cooperation will be required between VNAF maintenance personnel and USAF advisors. Problems must be recognized and corrective action taken as soon as possible.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

SECRET

PAGE 235 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Materiel, AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Air-Munition Supply Improvement

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To modernize and improve the VNAF airmunitions program to adequately support the increasing VNAF operational capability.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (U) Element - Airmunition Resupply.

Goal - Establish direct shipments of VNAF airmunitions from CONUS to Vung Tau to supply Binh Thuy AB. Starting in May, munitions have been ordered specifically for discharge at Vung Tau. In effect, a fourth port has been added to the in-country capability. Additionally, by having the cargo port-of-discharge identified, it may be removed or diverted at any-time. For example, if it is necessary to hold a ship in Subic Bay, PI, as it often is due to Port of Saigon congestion, the entire Binh Thuy cargo may be off-loaded at Subic Bay and shipped by LST directly to the shallow draft port of Can Tho.

Statement of Objective: To establish direct shipments of VNAF airmunitions from CONUS to Vung Tau to supply Binh Thuy AB.

a. Review of Progress: Starting in May, munitions have been ordered specifically for discharge at Vung Tau.

b. Analysis of Progress: This technique will be implemented with the receipt of munitions during the month of August.

c. Conclusions: In effect, a fourth port has been added to the in-country capability.

d. Corrective Action: Not applicable.

e. Projection: If it is necessary to hold a ship in Subic Bay, PI, as it often is due to port of Saigon congestion, the entire Binh Thuy cargo may be off-loaded at Subic Bay and shipped by LST directly to the shallow draft port of Can Tho.

2. (U) Element - Weapons Loading Standardisation and Evaluation Program.

Goal - Establish a weapons loading standardization and evaluation program. A program has been provided to VNAF. It has yet to be translated and published, although the Chief of the VNAF airmunitions division has shown interest in it. Past experience with the explosive safety manual has shown that the translation pool cannot handle technical subjects. The program at the present time is being coordinated through the VNAF DCS/Materiel and the VNAF training officer.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Statement of Objective: Establish VNAF a weapons loading standardisation and evaluation program.

- a. Review of Progress: A program has been provided to VNAF.
- b. Analysis of Progress: The program has yet to be translated and published, although the Chief of the VNAF Airmunitions Division has shown interest in it. The program at the present time is being coordinated through the VNAF Training Officer.
- c. Trends: Past experience with the explosive safety manual has shown that the translation pool cannot handle technical subjects. Translation will be made by the Chief, Airmunitions Division when the draft is coordinated.
- d. Corrective Action: To unblock the coordination and approval stalemate, the advisory effort is being raised to the DCS/Materiel level.
- e. Projection: Indications exist that the corrective action at DCS/Materiel level will provide the leverage necessary to get the program published. It is estimated that six weeks will be required to translate, print, and distribute the directive. Present training programs already include the concept and technical requirements of the Standardisation and Evaluation Program.

3. (U) Element - Safety Factors and Regulations.

Goal - A Vietnamese language equivalent of the USAF Explosive Safety Manual is published and has been distributed to the field. The publication is directive in nature and covers all the significant safety areas. Additionally, the VNAF staff has shown an interest in conditions existing at specific bases. Photographs made by the airmunitions advisor during a base visit have been requested by the VNAF staff as the basis for staff action to correct deficiencies. Action completed.

Statement of Objective: A Vietnamese equivalent of the USAF Explosive Safety Manual.

- a. Review of Progress: Action completed.
- b. Analysis of Progress: Not applicable.
- c. Conclusions: The publication is directive in nature and covers all significant safety areas.
- d. Corrective Action: Not applicable.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Projection: VNAF, prior to publication of this manual, had no established guide lines to support their explosive safety program and as a result, the housekeeping of their explosives areas was a continuous special subject of advisory effort. This manual will overcome this situation and support their explosive safety program.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

PAGE 238 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Materiel, AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Fuels Operations Improvement

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To modernize and improve the VNAF fuels operation to adequately support the increasing VNAF operational capability.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (U) Element - Fuel Quality Control.

Goal - Establish an acceptable quality control program at each operating Wing so that fuel serviced to aircraft will be of acceptable quality. Each VNAF Wing will nominate one highly qualified enlisted man to work with the local USAF fuels laboratory. This fuels operator will be trained in fuel sampling and testing procedures, and he will be instructed in all phases of fuel quality control. This individual will then be responsible for conducting the VNAF quality control program at his Wing.

Statement of Objective: Establish an acceptable quality control program at each operating Wing so that fuel serviced to aircraft will be of acceptable quality.

a. Review of Progress: 7AF has agreed to provide training to VNAF fuels personnel in fuel sampling and testing techniques. Each VNAF Wing will nominate one highly qualified man to work in the local USAF fuels laboratory. He will be instructed in all phases of fuel quality control and will then conduct the VNAF quality control program at his Wing.

b. Analysis of Progress: Hq VNAF is in the process of providing implementing instructions to each Wing. 7AF has already provided instructions to their fuels activities.

c. Conclusions: Approximately six months will be required to provide necessary training to the VNAF personnel. At that time, the personnel trained will be capable of conducting an adequate VNAF fuels quality control program.

d. Corrective Action: None required.

e. Projection: Initiation of a successful fuels quality control program.

2. (U) Element - Refueling Vehicle Standardization.

Goal - Revise refueling vehicle programming action so that eventually VNAF will have one type of fuel servicing vehicle. A programming

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 239 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

change has been initiated to cancel requirements for expensive, over-complicated R-5 type refueling units. At the same time, programming action was taken to obtain R-8 type fuel trucks commencing in FY-71. This is a new type multi-purpose truck which is being developed and will be available in FY71. This unit will be used to service Gr 115/145 AVGAS, JP-4, water-alcohol mix, MOGAS, and diesel fuel and will replace five different types of vehicles now in use. Spare parts stockage and vehicle maintenance should be greatly improved by this standardization.

Statement of Objective: Revise refueling vehicle programming action so that eventually VNAF will have one type of fuel servicing vehicle.

a. Review of Progress: A programming change has been initiated to cancel requirements for expensive, overly complicated R-5 type refueling units. At the same time, programming action was taken to obtain R-8 type fuel trucks for attrition of present vehicles.

b. Analysis of Progress: The R-8 is a new multi-purpose truck which is being developed and will be available in FY71. This unit will be capable of servicing 115/145 Avgas, JP-4, motor gasoline, diesel fuel, and water-alcohol mixture, and will replace five different types of vehicles now in use.

c. Conclusions: Upon completion of this standardization program, refueling vehicle maintenance should be much improved and spare parts stockage should be simplified.

d. Corrective Action: None required.

e. Projection: Attrition of present vehicles will be spread out over FY's 71-74. By the end of FY74, VNAF should have the single type fuel truck for all products.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Materiel, AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Improvement of VNAF Aircraft

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: Modify certain aircraft to enhance operating efficiency.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (C) Element - Comm/Nav Modernization of O-1A Aircraft.

Goal - Plans are to replace the obsolete VHF/AM, VHF/FM, UHF, and interphone. The modification to replace the VHF/AM radio has been approved and kits are being procured. The modification to replace the UHF/AM, VHF/FM and the interphone was submitted as a SEAOR and is expected to receive favorable consideration from CSAF. The VHF/AM modification will be held in abeyance and one modification effort made to update the O-1A aircraft. VNAF will perform this modification at wing level to expedite the modernization effort.

(C) Element - Interphone and TACAN for C-47D Aircraft.

Goal - Ten C-47D aircraft require AIC-10A interphone and TACAN installation. Both modifications have been approved; however, AIC-10A kits are being held at WRAMA due to technical difficulties. TACAN kits have been shipped from CONUS. Both modifications will be accomplished concurrently by VNAF or a contractor team to eliminate aircraft down time.

(C) Element - Psywar Speaker System for U-17A Aircraft.

Goal - Ten VNAF possessed U-17As will be equipped with a psywar speaker system. Kit delivery is expected in Nov 1968. In addition, six attrition U-17s will be delivered in Oct-Nov 1968, equipped with the psywar system.

(C) Element - TACAN for H-34 Helicopters.

Goal - A Class V modification is being processed to include TACAN in VNAF H-34 helicopters. CINCPACAF has assigned a priority 23 for service funding.

(C) Element - IFF/SIF System for A-1 Aircraft.

Goal - A Class V modification has been requested to retrofit the APX-6 IFF set to the IFF/SIF system - AN/APX-25. Program is awaiting FY69 funding.

PAGE 241 OF 265 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Element - Command and Control Console for UH-1 Helicopter

Goal - Two UH-1H helicopters will be equipped with Command and Control consoles for airmobile operations. Consoles are expected to be shipped from CONUS in October 1968.

Statement of Objective: Modify certain VNAF aircraft to enhance operating efficiency.

a. Review of Progress: Modification requests have been submitted on the C-47, O-1A, U-17A, H-34, A-1, and UH-1 aircraft to update and/or retrofit certain communications/navigational systems.

b. Analysis of Progress: Two modifications were requested for the O-1A aircraft; one to replace the AN type ARC-12 VHF/FM set. This has been approved and kits are being shipped to VNAF. The other modification is to replace the UHF, VHF/FM and the interphone sets. This request is being studied at an AFLC facility for feasibility and cost. Two modifications have been approved for ten (10) C-47s. TACAN kits have been shipped and will be held until the interphone kits are received. Interphone kits are expected to be supplied in Aug or Sep 1968. One modification has been approved for ten (10) U-17A aircraft. This modification will provide psywar capability to the aircraft. Kits should be available late in 1968. A modification to install TACAN in the H-34 helicopters is being processed through channels. CINCPACAF has approved the modification. One modification has been requested to install and/or retrofit the A-1 aircraft with IFF/SIF capability. This program is awaiting FY69 funding at CSAF. One modification has been approved to install command and control consoles in two UH-1H helicopters. The consoles are expected to be shipped in Oct 1968.

c. Conclusions: VNAF possesses a variety of aircraft with communications/navigational systems being of different types in one model of aircraft. The above modifications will start a standardization/modernization program which will provide more reliable communications and navigational aids. Maintenance will benefit as the number of comm/nav systems will decrease as the fleet is standardized. For example, there are five different UHF radio sets installed throughout the VNAF fleet, causing extensive maintenance and support problems. One UHF set should be installed, standardizing the entire fleet.

d. Corrective Action: Class V modifications have been submitted to standardize and modernize the VNAF. New aircraft being delivered and or programmed for VNAF are being equipped with equipment common to the modernization plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Projection: Continue to monitor the modernization effort and recommend comm/nav systems consistent with VNAF requirements and ability to maintain.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 243 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Materiel, AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Supply Support Improvement

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: To modernize and improve the VNAF supply system to adequately support the increasing VNAF operational capability.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (U) Element - VNAF Depot Inventory Accuracy.

Goal - Establish an acceptable level of inventory accuracy at the VNAF Bien Hoa Depot, to include all related actions necessary to assure an effective supply account. An AFLC RIPE (Redistribution of Idle Program Equipment). Team was deployed to the VNAF Air Logistics Wing from 15 April to 25 May 1968. The team identified, packed for shipment, redistributed to activities within the VNAF, or returned to CONUS depots, 5177 units of equipment, valued at \$1,960,141.28. A Rapid Area Supply Support (RASS) Team, composed of 21 military personnel, arrived at Bien Hoa 16 July 1968 for 120 days TDY. This team will assist the VNAF in completion of a wall-to-wall inventory, rewarehousing, and corrosion control. A third team will be deployed on completion of the work of the RASS team. This third team will perform the same function for excess spares as the RIPE team did for equipment excesses. At that time, the depot should be in a better position to provide effective supply support to VNAF.

Statement of Objective: Establish an acceptable level of inventory accuracy at the VNAF Bien Hoa depot, to include all related actions necessary to assure an effective supply account.

a. Review of Progress: An AFLC RIPE Team was deployed to the VNAF Air Logistics Wing from 15 April to 25 May 1968. The team identified, packed for shipment, redistributed to activities within the VNAF, or returned to CONUS depots, 5177 units of equipment, valued at \$1,960,141.28. A Rapid Area Supply Support (RASS) Team, composed of 21 military personnel, arrived at Bien Hoa 16 July 1968 for 120 days TDY. This team will assist the VNAF in completion of a wall-to-wall inventory, rewarehousing, and corrosion control. A third team will be deployed on completion of the work of the second team. This third team will perform the same function for excess spares as the RIPE team did for equipment excesses.

b. Analysis of Progress: The RIPE team made a substantial contribution toward the goal of improving the VNAF depot status. Disposition of the equipment excesses created urgently needed warehouse and open storage space. The in-place RASS team should further improve the depot status by conducting the long overdue wall-to-wall inventory, and consequently correcting stock record cards.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Conclusions: By the end of 1968, the VNAF supply depot should be in reasonably good condition, and the VNAF should be capable of maintaining this condition.

d. Corrective Action: None required.

e. Projection: Improved VNAF supply support should result from the work in progress.

2. (U) Element - Support of UH-1H Aircraft.

Goal - Provide sufficient spares and equipment to support the UH-1 aircraft. Spares and equipment to support this aircraft have been received in sufficient quantities to insure required support of the first increment. It was necessary to establish an urgent project to move base support spares and equipment to Binh Thuy AB as a result of the decision to operate these aircraft and provide training at that location in lieu of Tan Son Nhut. AFLC has concurred in establishment of Air Force Shipping Directives (AFSD's) for automatic shipment of spares and equipment for the balance of the aircraft of the first squadron, scheduled to arrive in early 1969.

Statement of Objective: Provide sufficient spares and equipment to support the UH-1H aircraft.

a. Review of Progress: Spares and equipment to support this type aircraft have been received in sufficient quantities to insure required support of the first increment. It was necessary to establish an urgent project to move base support spares and equipment to Binh Thuy AB as a result of the decision to operate these aircraft and provide training at that location in lieu of Tan Son Nhut. The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) has concurred in establishment of Air Force Shipping Directives (AFSD's) for automatic shipment of spares and equipment for the balance of the aircraft of the first squadron, scheduled to arrive in early 1969.

b. Analysis of Progress: Unless unforeseen difficulties arise, there should be no problem in providing adequate spares and equipment for the first VNAF UH-1H squadron.

c. Conclusions: Initial spares and equipment for the first UH-1H increment are already in place. Based on the success of this endeavor, there should be few problems in initial support.

d. Corrective Action: None required.

e. Projection: Successful initial support.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 245 OF 265 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER : Director of Materiel, AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE : Vehicle Management and Maintenance Improvement.

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE : To develop a dynamic vehicle management and maintenance capability that will be self-sustaining.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS :

1. Element - Assignment to VNAF of full operations and maintenance responsibility of all VNAF operated vehicles.

Goal - To obtain approval from JGS to assign full responsibility to VNAF for vehicle operation and maintenance of all VNAF vehicles.

Statement of Objective : Assignment to VNAF of full operations and maintenance responsibility of all VNAF vehicles.

a. Review of Progress : The JGS has taken one step in this direction. i. e., assigning full responsibility to VNAF for all commercial-type vehicles.

b. Analysis of Progress :

(1) A manpower study was just completed and was based on VNAF having full management and maintenance responsibility for all vehicles. There can be no valid manpower authorization established when the amount of control, maintenance, records, and salvage actions vary with each vehicle. Because there is no single command line, no single manual for management and maintenance procedures can be established. AFGP-MTR provided VNAF with a suitably modified version of AFM 66-12, but only some parts of the manual could be adopted because of the JGS-imposed split in responsibility.

(2) Since the manpower study revealed a total increase of 234 slots was required, it is possible that a change in manpower ceiling of VNAF may be required. Some vehicle maintenance mechanics will have to be transferred from the ARVN to the VNAF because VNAF is very short of total mechanics, but very critically short of 5, 7, and 9 level men. They could not maintain the full fleet without many fully qualified mechanics being transferred. One of the main reasons that all vehicle responsibility should be assigned to VNAF is because ARVN support companies and civil engineering units are providing very little support. AFGP has asked the AFATs to update the problem areas of ARVN support. When all of the reports are received, reviewed and consolidated, they will be forwarded to MACV for resolution.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Trends: ARVN ordnance and civil engineering support of VNAF vehicles varies from very little to none. This is a continuing problem throughout RVN. The Chief, Transportation Division, Hq VNAF, plans to request JGS to assign 3rd echelon responsibilities for all general purpose vehicles to VNAF within the next two months and probably request total responsibility by Jan 1969.

d. Corrective Action: Not only must there be an increase in manpower authorizations, but an actual transfer of many trained mechanics from ARVN to VNAF. Of equal importance will be the transfer of spare parts from ARVN and establishment of supply sources and stock levels for VNAF.

e. Projection: The earliest possible date that these changes could be hoped for would be Jul 1969, but more realistically, they are apt to occur about Jan 1970.

2. Element - Information for Management.

Goal - To provide timely and useful information to commanders and vehicle managers through improved reports so that they can take appropriate corrective action.

Statement of Objective: To provide timely and useful information to commanders and vehicle managers through improved reports so they can take appropriate corrective action.

a. Review of Progress: All past VDM and VDP reports were of no value. The guidelines established could not produce useful information and even they were not followed consistently by all bases.

b. Analysis of Progress: As in Element 1, the split in maintenance responsibility between VNAF, ARVN Ordnance, and ARVN Civil Engineering makes meaningful reporting virtually impossible. The VNAF is neither convinced that VDM/VDP reports are necessary to evaluate performance nor that they have the capability to compile this information daily. AFGP has requested AFAT assistance in order to develop a workable reporting system.

c. Trends: The AF Chief of Transportation Division is working closely with the VNAF Chief of Transportation to develop a system of useful reports.

d. Corrective Action: None developed at this time.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Projection: As estimated implementation date for revised reporting procedures is anticipated by Sep 1968.

3. Element - Improve Vehicle Support Facilities

Goal - To construct new facilities and repair or modify old facilities in order that proper service and repair can be provided to the vehicle fleet. Since MCP and MRMC funds are so very limited, many of these projects will have to be accomplished by self-help.

Statement of Objective: To construct new facilities and repair or modify old facilities in order that proper service can be provided to the vehicle fleet.

a. Review of Progress: Only one MCP project has been approved and funded for FY69, the new vehicle repair shop for the Air Logistics Wing. Self-help projects are continuously underway at each base.

b. Analysis of Progress: As long as MCP and MRMC funds remain so very short, limited self-help projects are virtually the only ones that can be expected to be accomplished.

c. Trends: Due to the demands for VNAF aircraft modernization, there is a lower priority for improved vehicle facilities.

d. Corrective Action: A constant review of Forms 1391 will be made in an attempt to improve facilities.

e. Projection: None at this time.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Operations, Air Force Advisory Group

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: VNAF ALO/FAC Program in Support of ARVN

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: (C) To assist the VNAF in establishing a capability to man and operate the Tactical Air Control System in RVN.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

(C) Element - VNAF Tactical Air Control System self-sufficiency.

Goals:

a. VNAF assume all ALO/FAC responsibilities to ARVN in the 7th ARVN Division in IV Corps by 31 Aug 68.

b. VNAF to eventually assume all ALO/FAC responsibilities to ARVN throughout South Vietnam.

(C) Statement of Objectives: To man the VNAF air request net in support of ARVN with qualified VNAF ALO personnel.

a. Review of Progress: Training of ALOs ahead of schedule and training of enlisted men on schedule as outlined in VNAF ALO/FAC Plan 67-02.

b. Analysis of Progress: The program is proceeding at an acceptable rate; however, deficiencies have been encountered in deployed site support of the ALO/FACs, i.e., inadequate housing, little or no messing facilities, inadequate or no transportation and no POL or ordnance support.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The deficiencies stated in b, above, must be eliminated or reduced in scope if the VNAF Tactical Air Control System is to become self-sufficient in sole support of ARVN.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) A site by site survey was conducted by each Air Force Advisory Team in all four CTZs to determine the logistical support required to make the VNAF ALO/FAC system self-sufficient.

(2) On 24 Jun 68 a training and evaluation of VNAF ALO/FAC by USAF was started in the 7th ARVN Division in IV Corps. This evaluation should determine VNAF capabilities to be self-sufficient in support of ARVN in the 7th Division.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

3. (C) Statement of Objective: Convert one CH-34 helicopter squadron to UH-1Hs.

a. Review of Progress: Two UH-1Hs were received in Jun 68, and initial qualification of aircrew members begun. Four VNAF instructor pilots are available for the qualification program.

b. Analysis of Progress: The program is on schedule, with all phases of training progressing normally.

c. Conclusions and/or trends: Conversion of the 211th Squadron should remain on schedule. The projected completion date of May 69 should be met.

d. Corrective Action: No corrective action required.

e. Projection: No significant problems are anticipated. Outlook favorable.

4. (U) Statement of Objective: Establish an Airlift Control Center (ALCC) for VNAF.

a. Review of Progress: ALCC plan submitted to VNAF and subsequently approved.

b. Analysis of Progress: Program on schedule.

c. Conclusions and/or trends: This program will provide centralized command and control over VNAF airlift resources.

d. Corrective Action: N/A.

e. Projection: The VNAF ALCC should be operating on a limited basis by mid Aug 68. Due to extensive communications requirements it is not possible at this time to determine the exact date for unrestricted operation.

5. (C) Statement of Objective: To develop an Airmobile capability for VNAF.

a. Review of Progress: The first two of four phases of training were completed 1 Jul 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: The program is running close to schedule although some delay has been encountered in acquiring passive defense systems and door gunners. Aircraft availability has also been deficient.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The program should be on schedule by mid Aug 68 and be completed on schedule, 31 Dec 68.

d. Corrective Action: Adequate passive defense equipment, i.e., seat armor and individual body armor has been requisitioned. Some items have been received. Additional door gunners have been trained and are available for duty. Aircraft availability has also improved since the arrival of a civilian contract maintenance team.

e. Projection: No significant problems are anticipated. The outlook for increased capability and participation is favorable.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

Sub-Program Manager: Director of Communications and Electronics

Sub-Program Title: Professionalize VNAF Communications & Electronics
Organization and Expand its Facilities

Sub-Program Elements and Goals:

1. (C) Element - Management Improvement Program in the VNAF Communications & Electronics Organization.

Statement of Objective: To realize improved management techniques, emphasizing the need for accurate, up-to-date information as a tool of good management. As a minimum, improvement must be made in the system used for submission of the following data from subordinate units:

(1) Personnel manning levels, authorizations and requirements.

(2) Required and actual skill levels to indicate training which is necessary. This data will allow correlation between training that is needed and that which is available.

(3) Timely reports of outage on communications circuits and of down-time on ACW radar and on flight facilities.

(4) Maintenance and supply problems.

In addition, vigorous and timely follow-up action must be taken by the Communications & Electronics Staff upon receipt of the data from subordinate units. New facilities and additional requirements should be discouraged until standardization, reliability and efficiency are achieved in the present organization.

a. Review of Progress: In the area of equipment accountability there has been little progress made except in non-tactical radios. The management of personnel and maintenance has improved at a steady rate with VNAF taking a closer look at skills required to fulfill operational requirements in conjunction with more timely reporting on circuit outages and equipment down-time.

b. Analysis of Progress: VNAF has not taken a firm stand on up-dating their PCSP document to reflect equipment location and accountability. The recent system incorporated to reflect accountability and condition of non-tactical radios is highly professional. The review of the 1968 VNAF UMD against the proposed 1969 VNAF UMD correlates the improvement to align personnel against mission requirements. The VNAF has requested training for personnel during FY 69 which reflects their desire to improve maintenance proficiency of their personnel. Circuit outage and equipment down-time is being reported, for the most part, on a timely and accurate basis, with interested agencies taking action as required.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The management of personnel and maintenance has been accepted by the VNAF as valid requirements to improve their overall capabilities, and they have initiated some controls and procedures to obtain these objectives. Equipment accountability by the use of the FCSP document continues to be an area that requires more VNAF attention.

d. Corrective Action: VNAF must be persuaded to accomplish a complete physical inventory of equipment and facilities at all levels and must continue to up-date the FCSP once it has been reaccomplished. The momentum that has been created in their management of personnel and maintenance must be maintained and increased as proficiency increases.

e. Projection: The realization, by the VNAF, that professionalism can not be obtained until all valid management tools are employed, will bring about the up-dating and maintaining of the FCSP. More effort by all concerned must be expanded, to bring about this realization. With the cooperation of the 1964 Comm Gp, 504th Tactical Air Support Group and 505th Tactical Control Group, the VNAF will make significant progress in training and upgrading its C&E personnel. The complete professionalization of the VNAF will be a long process and this Group will maintain a positive, **aggressive** approach to assist the VNAF to obtain these goals.

2. (C) Element - Establish a Secure On-Line Encryption Teletype System.

Statement of Objective: Provide on-line secure teletype communications between comm centers. On-line equipment is to be installed at the Da Nang comm center, the last to receive the required equipment. It was inspected and approved for on-line equipment in Nov 67. The required power supply PP-748/U for the installation of SSM-33 equipment has been obtained for this secure circuit. MACV J-6 has been asked to assist VNAF with the installation of the SSM-33 equipment at Da Nang.

a. Review of Progress: The necessary equipment has been obtained for the installation of the SSM-33 at Da Nang, the last station to be secured.

b. Analysis of Progress: Installation of the on-line equipment at Da Nang will give VNAF a secure teletype system.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: VNAF has almost completed the transition to an on-line teletype system and its personnel are becoming more proficient in the operation and maintenance of this equipment.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The Da Nang Communications Center will be secured within 6 months.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) Element - Modernize the VNAF Telephone System.

Statement of Objective: Provide VNAF with a modern and efficient communications system to exercise command and control of its resources. The Dial Central Office (DCO) at Hq VNAF has been completed with the exception of eight (8) trunk circuits. The additional trunk equipment is programmed for installation in Oct 68. This DCO has the capability of a maximum of four hundred (400) lines. It will be operated and maintained solely by VNAF personnel. The new DCOs at Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Pleiku have been completed and are operational. The remaining DCO at Binh Thuy will be completed and operational during the month of July 1968. All USAF DCOs will be joint operated and maintained. The VNAF Command Operational Control System (VCOCS) is programmed to receive new switchboards to modernize the system. Switchboards with the capacity of fifty (50) lines are programmed for installation at Nha Trang, Pleiku, Da Nang, Binh Thuy, and Bien Hoa with a twenty (20) line switchboard at Dalat. Installation of this equipment will represent completion of the modernization program.

a. Review of Progress: Installations of new USAF Dial Central Offices (DCOs) have been accomplished at Da Nang, Nha Trang and VNAF Hq at Tan Son Nhut AB. VNAF administrative telephones have been reterminated to the DCOs at Da Nang and Nha Trang and VNAF personnel integrated into the operation and maintenance of these DCOs.

b. Analysis of Progress: Installation of these new DCOs has improved the VNAF telephone system. Integration of VNAF personnel into these USAF DCOs has enabled the VNAF personnel to receive valuable training and thus aided the eventual goal of self-sufficiency. The VNAF Hq DCO installed in late June has a limited capability. This DCO is not yet operational, but plans are progressing to make it operational as soon as possible.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Integration of VNAF personnel into the operation and maintenance of these DCOs has been successful and will reduce the problems when USAF personnel leave Vietnam. The DCOs installed have greatly modernized the VNAF telephone system and should prove very adequate for some time to come.

d. Corrective Action: The VNAF Hq DCO at Tan Son Nhut will achieve its full trunking capability around Oct 68 when more equipment is received.

e. Projection: Installation of a new DCO at Binh Thuy is scheduled for completion in July 68. Fifty (50) line tactical switchboards are programmed for Nha Trang, Pleiku, Da Nang, Binh Thuy and Bien Hoa. A twenty (20) line tactical switchboard is programmed for Dalat. The operation and maintenance of the VNAF Hq DCO will be assumed by VNAF personnel.

4. (C) Element - Establish a Command and Control System.

Statement of Objective: Provide rapid and reliable voice communications between command posts and between command elements and command posts. Radio/telephone interfacing must be provided at and between command posts and between command elements and command posts. The radio/telephone interface with VNAF Command Operational Control System (VCOCS) has been approved by CINCPACAF; approved, published and sent to action agencies by CINCPAC. Estimated completion date is FY 2/69.

a. Review of Progress: Equipment to provide VNAF Command Posts with interfacing and patching capability from telephones and non-tactical radios on the Commanders Net to Air/Ground radio equipment has been programmed and partially funded.

b. Analysis of Progress: The plan to provide this capability, Addendum "A" to Engineering Requirements Plan VN-67-E is awaiting approval by CINCPAC.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: This system will enable VNAF Commanders to maintain contact with and control over their airborne aircraft anywhere in RVN.

d. Corrective Action: Original estimates and approved funding did not cover the total required cost of the system. Additional funds have been requested.

e. Projection: This system is scheduled for installation in FY 2/69.

5. (C) Element - Modernization of Control Towers.

Statement of Objective: Complete the modernization of existing VNAF control towers. The control towers at Nha Trang, Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and Binh Thuy have been equipped with the new FAA control consoles. Pac GEEDA has completed a technical survey for installation of this console at Fleiku. This installation is to be completed under Project "Facer Pick" (USAF) and funds are to be programmed through MAP to effect an in-country transfer of the FAA console to VNAF.

a. Review of Progress: The Fleiku tower is the only VNAF tower that has not been modernized, but it has been scheduled to receive the FAA console. In addition there will be equipment relocation and rehab of wiring and antennas at Fleiku.

b. Analysis of Progress: VNAF personnel are receiving training on the new FAA consoles and will be qualified to assume all maintenance responsibilities upon withdrawal of USAF forces. Spare parts to support new control consoles have been integrated into the VNAF supply system. Upon the completion of the Fleiku tower VNAF will have facilities on a par with USAF control facilities.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: The VNAF has accepted the fact that flying safety can be better achieved by the proper utilization of equipment and personnel. The VNAF will obtain self-sufficiency in control tower maintenance much quicker than any other area.

d. Corrective Action: To insure that VNAF is afforded the latest state of the art in equipment, aggressive action must be taken by this Group to insure that equipment which is easier to support is made available to the VNAF control towers.

e. Projected: With the new consoles and the installation of newer radio equipment the VNAF Control Tower Modernization can be considered achieved, but a firm date is not apropos at this time. The continued training and utilization of C&E personnel is of the utmost importance, in addition to the securing of more modern radio equipment. Continued monitoring and coordination with VNAF will be maintained on the control tower modernization will be done by this Group.

6. (C) Element - In-country Transfer of TACAN Facilities.

Statement of Objective: Complete the in-country transfer of TACAN facilities. At present, VNAF owns and maintains the TACAN facility at Ban Me Thuot. TACANs scheduled and funded for in-country transfer are located at Binh Thuy, Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Pleiku and Tan Son Nhut. In-country transfer of these facilities will be accomplished when VNAF maintenance personnel have demonstrated the ability to properly maintain the equipment. Proficiency and on-the-job-training and the USAF Career Development Course (CDC) is being translated into Vietnamese for VNAF maintenance personnel.

a. Review of Progress: The TACAN at Ban Me Thuot continues to be the only VNAF owned and maintained facility. Continued problems have been experienced at this location on the reliability of this facility. A contingency TACAN is still on location to satisfy operational requirements due to inability of the VNAF to maintain their units. Considerable difficulties have been experienced by the VNAF in providing logistical support for air conditioners and AGE. Coordination has been affected with GEEIA to perform on-site DLM on VNAF TACANs. Estimated completion date of DLM is 31 July 68, but it is anticipated slippage will occur due to lack of parts.

b. Analysis of Progress: In-country transfer must await the availability of trained personnel and a adequate supply system. With the emphasis VNAF is beginning to place on training and proper utilization of personnel, it appears that training will not hinder in-country transfer. The major and most pronounced hindrance will be in the VNAF providing adequate and timely logistical support, not only for electronic parts but air conditioning and AGE.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Funds for in-country transfer are available, but the transfer should not be accomplished until VNAF has proven the ability to satisfy all requirements related to the Ban Me Thuot TACAN. Once objectives are satisfied at this location normal transfer can be phased in at the other locations.

d. Corrective Action: To insure that VNAF continues it's progress achieved in personnel management, close monitoring of TACAN maintenance personnel will be continued. More stress will be placed on the logistical support requirements in order that orderly progression can be achieved in the two management areas.

e. Projection: Once the DLM at Ban Me Thuot facility has been completed a close working relationship between VNAF/AFGP on this facility will enhance the realization of our objective. With the proper personnel and logistical support available it is envisioned that in-country transfer can progress at a rapid rate.

7. (C) Element - Installation and in-country transfer of AN/GRP-11 Direction Finding Equipment.

Statement of Objective: Complete installation of DF equipment and plans for incountry transfer. VNAF currently owns and operates the UHF/DF facilities (AN/CRD-6) at the Ban Me Thuot and Tan Son Nhut ACW sites. The AN/GRD-11 DF equipment is installed (non-operational) at Bien Hoa and Pleiku. An AN/GRD-11 is programmed for the Da Nang Control Tower. However, all three (3) AN/GRD-11 facilities are in Held-in-Abeyance status (HIA) pending resolution of a frequency instability problem by AFLC. These facilities will be in-country transferred to VNAF when completed.

a. - e. There has been no change in this objective since last report.

8. (C) Element - Up-Grade ACW Radar Sites.

Statement of Objective: Up-grade Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku ACW sites and complete installation of equipment at Binh Thuy ACW site. Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku ACW sites are scheduled for more modern Height Radars (AN/FPS-90) to go with the previously installed AN/MPS-11 radars under Project "Facer Dog". They were to have been installed by June 68. Due to GEEIA workload and equipment shortage the dates have slipped. The present estimated completion dates are Nov 68 for Pleiku and Dec 68 for Ban Me Thuot. Binh Thuy ACW site was completed in May 68 and began operation on 1 Jun 68. The equipment is scheduled to be transferred to VNAF in the very near future.

a. Review of Progress: Installation of the new ACW site at Binh Thuy was completed in May 68 and become operational 1 June 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: The new search radars (AN/MPS-11s) installed and the new height radars scheduled to be installed at Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot under Project Pacer Dog are more dependable, give better tracking and longer ranges. They are also easier to maintain and parts are more readily available.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: This modernization program will give VNAF a more sophisticated radar system with an increased capability to handle modern jet aircraft.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: This modernization should be complete by FY 2/69.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Operations, Air Force Advisory Group

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: VNAF Modernization Program

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: Increase the combat effectiveness of the Vietnamese Air Force through modernization of VNAF aircraft, facilities and operations.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

(C) Element - Modernization of VNAF Aircraft and Facilities.

Goals:

- a. Convert one A-1 Squadron to F-5 aircraft. (Progress) completed. One 18 UE F-5 squadron operationally ready (OR).
- b. Convert one C-47 squadron to C-119G aircraft (Progress) completed. One C-119G squadron OR.
- c. Convert 3 A-1 squadrons to A-37 aircraft. (Progress) proceeding on schedule. All squadrons scheduled to be OR by 15 Aug 69.
- d. Convert one C-47 squadron to AC-47 aircraft. (Progress) three aircraft converted, remaining conversion assets delayed until 4/69.
- e. Convert one H-34 squadron to UH-1H helicopters. (Progress) two UH-1H helicopters were delivered to VNAF in Jun 68. Six additional helicopters will be delivered in late Jul, and one in Aug 68. The remaining (11) will be delivered Feb thru May 69. A UH-1H initial qualification program for pilots and non-rated crew members is being conducted.
- f. Establish a VNAF Airlift Control Center (ALCC). (Progress) Airlift Control Plan has been approved by VNAF and a work request submitted for construction of facilities to house the Control Center. An operational requirement is being submitted by VNAF for a complete communication system to provide contact with all agencies involved in the airlift system.
- g. Develop VNAF Airmobile Capability. (Progress) VNAF Helicopter Mission Statement was redefined on 1 Apr 68, to reflect airmobile operations as first priority. The 21st Helicopter Squadron was deployed from Tan Son Nhut to Binh Thuy to provide two squadrons for support of IV CTZ airmobile operations. An Airmobile Training Plan developed by the 164th Combat Aviation Group (USARV) was implemented during May 68, and training under actual combat conditions has been in progress since. Scheduled completion date for 164th CAG training program is 31 Dec 68 at which time VNAF will be capable of sustaining their own training.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1. (C) Statement of Objective: Convert 3 A-1 squadrons to A-37 aircraft.

a. Review of Progress: VNAF Pilots are receiving CONUS A-37 training. Maintenance personnel are attending MTT at the Air Training Center in Nha Trang. Aircraft delivery schedules have been provided and AGE, spare parts, POL, and related equipment programmed. Necessary construction programs are funded and in progress.

b. Analysis of Progress: The A-37 conversion plan is being developed under the PERT programming concept and is progressing on schedule.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Barring unforeseen changes in aircraft/equipment delivery or construction set backs due to enemy activity, program will proceed as scheduled.

d. Corrective Action: N/A.

e. Projection: Three VNAF squadrons should be operationally ready by the following dates:

(1) 524th Tac Ftr Sq - 15 Feb 69.

(2) 520th Tac Ftr Sq - 15 May 69.

(3) 516th Tac Ftr Sq - 15 Aug 69.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: Convert one C-47 squadron (16 aircraft) to AC-47 aircraft.

a. Review of Progress: Three aircraft converted.

b. Analysis of Progress: Program slippage has been experienced. Additional 13 modification kits scheduled to arrive 4/69.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Program behind schedule due to non-availability of modification kits.

d. Corrective Action: Follow-up action on kit availability established a due in date of 4/69.

e. Projections: The VNAF has many C-47 qualified aircrews, therefore the introduction of the AC-47 should present no major problems. Aircrew training presently in progress with 3 aircraft.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Training Division, AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Expand and Improve VNAF Training

SUB-PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: Develop and use training resources to provide the required numbers of personnel with the skills necessary to support the approved VNAF force structure.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND GOALS:

1. (U) Element - Maintain VNAF CONUS training program at lowest practical level.

Goal - Increase in-country training capability so that CONUS training requirement may be reduced. Develop VNAF training capability to support new weapons systems.

Statement of Objective: Maintain VNAF CONUS training at lowest practical level.

Review of Progress: As VNAF modernization continues, CONUS training spaces in critical technical areas are being increased. Basic skill CONUS training requirements are being reduced, as in-country training capability improves. In-country capability in CY 68 has been improved by development of C-119, A-37, and UH-1 instructor cadres in conjunction with MTT's. The training equipment from each of these MTT's also forms a valuable VNAF training asset.

2. (U) Element - Improve the quality of instruction at the Air Training Center, Nha Trang.

Goal - Evaluate and update curriculum of all schools at ATC by Jan 69. Establish instructor training course and in service training for instructors by Jan 69.

Statement of Objective: Improve the quality of instruction at the Air Training Center, Nha Trang.

Review of Progress: In Feb 68, AFAT-4 published the first complete survey of ATC facilities, personnel, and capabilities. The survey was instigated and assisted by AFGP-TTC (now PTH), and is to be updated at least semi-annually as a basic document for scheduling and improvement actions. On 1 Jun 68, AFGP-PTH completed a detailed study of ATC and VNAF formal training procedures, problems, and recommended improvements. AFGP-CCH furnished the study and recommendations to Commander VNAF. Subsequently, Commander VNAF acted to keep the A-37 MTT at ATC, instead of moving it. On 30 Jun 68, AFGP-PTH completed a study of problems and

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 261 OF 265 PAGES

SECRET

recommended improvements at the VNAF English Language School at ATC. AFGP-CCH approved the study, and forwarded to Commander VNAF. This is a continuing priority goal.

3. (S) Element - Provide VNAF skills for new weapons systems.

Goal - Train VNAF flying and maintenance personnel for the A-37 and UH-1H aircraft.

Statement of Objective: Provide VNAF skills for new weapons systems.

Review of Progress: As new weapons systems are brought into the inventory, training is programmed to insure effective utilization of the systems. Off-shore training, field training detachments (MTT plus MTS), and contract engineering technical services personnel (CETSP) are used to provide initial training. Follow-on training will be done by VNAF ATC, and by OJT. Initial C-119 training was completed in Mar 68, and the C-119 has entered the inventory. A combined VNAF/USAF A-37 MTT arrived 29 May 68, and started training support personnel on 17 Jun 68 at ATC. A CETSP UH-1 MTT is training at Binh Thuy, and first VNAF UH-1's are in-country. Three AC-47's already are flying. CONUS pilot training for A-37's is in progress, and CONUS UH-1 pilot training is scheduled in FY 69 to supplement the existing USARV UH-1 transition program.

4. (U) Element - Increase the number of technicians (7-level) and superintendents (9-level) in the Vietnamese Air Force.

Goal - Encourage VNAF to program additional 7-level courses at the ATC. Expand the use of OJT for upgrade to the 7- and 9-levels.

Statement of Objectives: Increase the number of technicians (7-level) and superintendents (9-level) in the Vietnamese Air Force.

Review of Progress: A plan has been forwarded to JGS by VNAF to recruit high education level personnel. These people will be given intensive career field training and noncommissioned officer training. After training and on-the-job experience, they will be given a technician skill level and NCO status. This process is to take 14 months. Also, USAF Advisory Group is encouraging the upgrading of qualified personnel presently at the 5 and 7 skill levels. This upgrade program is slowly gaining momentum with impetus from training advisors. This is a continuing goal.

5. (U) Element - Decrease the number of unskilled (1-level) airmen.

Goal - Program additional VNAF apprentice (3-level) courses. Encourage VNAF to establish an OJT upgrade program to the three level for selected AFSCs.

UNCLASSIFIED

Statement of Objective: Decrease the number of unskilled (1-level) airmen.

Review of Progress: Additional VNAF apprentice (3-level) courses have been programmed for CY 68. However, the apparent 1-level backlog of over 3000 remains stable. This is partly due to recruitment. Part is caused by training slow-downs during the 1968 communist offensives. Some is caused by poor classification and reporting systems. There is continuous AFGP advisory pressure on VNAF to improve both training and reporting procedures. This ties directly to the ATC improvement goal.

6. (U) Element - Provide training for an improved VNAF ALO/FAC program.

Goal - VNAF established an ALO/FAC course at the ATC in Jun 68. It is VNAF's intention that all VNAF pilots eventually will attend.

Statement of Objective: Provide training for an improved VNAF ALO/FAC program.

Review of Progress: VNAF established an ALO/FAC course at the ATC in Jun 68. It is VNAF's intention that all VNAF pilots eventually will attend.

7. (U) Element - Increase the number of personnel in the training career field (AFSC 75XXX).

Goal - Develop a formal training course to insure well-qualified personnel are working in the training field. Also develop training administrators.

Statement of Objective: Increase the number of personnel in the training career field (AFSC 75XXX).

Review of Progress: Many of the individuals working as training officers do not have training AFSC's. Advisory effort is underway to convert these people to training. In line with this, the Vietnamese Air Force is developing a formal training course to insure well qualified people in this career field. The VNAF temporarily dropped planning for this course, but latest word from AFAT-4 indicates they again are thinking of it, with emphasis on development of training administrators.

8. (U) Element - Standardize and improve the VNAF OJT system.

Goal - Develop and implement uniform training standards and proficiency tests. Train OJT administrators and trainers. Improve record-keeping and reporting procedures.

Statement of Objective: Standardize and improve the VNAF OJT system.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Review of Progress: In Apr 68, AFGP-TDC (now PTR) published the AFGP VNAF Training Guide, including the first known compilation of data on the working of the VNAF OJT system. In Jun 68, AFGP-PTR completed a detailed study of the system, with specific recommendations. These recommendations form the basis for detailed discussion and planning with VNAF counterparts which will take place in Jul 68, and which we expect to lead to actual improvements, including standards, testing, recording, and reporting.

9. (U) Element - Improve the quality of students departing for CONUS undergraduate pilot training programs.

Goal - Assist VNAF develop aptitude screening procedures for both pilots and airmen.

Statement of Objective: Improve the quality of students departing for CONUS undergraduate pilot training programs.

Review of Progress: VNAF's intent to provide pre-solo flying indoctrination prior to CONUS pilot training became impractical because of heavy liaison aircraft attrition and lack of replacement aircraft. AFGP is engaged in a program to help VNAF develop aptitude screening procedures for both pilots and airmen. AFGP-PTR is investigating all possible CONUS sources of expertise in developing these procedures.

10. (U) Element - Improve VNAF classification procedures.

Goal - Assist VNAF to develop a primary, duty, and control AFSC system, to allow pinpointing of training requirements and actual utilization versus skills.

Statement of Objective: Improve VNAF classification procedures.

Review of Progress: This goal has developed from one of improving classification publications. In addition to a slow and long-term project of helping VNAF improve its publications along USAF lines, AFGP-PLC is applying advisory pressure to transfer VNAF classification from DCS/T to DCS/P. This would allow improved reporting and control procedures.

Provisions for use of a duty AFSC are contained in VNAF Regulations 36-1 and 36-2. However, reporting forms are inadequate. AF Advisory Group Training continues to advise VNAF of correct use of Primary, Secondary, and Duty AFSC's. First noted use of duty AFSC's occurred in Jan 68, as A-1 fighter pilots went into liaison and ALO/FAC system, retaining fighter AFSC as primary, and being reported as liaison pilots for duty. Continuing goal.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

11. (U) Element - Improve the quality of instruction at the VNAF English Language School, Nha Trang.

Goal - Secure assignment of a full-time English language instructor supervisor from Defense Language Institute, Lackland AFB. Insure that all graduates achieve a minimum English language comprehension level of 40.

Statement of Objective: Improve the quality of instruction of the VNAF English Language School, Nha Trang.

Review of Progress: In the past, students have gone to CONUS on waiver with less than ECL 40. MACV has advised that ECL 40 will become mandatory early in FY 69, and recommended that AFGP establish ECL 40 by 1 Jul 68. AFGP-PTR has advised DCS/T VNAF, and a CCH letter to Commander VNAF also indicated that we would go to ECL 40. This ties directly to the goal of ATC improvement, as pertains to the VNAF English Language School. A mandatory ECL 40 will give the school added incentive to improve its product. (Initial enforcement will result in cancellation or delay of some CONUS training quotas). AFGP-PTR also has programmed a Defense Language Institute civilian expert advisor for the VNAF English Language School. He was scheduled to arrive in April, was delayed, will arrive about 15 Aug 68.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTIVE: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 265 OF 265 PAGES